HLS201: Introduction to Homeland Security
Lesson 3: Homeland Security: The Concept, the Organization
Overview
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Overview
This lesson will outline in great detail the actual events of September 11, 2001 as reported by the 9/11 Commission. This account will provide a chilling reminder of that fateful day that truly changed the course of our nation’s history. You will view a video from the perspective of the emergency first responders at “ground zero” in New York City. The lesson will also explain the actions taken by the United States and its leaders in reaction to the attacks. You will read Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge's personal recollection of the call to duty from President George W. Bush. You will also hear from one of the governor’s senior staff describe his account of the events of 9/11 and the days that followed that led to the creation of the White House Office of Homeland Security, and at the conclusion of the lesson you will have a better understanding of the chaos of that September day followed by a period of tremendous cooperation, pride, and the resolve of our nation to move forward.
In the immediate aftermath of September 11th. . .
. . .the nation was frightened and attempting to cope with the events that were witnessed. Over 3,000 of our fellow citizens have been killed in three separate and horrific events. President Bush, Congress, and many of other leaders joined with our nation’s spiritual leaders at an event held at the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C. Days after the attack, President Bush visited ground zero and vowed that our nation would never forget the attacks and would recover. 
Defense measures were initiated to protect the nation from another attack and nine days after the attack, President Bush issued an executive order announcing the formation of the White House Office of Homeland Security and creating the Homeland Security Council. That council would be responsible for developing and implementing a comprehensive national strategy to make our nation secure from another terrorist attack.
Defense measures were initiated to protect the nation from another attack and nine days after the attack, President Bush issued an executive order announcing the formation of the White House Office of Homeland Security and creating the Homeland Security Council. That council would be responsible for developing and implementing a comprehensive national strategy to make our nation secure from another terrorist attack.Several weeks later. . .
. . .President Bush issued the first of many Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) which were specifically designed to “record and communicate presidential decisions about the homeland security policies of the United States” (HSPD-1, 2001). HSPD-1 dealt with the creation and operation of the Homeland Security Council. The objective of HSPD-1 was to ensure coordination of all homeland security-related activities among the various federal government executive departments and agencies to develop and implement all homeland security policies.
During future lessons, we will learn more about the other HSPDs that have been issued by Presidents Bush and Obama in the past decade since 9/11.
The flurry of homeland security legislation that was enacted after September 11 created a considerable debate concerning the appropriate role of federal and state governments in the discipline of homeland security. No greater example of that debate was the passage of a congressional bill: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, which would be commonly referred to as the Patriot Act. This legislation was and still is very controversial. We will spend time discussing this and other pieces of legislation that significantly increased the investigative and surveillance powers of law enforcement agencies.
The events of September 11, 2001, which you will hear and read about through the recollections of those involved, set into motion dramatic changes in the American political, legal, bureaucratic, economic, psychological, philosophical, and virtually all other facets of the American way of life.
Lesson Objectives
At the end of this lesson, students will be able to do the following:
- Better understanding of the events of September 11 and the initial actions taken by the United States in response to the attacks.
- Discuss the ramifications of congressional action and comprehend the policy decisions, directives, and executive orders stemming from various federal statutes that were enacted.
Lesson Readings & Activities
By the end of this lesson, make sure you have completed the readings and activities found in the Course Schedule.
Reference
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1. (October 29, 2001). Retrieved on April 23, 2012.
The Events of September 11th
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The Events of September 11th
These series of videos depict a chilling account of the horrific events at “ground zero” in New York City and the events on Flight 93 on September 11, 2001. These videos set the stage for the ever-evolving discipline which became to be known as “homeland security.” Please watch the following videos and feel free to explore the many other videos, photos, and interactive media found at history.com.
Video 3.1. 9/11 Ground Zero Timeline
Video 3.1. Ground Zero Timeline transcript
NARRATOR: September 11, 2001. A day of grief. A day of courage. This is how that day unfolded.
GEORGE TAMARO: My daughter called me. She said a plane just flew into the World Trade Center. Nah, you got to be kidding. It's got to be a pipe. [? A ?] cumbersome clown was flying down the river.
NARRATOR: At 8:46 AM American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston with 92 aboard. September 11, 2001. A day of grief. A day of courage. This is how that day unfolded.
GEORGE TAMARO: My daughter called me. She said a plane just flew into the World Trade Center. No, you got to be kidding. It's got to be a [? pipe. A ?] cumbersome clown was flying down the river.
NARRATOR: At 8:46 AM American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston with 92 aboard, traveling at a speed of 470 miles per hour, strikes the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex. Within minutes, officials coordinate the citywide emergency response. Their base of operations is a state of the art command center located on the 23rd floor of 7 World Trade Center.
With one tower in flames, the tragedy is only beginning. It is 9:03 when United Airlines Flight 175 with 65 aboard, traveling at the speed of 590 miles per hour, smashes into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. This aircraft strikes the corner of the South Tower. It rips a diagonally shaped gash from the 84th to the 78th floors. The South Tower lasts only 56 minutes before it succumbs at 9:59 AM. The dust cloud billows outward for blocks. Victims stagger away. At 10:28, the television mast atop the North Tower spears straight down.
W. GENE CORLEY: Once the collapse started, there really wasn't any way to stop it. It was just going to go all the way down once it got started.
NARRATOR: Chaos in New York City. Power is down in Lower Manhattan. Phone lines jammed with more than 230 million calls. Hundreds of firefighters trapped in the towers. Hundreds more raced to the scene.
Falling debris from the collapse of the North and South towers ignites fires in the neighboring buildings of the World Trade Center. World Trade 4, 5, and 6 are ablaze. World Trade 7, the building housing the city's command center, burns unchecked for seven hours. At 5:20, it collapses. The city's emergency nerve center is destroyed.
RICHARD J. SHEIRER: Somewhere in that time-- and it's very hard to keep track of time during this-- they had been ordered to evacuate Number 7 by the Port Authority. To this day, we don't know who gave that order, but whoever it was saved a lot of people's lives.
NARRATOR: With New York a war zone, some residents walk across the Brooklyn Bridge to get out of the city. Others seek escape in vessels piloted by the Army Corps of Engineers. At 7:45 PM, the New York Police Department says 78 officers are missing and estimates that 200 firefighters are dead. At 10:56 PM, police officials say they believe there are victims alive in the rubble of the World Trade Center.
RICHARD BIGGS: Working with urban search and rescue teams, there was a lot of areas to be searched underneath the debris field. There were voids that had to be searched for possible live people.
NARRATOR: September 11, 2001, the longest and most tragic day in New York's history is drawing to a close.
GEORGE TAMARO: My daughter called me. She said a plane just flew into the World Trade Center. Nah, you got to be kidding. It's got to be a pipe. [? A ?] cumbersome clown was flying down the river.
NARRATOR: At 8:46 AM American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston with 92 aboard. September 11, 2001. A day of grief. A day of courage. This is how that day unfolded.
GEORGE TAMARO: My daughter called me. She said a plane just flew into the World Trade Center. No, you got to be kidding. It's got to be a [? pipe. A ?] cumbersome clown was flying down the river.
NARRATOR: At 8:46 AM American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston with 92 aboard, traveling at a speed of 470 miles per hour, strikes the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex. Within minutes, officials coordinate the citywide emergency response. Their base of operations is a state of the art command center located on the 23rd floor of 7 World Trade Center.
With one tower in flames, the tragedy is only beginning. It is 9:03 when United Airlines Flight 175 with 65 aboard, traveling at the speed of 590 miles per hour, smashes into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. This aircraft strikes the corner of the South Tower. It rips a diagonally shaped gash from the 84th to the 78th floors. The South Tower lasts only 56 minutes before it succumbs at 9:59 AM. The dust cloud billows outward for blocks. Victims stagger away. At 10:28, the television mast atop the North Tower spears straight down.
W. GENE CORLEY: Once the collapse started, there really wasn't any way to stop it. It was just going to go all the way down once it got started.
NARRATOR: Chaos in New York City. Power is down in Lower Manhattan. Phone lines jammed with more than 230 million calls. Hundreds of firefighters trapped in the towers. Hundreds more raced to the scene.
Falling debris from the collapse of the North and South towers ignites fires in the neighboring buildings of the World Trade Center. World Trade 4, 5, and 6 are ablaze. World Trade 7, the building housing the city's command center, burns unchecked for seven hours. At 5:20, it collapses. The city's emergency nerve center is destroyed.
RICHARD J. SHEIRER: Somewhere in that time-- and it's very hard to keep track of time during this-- they had been ordered to evacuate Number 7 by the Port Authority. To this day, we don't know who gave that order, but whoever it was saved a lot of people's lives.
NARRATOR: With New York a war zone, some residents walk across the Brooklyn Bridge to get out of the city. Others seek escape in vessels piloted by the Army Corps of Engineers. At 7:45 PM, the New York Police Department says 78 officers are missing and estimates that 200 firefighters are dead. At 10:56 PM, police officials say they believe there are victims alive in the rubble of the World Trade Center.
RICHARD BIGGS: Working with urban search and rescue teams, there was a lot of areas to be searched underneath the debris field. There were voids that had to be searched for possible live people.
NARRATOR: September 11, 2001, the longest and most tragic day in New York's history is drawing to a close.
Video 3.2. 9/11 Ground Zero Rescue and Survival
Video 3.2. Ground Zero Rescue and Survival transcript
NARRATOR: 9:03 AM, 17 minutes after the attack on the World Trade Center began, a second plane crashed into the South Tower. Fire Chief Richard Picciatto arrived just after the second plane hit. He was told people need assistance on the 25th floor of the North Tower. By now, hundreds of firefighters and other rescue workers were rushing up the stairs in an attempt to save those who were trapped.
RICHARD PICCIATTO: All of a sudden, this noise starts, this horrendous noise. It's coming from above us. It's really loud. It's powerful. Sounds like something's crashing through the floors above us. It just froze us we all just froze our steps looking up wondering what is this.
NARRATOR: The collapse of the South Tower wasn't visible to people inside the stairwells of the North Tower. Fire Chief Richard Picciotto was on the 35th floor when the lights failed. Up above, police helicopters could see what was happening to the surviving tower. They quickly passed this information down to their colleagues on the ground.
DISPATCH: The remaining tower, the North Tower is leaning to the southwest at this time. It appears to be buckling in the southwest corner.
JIM DWYER: That message got communicated down to the police officers. A number of them were inside the building. Some of them were on the street. And people were getting told to pull back, pull back, pull back.
NARRATOR: Fire Chief Richard Picciato was one of the few firefighters who did hear the order to get out.
RICHARD PICCIATO: We're getting out. And I went to all three stairwells-- just three stairwells in the building-- yelled up and down for people to get out. Floor by floor, I was doing a quick sweep to try to make sure no one was left behind.
NARRATOR: It was 10:26. The North Tower was moments from collapse.
RICHARD PICCIATO: I got down to approximately the sixth floor of the building was shaken more lights went out. Didn't know what was happening. I knew the building was collapsing. It took eight seconds for the North Tower to collapse. I tell people there's a lot of things you could think about in eight seconds. It's not really a lot you could do.
NARRATOR: As the floors pancaked onwards, Fire Chief Picciato's group began falling inside the collapsing tower.
RICHARD PICCIATO: The building was shaking. We were getting tossed around. And then the stairs went out from under me. And I started tumbling and falling. I'm laying in total darkness, total silence. And at first, I thought I was dead. But I had the sense that there were other people there. So I called out, is anyone else here? And I started to get a few responses. Yeah, I'm here. I'm here too.
NARRATOR: Miraculously, the 12 firemen and the disabled woman they'd been carrying lay battered but alive in the remains of the stairway. They had survived the collapse of 107 floors but were now encased in debris in what they feared would become their tomb. From under the ruins, Fire Chief Picciatto continued to try to make contact with the outside world.
RICHARD PICCIATO: I think it was approximately an hour and a half I was calling until someone answered me back. And I told him we're in the B stairway, the North Tower of the B stairway, approximate the third floor. That's where I originally was, about the third floor. And his first response back was, where's the North Tower?
NARRATOR: The devastation was such that rescue workers couldn't even tell where the tower had been. It was another three hours before Richard Picciotto got out.
RICHARD PICCIATO: There was this crevice leading up through all this debris. So I climbed up and followed the light. And all of a sudden, I was on top of this-- I was out on the rubble field, I was on this huge pile. I was at the top of it. All I could see was just devastation and buildings on fire, like what you would picture in the remnants of the nuclear war.
RICHARD PICCIATTO: All of a sudden, this noise starts, this horrendous noise. It's coming from above us. It's really loud. It's powerful. Sounds like something's crashing through the floors above us. It just froze us we all just froze our steps looking up wondering what is this.
NARRATOR: The collapse of the South Tower wasn't visible to people inside the stairwells of the North Tower. Fire Chief Richard Picciotto was on the 35th floor when the lights failed. Up above, police helicopters could see what was happening to the surviving tower. They quickly passed this information down to their colleagues on the ground.
DISPATCH: The remaining tower, the North Tower is leaning to the southwest at this time. It appears to be buckling in the southwest corner.
JIM DWYER: That message got communicated down to the police officers. A number of them were inside the building. Some of them were on the street. And people were getting told to pull back, pull back, pull back.
NARRATOR: Fire Chief Richard Picciato was one of the few firefighters who did hear the order to get out.
RICHARD PICCIATO: We're getting out. And I went to all three stairwells-- just three stairwells in the building-- yelled up and down for people to get out. Floor by floor, I was doing a quick sweep to try to make sure no one was left behind.
NARRATOR: It was 10:26. The North Tower was moments from collapse.
RICHARD PICCIATO: I got down to approximately the sixth floor of the building was shaken more lights went out. Didn't know what was happening. I knew the building was collapsing. It took eight seconds for the North Tower to collapse. I tell people there's a lot of things you could think about in eight seconds. It's not really a lot you could do.
NARRATOR: As the floors pancaked onwards, Fire Chief Picciato's group began falling inside the collapsing tower.
RICHARD PICCIATO: The building was shaking. We were getting tossed around. And then the stairs went out from under me. And I started tumbling and falling. I'm laying in total darkness, total silence. And at first, I thought I was dead. But I had the sense that there were other people there. So I called out, is anyone else here? And I started to get a few responses. Yeah, I'm here. I'm here too.
NARRATOR: Miraculously, the 12 firemen and the disabled woman they'd been carrying lay battered but alive in the remains of the stairway. They had survived the collapse of 107 floors but were now encased in debris in what they feared would become their tomb. From under the ruins, Fire Chief Picciatto continued to try to make contact with the outside world.
RICHARD PICCIATO: I think it was approximately an hour and a half I was calling until someone answered me back. And I told him we're in the B stairway, the North Tower of the B stairway, approximate the third floor. That's where I originally was, about the third floor. And his first response back was, where's the North Tower?
NARRATOR: The devastation was such that rescue workers couldn't even tell where the tower had been. It was another three hours before Richard Picciotto got out.
RICHARD PICCIATO: There was this crevice leading up through all this debris. So I climbed up and followed the light. And all of a sudden, I was on top of this-- I was out on the rubble field, I was on this huge pile. I was at the top of it. All I could see was just devastation and buildings on fire, like what you would picture in the remnants of the nuclear war.
Video 3.3. 9/11 Flight 93 The Todd Beamer Story: "Let's Roll"
Video 3.3. The Todd Beamer Story transcript
SPEAKER 1: One report said-- and we can't confirm any of this-- that a plane may have hit one of the two towers of the World Trade Center.
[SIRENS]
SPEAKER 2: Oh my god.
SPEAKER 3: That looks like a second plane.
[SHOUTING]
SPEAKER 4: Our belief at the moment is that an aircraft has crashed into the Pentagon.
SPEAKER 5: By 9:34 AM, it had become clear to air controllers that yet another plane had been hijacked. Then word started reaching the press.
JON MEYER: Across the scanner in our newsroom was said that there was a flight that was missing. There had been a flight that they thought was heading towards Pittsburgh or Johnstown, which is where I was. And they couldn't get in touch with it.
SPEAKER 5: They were talking about flight 93. It had changed direction, and was apparently now over Pennsylvania. All indications were that the plane was heading towards the nation's capital. But the hijackers had been careful to turn off the transponder, cutting all communication with air traffic control. From a plane near Cleveland, a call came into the GTE phone center. It was particularly alarming.
LISA JEFFERSON: When I took over the call, there was a gentleman on the line-- very soft spoken, calm.
SPEAKER 5: The soft spoken gentleman was Todd Beamer, a passenger on United 93.
LISA JEFFERSON: I asked him to explain to me in detail what is happening on the plane. He told me there were three people that was taking over the flight.
JON MEYER: They tied red bandannas around their head, got up, and that that was when they forced their way into the cabin.
SPEAKER 5: But when the hijackers stormed the cockpit, nobody on flight 93 was primed to stop them.
JON MEYER: Prior to September 11, the way flight attendants were trained on a plane was to listen to the hijackers, to stay calm, and to comply with what their demands were.
SPEAKER 5: Unreleased recordings indicate a struggle in the cockpit.
JOHN NANCE: Well, in the cockpit, I think that what happened is the pilots had been subdued. I think their necks had been slashed. And they're strapped down.
They've got no way of defending themselves. You can't turn around and fight. They're just sitting ducks.
SPEAKER 5: But it only got worse. From the hijackers, there was a horrifying announcement.
JON MEYER: The hijackers on the intercom saying, there's a bomb on board. We have control of this plane. We're going back to the airport.
SPEAKER 5: On the air phone, Todd Beamer had informed operator Lisa Jefferson about the hijackers' tactics.
LISA JEFFERSON: He told me that they've taken control of the plane. The plane is going down. At this point, he raised his voice. He said, we're going down. We're going down.
No, we're coming back up. Wait, we're turning around. We're going back north. I think we're going north. At this point, I don't know where we're going.
SPEAKER 5: In fact they had turned around, and were now going east. At 9:35, it appeared that the hijackers were headed for Washington D.C. But this was no ordinary hijacking. The attack on the World Trade Center would soon become known to the passengers on flight 93, who called relatives.
JON MEYER: And that's when they knew that this plane wasn't just being flown back to an airport. Once those people on board that plane knew it, there was-- they knew there was no going back. This was the new reality of what we face now. They were the first ones they realized they needed to do something.
SPEAKER 5: In the air above Pennsylvania, a plot was brewing.
LISA JEFFERSON: Todd told me that him and a few other guys were thinking about jumping the guy with the bomb. He felt that he had to do-- to try to save the plane, or at least try to get the plane to land safely. And I told him that he had every hope, and I had hope for him that they could land the plane safely.
He turned from me to speak to someone else. And he said, are you ready? I couldn't hear their response. He said, OK. Let's roll. That's the last I heard from Todd Beamer.
The line was still open, but it was very silent. I didn't hear anything else. I kept that phone line open for about 15 additional minutes.
And while our operation center was tracking the call, we heard that the plane had crashed in Pittsburgh. And I knew that was his flight. I felt that I had just lost a good friend.
SPEAKER 5: A 35 foot deep pit in Pennsylvania became the grave of everybody on flight 93.
JON MEYER: People were drawn to flight 93 because they felt those people on board were the first warriors in the battle against terrorism. And that's a theme you see in this temporary memorial over and over again in the messages people leave. Thank you for fighting back.
Thank you for starting this fight against terrorists. I think people have thought that through and thought, would I do that? These people did something special.
[MUSIC PLAYING]
[SIRENS]
SPEAKER 2: Oh my god.
SPEAKER 3: That looks like a second plane.
[SHOUTING]
SPEAKER 4: Our belief at the moment is that an aircraft has crashed into the Pentagon.
SPEAKER 5: By 9:34 AM, it had become clear to air controllers that yet another plane had been hijacked. Then word started reaching the press.
JON MEYER: Across the scanner in our newsroom was said that there was a flight that was missing. There had been a flight that they thought was heading towards Pittsburgh or Johnstown, which is where I was. And they couldn't get in touch with it.
SPEAKER 5: They were talking about flight 93. It had changed direction, and was apparently now over Pennsylvania. All indications were that the plane was heading towards the nation's capital. But the hijackers had been careful to turn off the transponder, cutting all communication with air traffic control. From a plane near Cleveland, a call came into the GTE phone center. It was particularly alarming.
LISA JEFFERSON: When I took over the call, there was a gentleman on the line-- very soft spoken, calm.
SPEAKER 5: The soft spoken gentleman was Todd Beamer, a passenger on United 93.
LISA JEFFERSON: I asked him to explain to me in detail what is happening on the plane. He told me there were three people that was taking over the flight.
JON MEYER: They tied red bandannas around their head, got up, and that that was when they forced their way into the cabin.
SPEAKER 5: But when the hijackers stormed the cockpit, nobody on flight 93 was primed to stop them.
JON MEYER: Prior to September 11, the way flight attendants were trained on a plane was to listen to the hijackers, to stay calm, and to comply with what their demands were.
SPEAKER 5: Unreleased recordings indicate a struggle in the cockpit.
JOHN NANCE: Well, in the cockpit, I think that what happened is the pilots had been subdued. I think their necks had been slashed. And they're strapped down.
They've got no way of defending themselves. You can't turn around and fight. They're just sitting ducks.
SPEAKER 5: But it only got worse. From the hijackers, there was a horrifying announcement.
JON MEYER: The hijackers on the intercom saying, there's a bomb on board. We have control of this plane. We're going back to the airport.
SPEAKER 5: On the air phone, Todd Beamer had informed operator Lisa Jefferson about the hijackers' tactics.
LISA JEFFERSON: He told me that they've taken control of the plane. The plane is going down. At this point, he raised his voice. He said, we're going down. We're going down.
No, we're coming back up. Wait, we're turning around. We're going back north. I think we're going north. At this point, I don't know where we're going.
SPEAKER 5: In fact they had turned around, and were now going east. At 9:35, it appeared that the hijackers were headed for Washington D.C. But this was no ordinary hijacking. The attack on the World Trade Center would soon become known to the passengers on flight 93, who called relatives.
JON MEYER: And that's when they knew that this plane wasn't just being flown back to an airport. Once those people on board that plane knew it, there was-- they knew there was no going back. This was the new reality of what we face now. They were the first ones they realized they needed to do something.
SPEAKER 5: In the air above Pennsylvania, a plot was brewing.
LISA JEFFERSON: Todd told me that him and a few other guys were thinking about jumping the guy with the bomb. He felt that he had to do-- to try to save the plane, or at least try to get the plane to land safely. And I told him that he had every hope, and I had hope for him that they could land the plane safely.
He turned from me to speak to someone else. And he said, are you ready? I couldn't hear their response. He said, OK. Let's roll. That's the last I heard from Todd Beamer.
The line was still open, but it was very silent. I didn't hear anything else. I kept that phone line open for about 15 additional minutes.
And while our operation center was tracking the call, we heard that the plane had crashed in Pittsburgh. And I knew that was his flight. I felt that I had just lost a good friend.
SPEAKER 5: A 35 foot deep pit in Pennsylvania became the grave of everybody on flight 93.
JON MEYER: People were drawn to flight 93 because they felt those people on board were the first warriors in the battle against terrorism. And that's a theme you see in this temporary memorial over and over again in the messages people leave. Thank you for fighting back.
Thank you for starting this fight against terrorists. I think people have thought that through and thought, would I do that? These people did something special.
[MUSIC PLAYING]
Tom Ridge's Appointment
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Tom Ridge's Appointment
Tom Ridge became the nation’s first assistant to the president for Homeland Security shortly after the 9/11 attacks and later the first Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Previously, he was twice elected governor of Pennsylvania after serving as a congressman from Erie, Pennsylvania. Governor Ridge was known for his capable handling of several emergency management events in Pennsylvania and with his years of service in Congress, he had the requisite experience and background to fulfill the duties inherent in the homeland security positions. He tirelessly worked to make the nation safer and his calm demeanor positively influenced the country in the days and weeks after the 9/11 attacks.
The following video features an interview between Tom Arminio, faculty instructor for the Penn State Homeland Security program, and Duncan Campbell, formerly the chief of staff for Secretary Tom Ridge at the Department of Homeland Security. In the clip below, Duncan Campbell discusses his experiences on September 11, 2001 and Governor Ridge's appointment to director of Homeland Security.
Video 3.4. Perspectives Interview: Establishing the Department of Homeland Security with Duncan Campbell
Video 3.4, Length: 00:49:08 Perspectives Interview Transcript
[MUSIC PLAYING] TOM ARMINIO: Hello and welcome to Perspectives. I'm Tom Arminio, faculty instructor at Penn State Harrisburg and with the World Campus. With us today is Duncan Campbell. Duncan is currently the Managing Director of Operations at Ridge Global, but formerly the Chief of Staff for Secretary Tom Ridge at the Department of Homeland Security. So welcome, Duncan. Thank you for your time. And thank you for joining us.
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Thank you, Tom. My pleasure.
TOM ARMINIO: I want to sort of take maybe a historical journey with you, since you were with Secretary Ridge from the early days in the Office of Homeland Security before it was a federal department. So where were you on 9/11? What were you doing?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: I was serving as Executive Director of the Republican Governors Association. So I had left Tom Ridge as Governor of Pennsylvania about six months earlier, moved to Washington, DC, and was serving as his executive director. He was the chair of the RGA.
On 9/11, I was actually down in Richmond. I was at the Richmond airport getting ready to pick up Mark Holman, who was the governor's former Chief of Staff. And I was in the private sector. He and I were working on the RGA together and had seen that the first tower had been hit. And then just as I was picking him up at the airport, the second tower had been hit.
We were actually going to a meeting with Virginia Governor, Jim Gilmore. And as we got to the meeting, his executive detail was scrambling and preparing to get back to northern Virginia-- or get to northern Virginia, as the Pentagon had just been hit. So it was obviously a very, very confusing upsetting day. And we went in. We started to do the meeting. And about an hour into it-- it was before smartphones and Blackberries and there were no TVs. And there was just a gentleman on the phone who said, about an hour into it, the first tower had come down.
And we canceled the meeting and went back to where we were living in northern Virginia, went to try to actually give blood at the hospital down the street from where I live right now. And the system was entirely overwhelmed. And obviously, there was no understanding or expectation for what was going on. So that's my introduction to 9/11.
TOM ARMINIO: Why do you think President Bush asked Governor Ridge to be the first Director of the Office of Homeland Security?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Sure. Well, I know that Tom Ridge is the Governor of Pennsylvania, a major state filled with critical infrastructure and filled with-- a very populous state, the site of the fourth plane going down, flight 93. And he had firsthand experience, having been right to the site that day, that fateful day on 9/11, as the unofficial author of the Stafford Act, when he was a member of Congress, as tornadoes swept through his northwestern congressional district. And he was not pleased with the response that had been received by FEMA, that he received as a member of Congress in the area, and his constituents had received from the Federal Emergency Management Agency at the time.
And his loyalty to George Bush-- he was the chairman of the Bush campaign in Pennsylvania about a year earlier. He was a friend. He was a former governor, a colleague of President Bush. And I know President Bush and the Bush administration was very serious about loyalty. They didn't want individuals that were coming into the administration with their own agenda. So it was the president's agenda. They were free to offer their opinions, obviously. But I think there was a strong placement of loyalty on top of just the credentials.
And finally, as a former veteran-- he was a veteran of Vietnam-- Governor Ridge brought a perspective from the defense side as well. So you had-- it was a very strange time, those nine days in between the attacks of 9/11 and the announcement of Tom Ridge as the first Homeland Security advisor to the president. I was down in Washington, as I mentioned, but I know the days leading into that day-- when he was announced in front of the world, as I think we all recall, happened to be my 30th birthday, September 20, 2001. And I was not expecting to go in to the Office of Homeland Security at first.
And then my experience with the Republican Governors Association, as well as having been Deputy Chief of Staff in Pennsylvania, brought a perspective of state and local intergovernmental outreach that was invited in to be part of that initial stand up of the department-- or excuse me, of the Office of Homeland Security. Tom Ridge was sworn in on October 8 of 2001, just almost four weeks to the date of the attacks. And he became the first Homeland Security advisor assisting the President for Homeland Security.
TOM ARMINIO: So what were those early days like? I mean, you're working for the president now and the administration. Again, for clarification, this is before the Homeland Security Act. So what was it like standing up, getting things organized for that new office?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: It was the most difficult, most wonderful experience of my life, just personally. But professionally, every day was a new day. We thought we were going to be hit again. You went to the White House, which was this-- some would argue was the expected target for one of the flights. And you are building a staff. You're building a policy that--
Governor Ridge was given the assignment to coordinate the federal government amongst about six areas to deter an act of terrorism, to prevent, to protect against, to prepare for, to respond, and to recover to terrorist activity for the federal government. So how do you coordinate all those aspects of the federal government on behalf of the president? And if you think of those six areas, every federal agency has some role to play, whether it's protecting or critical infrastructure that each of the agencies has responsibility over. So Tom Ridge was given the authority by the president to bring that entire strategy together. And that was one of the other items that he was granted or was given the responsibility for, was to create a national strategy for Homeland Security.
And so from day one on October 8, 2001, when he went in with a staff of five-- I was fortunate to be one of those five-- we started to develop what that strategy was going to be. But ultimately, it ended up-- the authority that he was given through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1, which came out a couple weeks later, was to be able to develop policy coordinating councils to receive detailed employees from the federal agencies, to how do you create or how do you understand the multitude of agencies that have a role in Homeland Security. Well, to be given staff, loaned, but to help develop what that strategy should be. And that's where you had a policy side and you had an external side of the office. And my role was intergovernmental affairs to work with state and local governments.
TOM ARMINIO: Yeah, I want to ensure that our students understand that, as an office within the White House, at the time, Governor Ridge was not a cabinet secretary, so he didn't have a budget. And in DC, in the capital, budget authority equates to power. So there were some significant challenges there. Not only did he not have budget authority-- he wasn't a cabinet secretary yet-- but he also had to, as you say, was responsible for preventing, deterring, responding, recovering from another terrorist attack. So how do you sort of navigate those waters? The interagency process is complicated enough. And it was complicated enough on September 10th, 2001. How did it change on September 11th?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Well, you had a nation of patriots that were committed to doing the right thing. As hard as that is in an interagency process, you had everyone giving whatever they were asked to do on September 11th through until-- well, from that time on, for the foreseeable future, what were they being asked to do? What resources were they being asked to give? What policy coordination were they asked to provide? But what changed was you had one individual on behalf of the president coordinating the federal government for all policy, whether it was border and transportation security, or intel and warning, science and technology.
If you think about all the facets that go into Homeland Security, like I said, the critical infrastructure protection. You have water systems. You have chemicals systems. You have the response and recovery policies that are required. Every piece of Homeland Security was being coordinated now from a very small office.
But everything was on the table to be reviewed and to be established for the strategy going forward. What roles would be played? Or what policies would be suggested? And ultimately, it came to the development of the Department of Homeland Security, which was a proposal that President Bush provided in June of 2002, about a month before the National Strategy came forward in July.
And so you had a commitment from the federal agencies. Now not everyone agreed with everything. And it wasn't just Tom Ridge was giving authority to make decisions on behalf. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1, which I mentioned, established a Homeland Security Council of federal agencies. The heads of those agencies were part of the council that the Governor Ridge chaired. They also established policy coordinating councils, PCCs. And each of the-- that were to be run or chaired by the staff of the Office of Homeland Security.
So you had in-- the structure of the OHS, or Office of Homeland Security, was that you had three major policy leads. You had protection and prevention-- or prevention and protection, excuse me-- director headed by Bruce Lawlor. He was senior director for prevention protection. You had Rich Falkenrath. He served as the senior director for policy and planning. And then you had Mike Byrne, who headed up the-- was senior director for response and recovery. So the three of those gentlemen had a huge portfolio of issues that they were leading policy coordinating councils to help drive to decision making that would then ultimately be led into the strategy and to the department.
TOM ARMINIO: You mentioned the national strategy for Homeland Security a couple of times. Tell us about that process. What considerations, what priorities, went into it? And how it supported the National Security Strategy. We have so many strategies now-- the Cyber Security Strategy, National Infrastructure Strategy. So how do they all support and complement the National Security Strategy?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Sure. The national strategy for Homeland Security was one of the four primary responsibilities granted to Tom Ridge when he became assistant to the President for Homeland Security. So Executive Order 13228 that established the Office of Homeland Security established this responsibility. And as I previously mentioned, to be able to coordinate the federal government within those six areas, from deterrence to prevention, protection, preparedness, response, and recovery.
The national strategy had three major objectives. Primarily, the national strategy was intended to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring again. Or how do we prevent terrorist attacks from occurring? How do you minimize the damage that comes from a terrorist attack? And then how do you identify your vulnerabilities? So the three areas around-- we talk about critical infrastructure protection, so that's where our vulnerabilities lie. How do you put a full nation filled with-- with the private sector owning most of this critical infrastructure, how do you put that to work to make sure that you're managing that risk?
And then within those-- from those objectives, there are primary areas, such as border transportation security, intelligence and warning, counter-terrorism, emergency preparedness and response. There are major areas of the national strategy that were defined going forward. And as you match that up against the way the Department of Homeland Security was created, you'll see the major directorates that were developed coming out of the legislation that created the department that match up with the national strategy.
So it wasn't a federal strategy. It wasn't intended to be government. It was a national strategy, because you had state and local governments. You had the private sector. You had the public at large. And all that needed to play into this new phenomenon known as Homeland Security, that on September 10th, really weren't familiar with. The public at large was not-- wasn't supposed to know what Homeland Security was.
TOM ARMINIO: Secretary Ridge has said a number of times that Homeland Security is a national challenge-- not only a federal, but it's a challenge that's a national obligation.
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Has to be. And when you think about the law enforcement community and the first responder community that exists out in the 50 states and around the territories, the private sector entities, the individuals that are working at the power plants and the places that we know are soft targets for the enemy, the public, See Something, Say Something, the Ready Campaign, how do we as-- and I think that's what you saw after 9/11, was individual people wanting to know, what could they do.
And the goal was to not scare people. You don't have to go take law into your hands. But if you see something, be aware of it. Be aware of your surroundings. When the threat level was raised from time to time, in '02, '03, and '04, again, not intended to scare people, but just make you a little more aware of your surroundings-- to know that things are just a little bit hot right now and to be aware of it.
TOM ARMINIO: So in 2002, the Homeland Security Act was passed. And the department was turning lights on in March of '03. So in terms of historical perspective, what did you see were the greatest challenges in getting 22 federal agencies together under this new department, some of which have long histories and some organizational culture and different roles and missions now coming together under one department, one new department?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Sure. One of the greatest challenges was just physical, being in the same physical place. You've got-- just in the Washington, DC, area alone with 22 agencies, that amounted to about 17,000 employees. You weren't going to find a building that housed 17,000 employees. In fact, we had a complex of buildings we went to on January 27, which was the first day that the doors opened of the department's first initial wave of staffing. Then March 1 was the official first day of DHS. You had Secretary Ridge sworn in as Secretary on the 24th of January. On the 25th, several of us were up at the Nebraska Avenue complex, which was our new home, cleaning out the pencils and the rubber bands and making it somewhat of a place where a hundred new senior staff for the department could call home on that Monday, the 27th.
That Building 3 of Nebraska Avenue complex was a building that was set aside for the Office of Homeland Security. There was a thought that the Office of Homeland Security, which ended up residing with Tom Ridge in the West Wing of the White House and our offices were in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. But there was a building that was set aside for whether or not that staff was going to be developed to have an off-site. And we ended up transitioning to that building. And then ultimately the entire Nebraska Avenue complex became the home where DHS resides today. It fits about 2,000 people.
So you're still nowhere near that full universe of agency personnel. I don't know that you have to have that. But the challenge was, you would be having meetings that involved the FEMA director. And the FEMA director was down at 500 C Street, his headquarters. And it made it very difficult to-- you have phones and you have email, but really the facility-- the proximity of having everyone together was a challenge.
180,000 employees across the country. You had the DC region, but you had-- obviously you had multiple regions for each of the component agencies. FEMA has 10 regions. Coast Guard has its districts and its ports. TSA had its airports. You didn't have an overlay that matched up. And so just a natural challenge, which was to get everyone together on the same page.
We talked about one team, one fight. And there was a cultural commitment that came from the top, from Secretary Ridge. And that was, we are one team. We may have 22 agencies, but we-- and we have great respect for the histories of the Customs Service and FEMA and the Coast Guard and the Secret Service, but we are part of this new department, the Department of Homeland Security. And we can keep our cultures. We can build a new culture, though, as that department.
TOM ARMINIO: So now, we have a new federal department with a budget. And with that budget comes congressional oversight. So how did you help staff prepare for the plethora of testimonies that were about to come down the road?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: It was and probably remains one of the greatest challenges of the department. And that is the help that is granted through oversight. And there were 88 committees or subcommittees when we were at DHS. I believe it's up to 104, 106. Ironically, I believe it's the one recommendation coming out of the 9/11 Commission Report that has not been enacted. It's actually grown.
And that just sends a really difficult signal to the department's staff. And these are the same people who are going up to testify that are supposed to be looking to the vision of prevention and protection and response and recovery. It's very difficult when you're being asked and you're being pulled up to multiple committees. And then come the questions for the record. And the preparation that goes into the testimony is just-- it is not an insignificant amount of time that is asked to be placed on individuals who are being asked by the department and by the country to look forwardly.
Now, there is a place for oversight. I have no disagreement with that. But 106 different committees or subcommittees that can just pull you up. And you as an individual have to make that decision based on your budget. There's appropriations that you don't want to keep-- you don't want to upset the appropriators, the authorizers, same thing. But you have to-- and I think that's where there needs to be a coordinated review of those requests that come in to determine when you can push back, when you can offer up other individuals, and when you go. There's a time and place definitely for it.
TOM ARMINIO: Like to talk about risk for a few minutes. Risk is often defined as threats times vulnerabilities times consequences. And there's other variables in that equation, including frequency and mitigation actions. But from the early days in DHS, were you and the staff and the secretary-- were you talking about risk and how to manage risk? And what was your outlook towards risk assessment and risk management?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: No, absolutely. Risk management was always talked about it. It was something that Governor Ridge felt very strongly about. Part of the challenge of risk management, when you talk about the vulnerabilities piece of it, this country had never had to or never had pulled an inventory of all the sites that you would call vulnerable. And each state and each locality had a different sense of what was critical infrastructure, what was a vulnerable site.
And so I know early in the days of DHS, there was a commitment to developing an asset database. And that came with challenges and concern from others, because what may be a critical infrastructure or critical key resource or a place of where people gathered in one state was important to them and should be on that database. Water parks and places became somewhat mocked in the national press. But to that locality or that state, it was where people gathered, and they wanted to keep it protected. And they were doing what we asked them to do, which was identify locations or places that you felt required attention and protection.
So managing the risk was a huge commitment from Governor Ridge and the secretary and the department. It's evolved, just as we've been able to evolve to understand what the key vulnerabilities are and the consequences that come. A lot of this was just being started from day one. And even though the department was created, what, 16 months after 9/11, or 18 months after 9/11, it was still-- it was early on. And it was the start of how to even review and view these issues. So it was not an easy task.
TOM ARMINIO: Well, I'd like to continue that thought there with the critical infrastructure database at the local level versus the national level. Different perspectives-- where you stand depends on where you sit kind of mentality. So a big box retail store in rural Pennsylvania or Kansas River may be critical infrastructure to that community, because of the economic impacts, jobs. And so how did you coordinate that with the state and local folks? And what was their pushback?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Well, there was-- first of all, just getting the information was a huge ask. Anytime the federal government asks the state and local governments for something, you want to believe that just on the merits and the patriotic want to be part of the team, but it's a huge task. And we worked very closely with the state Homeland Security advisors. And we were very careful when we asked for something. We knew it was going to take time and resources on that end, but that it was for the good of the fight.
So it wasn't like they had this list on a shelf and they could pull it off and send it to you. This was a huge ask, from that perspective, from the local perspective, the state perspective, what was being asked. But once you received that information, once you had a full inventory, then it was a matter of reviewing it and determining what-- it's hard to, say, tell the governor of South Dakota that that facility is not important to them. Its speaks to the federalism that we so respect.
But that's where-- then how do you devote resources to protecting? And the one way that we were able to help accomplish the resource allocation was through grant programs. And how do you let the states determine how to spend their funding that they're going to get and with their local partners? How do you spend that money? And how do you define for your own state what your strategy is going to be?
We tried to lay out for the states a menu of items they could spend grant funding on. And it was training, it was planning, it was exercises, and it was equipment. And as long as you took a review-- you, governor from Pennsylvania, from whatever state-- you took a review. You had your team reviewing, working with your local communities to determine what was going to make sense. We didn't want every county in Pennsylvania to have the same shiny equipment, when they could use mutual aid and regional efforts to share the burden. And so it really took coordination.
And locals wanted that money coming directly to them. And the states-- and we believed the state should receive funding directly, so they could look across their entire municipality, their map, and see, OK, and work with those regions to determine what was best for the state as a whole. So I looked at-- you look at the database list as kind of an example of where the federal government was helping the states determine what their needs were. And then by providing funding to them, they could then help to provide the resources and shore up their security at those places.
TOM ARMINIO: We all strive-- or we all should be good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars. And with that in mind, the grant money that's flowing to the states, and then the states allocate it to where they think the needs are. So our students understand the grant process. With grants come deliverables. It's not just here's some money, do whatever you want with it.
The states are required to provide feedback to the federal government, to DHS, on how they use that money, in terms of exercising or equipment. And one thing early on in the grant program, one thing that was not permitted was brick and mortar. Can you talk about the grant process a little bit? And how states-- or what your philosophy was on issuing grants to different states?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Take you back even to right after 9/11. And that was, when we started in the Office of Homeland Security, one of the first things that Governor Ridge did was he held a conference call with the governors of the states and said, we know you need funding. We're asking you to do more to help protect your critical infrastructure and your people and develop your own strategies how can we help you.
And so there was $500 million that was going to FEMA in the first '01 supplemental. Well, something happened at that time. And that was the anthrax attacks. And the anthrax attacks, one, helped to-- if nothing else, it helped to establish the Office of Homeland Security based on the executive order that was created to give Tom Ridge incident management support of that incident, working with the postmaster general and with the attorney general and the full array of federal agencies. But what it also did was it took the funding that was intended for state and local response and recovery efforts or preparedness efforts-- went to bioterrorism and to the states for bioterrorism efforts. So it's just an anecdote about how the funding originally set for FEMA went to HHS in that first supplemental of '01.
Now, for the '02 budget-- and you'll recall, and for your students, the federal budget, as they may know already, runs from October 1 through September 30, notwithstanding continuing resolution, which we end up seeing more and more of from time to time. At that time-- so on October 8, when Tom Ridge enters the White House-- the federal budget for '02, the '02 budget is already pretty much wrapped up and getting ready to go to the president for-- to OMB, the Office of Management and Budget. So we had two real quick months, if that-- one month, I guess-- to get budget priorities in line for the '02 budget. And those four priorities that were established were information sharing, border and transportation security, bioterrorism-- again, coming out of the anthrax-- and first responder funding.
And so the funding level that was requested and agreed to was $3.5 billion to help develop our first responder capability nationwide. Sounds like a large number. There was probably $100 billion worth of need, if you believe some of the reports. But the system could not accept more than $3.5 billion at one time. The equipment manufacturers and the-- there was just a systematic need to be able to address what the supply and the demand was. So that initial grant program for '02 was $3.5 billion to be spread out to the 50 states.
In '02, we were also getting ready to-- the Iraq War was beginning in March. March 17, I believe, of '02. And there was another attempt in-- there was a supplemental bill that was developed during that time. And there was increased funding put towards what are now called Urban Area Security Initiative, or UASI, cities. So in the '02 budget, I think there was maybe $100 million for six cities. And that number grew increasingly to where-- I'm not sure of the exact numbers, but ultimately, it was about $1.5 billion to the states and $1 billion to the cities and ultimately about a $3.5 billion number that was intended to go out to states and locals.
Where we are today, 10 years later, a lot of money has been put into the system. We're not done. But you're going to see, and you're starting to see, especially as we're looking at the economic times, somewhat of a pullback from the amount of money being put into the first responder system. That's probably understandable, but it's also-- in my opinion, it's somewhat concerning. Because we're definitely not done. We don't have our first responders capability established nationwide to where we're ready to be done.
Bricks and mortar was not intended to be part of the initial funding, and same with personnel. The concern about hiring individuals on this money against this funding and then not being able to continue to pay for it. And so like I said, planning, training, equipment, and exercising were the four priorities.
In 2002, when this first program was established-- and even before 9/11, there was a small program, a $5 million program over at the Department of Justice within the Office for Domestic Preparedness. And that office-- there were [INAUDIBLE] cities. There was some very small effort to be prepared for terrorism, but it was by no means coordinated with FEMA. Or I should say, it was by no means had the attention or the level of funding that it grew to. Now, ODP is part of FEMA, coming out of Katrina-- post-Katrina response. So that's where it became one-stop shopping to the state and local.
TOM ARMINIO: You were also the Director of Intergovernmental Affairs. So how did you approach that job? And what were your responsibilities in that position?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Sure. With a background, having worked in a state capital for Governor Ridge as his Deputy Chief of Staff, and then the time at the Republican Governors Association, where I was able to get to know the governors and their Chiefs of Staff, the first thing I did as Director of Intergovernmental Affairs was to call each of the Chiefs of Staff for the 50 governors, as well as the territorial governors and the mayor of DC, give us a point of contact. It's not going to be you, necessarily, Governor, or even Chief of Staff, but who can we call if on the days after 9/11, if something happens that we need to be able-- we have a threat or we want to be able to get to your governor? So establishing what is now the Network of Homeland Security Advisors around the nation. Every governor has someone, whether it's an emergency manager, an adjutant general, a director of a new office that was created.
And it didn't matter. There was no politics involved. It was Republican, Democrat, independent at the time. But we just-- you know, here's my home number, here's my cell number, here's my pager, at the time. Here's everything that we want you to be able to get to Tom Ridge, if you see something coming out of, again, the horrible attacks of 9/11 that we should be aware of. So as the Director of Intergovernmental Affairs, working with the state governors in their offices-- in this case, the Homeland Security Advisors-- working with the big city mayors and the counties and the state representatives and the first responder community, it was a huge universe of national participants in this, as we talked about the national strategy. Every one of those stakeholders has a role to play from the state and local governments side.
So we had, I think, biweekly conference calls with five regions. We split up the nation by the FEMA regions. And it was as much to receive information as it was to share information. I'm very proud of the efforts. I think Tom Ridge as a former governor at the time, as a former member of Congress, he understood the importance of that outreach. And it was external affairs.
And it was-- if you were going to be asking these governors and mayors for their support, for their information, we needed to offer something in return, which was information, as well, as well as just a place that they could come to if they had any questions or concerns. So very serious part of the office that, beyond the policy and the establishment of the Homeland Security Strategy, each of these individuals played into that strategy.
We had an annex that went out with the national strategy that showcased the state and local actions and activities that were being performed post-9/11. And it's also important to say, with regards to the Homeland Security Advisory system, the color-coded system that your students may be aware of from David Letterman and Jay Leno-- but that system was created at the bequest of the state and local community and with their input. International Association of Chiefs of Police met right at ground zero in December of 2001.
And right after 9/11, you had Governor Ridge and John Ashcroft and director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, going out doing press conferences, letting the world know, or the country know, that we're at a higher alert. And you had the public saying, well, what do you mean we're at higher? What does that mean? What are we supposed to do? So the development of the Homeland Security Advisory system with each of those state and local partners was intended to help better define what action should be taken, what are the protective measures that the state and local individual should be taking, and what the federal government would be doing, as well, at the federal agency level.
TOM ARMINIO: So was there acceptance, let's say, for the Homeland Security Advisory system or other initiatives? Was there acceptance-- reluctant acceptance or otherwise-- from the states and local folks? Or was there some pushback there?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: With every day that something didn't happen and the days that went on post-9/11, the patriotism which exuded on September 11 and September 12 and for the year after-- and I'm not questioning the patriotism of our state and local partners, but-- it became more difficult for them to stay in block on issues that they felt that they wanted to disagree with. But I would say, immediately in the aftermath of 9/11, the state and local partners did whatever they were asked to do.
And they did it at a cost. Their budgets were not in a position to continue forever the protective measures that came with elevating the Homeland Security Advisory system, but they did it. And they asked for help when they needed it. But it was not pushback, in that we don't want to be part of the team, we don't want to be doing our part. It was very respectful. And I would say, for the first year after 9/11, there was not the resistance. It was, what can we do, how can we do it.
There may have been some quiet private disagreements, but it was never taken into the papers and the public. The greatest public debate was probably over how the funding should be spent and where it should be going. The US conference of mayors and the local communities wanting that funding to come directly to them. The national governors and the states wanting it to come directly to them, so that they could then, again, not have waste and-- shouldn't say waste-- shouldn't have overlap of equipment purchasing and training, when it could be done in a more comprehensive and coordinated way. But I would say, in general, the participation of the state and local community post-9/11 was just superior. And they did whatever they were asked to do, and they did it with a smile. And they continue to be part of the national effort.
TOM ARMINIO: In terms of planning and planning protocols, there are several DHS documents available. But one size doesn't necessarily fit all. I mean, our country is very big. Geographically, it's very big. It's diverse in terms of population, population density, resources, capabilities. So the planning protocols, we had the-- initially, we had the National Response Plan and then the National Response Framework, NIMS, the National Incident Management System, had the National Preparedness Guidelines, the National Planning Scenarios, the Target Capabilities List. I mean, the list is as long as your arm.
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: And you'll have more coming.
TOM ARMINIO: Right. But again, some smaller communities or counties don't have the resources to apply some of these planning protocols. Or they may not even be applicable to them. So again, in terms of the Intergovernmental Affairs role, were there any interactions with the State Homeland Security advisors and yourself or other members of your staff to talk about the planning protocols in particular?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: The National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, NIMS, NRP, were established by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, HSPD5. Admiral Loy took the lead of the outreach to the first responder community to make sure they were part of the process. Bob Steffan took the handoff from Admiral Loy to finish that outreach. Each step of the way, the state and local community-- and it wasn't all 3,000 county individuals. It was a manageable group of representative bodies. But they were at the table to ensure that these plans were established.
And the federal government-- this was going to happen. The National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, it was understood that those two plans-- those two doctrines-- were going to be established. And they didn't want to do it without the involvement of the state and local community that we're going to have to then be enacting the system. So the planning itself and the multitude of plans, that's-- unfortunately, that's what federal government does is establish doctrine. And for every part and every facet of the enterprise, there are plans-- the cybersecurity planning, the preparedness goal.
And that's part of what these individuals at the federal government are being asked to do. And to do it-- how can be done in a coordinated fashion? How can it be done in a way that isn't burdensome to the folks, the stakeholders that have to then enact what those plans establish?
TOM ARMINIO: So in the past 10 years, the relationship with the states has developed and matured. So where do you see it now? As we sit here in December of 2011, where do you see the relationship with the states and the federal government now? And where do you see it going in the future?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: I think it's evolved quite a bit since September 12th of-- October 8th, if you will, when the Office of Homeland Security was created. You have leadership. And leadership is the greatest tool that can be offered to Homeland Security, in my opinion, is to have the right people in leadership. And the intent was never to prescribe to the governors or to the states who they had to have as that leader, but to have someone that had the confidence of the governor that could help to coordinate-- similar to what Tom Ridge was asked to do at the White House-- but to coordinate the state agencies.
So whether you're an emergency manager, to be able to work with the adjutant general and the state police commissioner and the office of technology secretary, whoever it is. Because the federal government's going to continue to work with whomever they decide. Not every agency is going to work directly with that one agency in the states. So you're going to have multiple state agencies that are interfacing with the federal government on Homeland Security issues. The hope was that you would not have that. You wanted a one-to-one relationship, but it never evolved to that point.
But at the state level, you have more funding that's come into the states. You have more capability that's been established. And if nothing else, you've got a communication channel that's been established. In some states, you've got regions-- I know Pennsylvania with Region 13 and the other various regions throughout the Commonwealth.
The state and local government does not want to have to rely on the federal government. And I know that, having worked in a governor's office, you want to be able to take care yourself. And to be able to come to the federal government when the resources are overwhelmed. But in this case, at the local level, and then to the state level where that coordination can be defined and the strategy can be implemented to where the states can take care of themselves, and then come to the federal government as needed, I think that's probably what would be preferred out of the state level.
TOM ARMINIO: Early in our conversation, you talked about your role with the Republican Governors Association. Our students should know that there's a National Governors Association, NGA, that is a very proactive organization. They meet frequently. Where do you see that body interacting with DHS?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Very strongly. Again, they represent the 50 governors. And the National Governors Association is a policy-leaning organization that is intended to push policy. They have they have a Homeland Security advisor network that meets under the guise of the National Governors Association, the NGA. So they are a constant advocate on the hill, advocating for policies and funding to go to the governors and to the states.
They are one of six or seven entities in the DC area of the state and local organizations that receive direct attention from the department, because it's not easy to go to 50 governors. But to be able to go to one association, but at the same time to also be able to go those 50 governors, because you don't want just one association speaking on behalf of each of those entities if each situation will require a different approach.
But the NGA is a very strong organization. It's got strong leadership and will continue to be representative of those 50 state governors on the hill, interfacing with DHS, and setting their own policy. I know during transition, they've offered to their new governors a Homeland Security transition guide, just as you don't want to lose that time between election and governing the intelligence and the capability that's been established by their predecessors. And so the NGA works to help to offer training and that type of resource.
TOM ARMINIO: Duncan, thank you very much for your time.
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Thank you very much.
TOM ARMINIO: I appreciate the conversation. And most of all, I appreciate your insight and sharing your experiences with us as you helped establish the Office of Homeland Security, as well as the Department of Homeland Security.
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: It's my pleasure.
TOM ARMINIO: Thank you. Thank you very much.
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Thank you for your time. Thank you.
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Thank you, Tom. My pleasure.
TOM ARMINIO: I want to sort of take maybe a historical journey with you, since you were with Secretary Ridge from the early days in the Office of Homeland Security before it was a federal department. So where were you on 9/11? What were you doing?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: I was serving as Executive Director of the Republican Governors Association. So I had left Tom Ridge as Governor of Pennsylvania about six months earlier, moved to Washington, DC, and was serving as his executive director. He was the chair of the RGA.
On 9/11, I was actually down in Richmond. I was at the Richmond airport getting ready to pick up Mark Holman, who was the governor's former Chief of Staff. And I was in the private sector. He and I were working on the RGA together and had seen that the first tower had been hit. And then just as I was picking him up at the airport, the second tower had been hit.
We were actually going to a meeting with Virginia Governor, Jim Gilmore. And as we got to the meeting, his executive detail was scrambling and preparing to get back to northern Virginia-- or get to northern Virginia, as the Pentagon had just been hit. So it was obviously a very, very confusing upsetting day. And we went in. We started to do the meeting. And about an hour into it-- it was before smartphones and Blackberries and there were no TVs. And there was just a gentleman on the phone who said, about an hour into it, the first tower had come down.
And we canceled the meeting and went back to where we were living in northern Virginia, went to try to actually give blood at the hospital down the street from where I live right now. And the system was entirely overwhelmed. And obviously, there was no understanding or expectation for what was going on. So that's my introduction to 9/11.
TOM ARMINIO: Why do you think President Bush asked Governor Ridge to be the first Director of the Office of Homeland Security?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Sure. Well, I know that Tom Ridge is the Governor of Pennsylvania, a major state filled with critical infrastructure and filled with-- a very populous state, the site of the fourth plane going down, flight 93. And he had firsthand experience, having been right to the site that day, that fateful day on 9/11, as the unofficial author of the Stafford Act, when he was a member of Congress, as tornadoes swept through his northwestern congressional district. And he was not pleased with the response that had been received by FEMA, that he received as a member of Congress in the area, and his constituents had received from the Federal Emergency Management Agency at the time.
And his loyalty to George Bush-- he was the chairman of the Bush campaign in Pennsylvania about a year earlier. He was a friend. He was a former governor, a colleague of President Bush. And I know President Bush and the Bush administration was very serious about loyalty. They didn't want individuals that were coming into the administration with their own agenda. So it was the president's agenda. They were free to offer their opinions, obviously. But I think there was a strong placement of loyalty on top of just the credentials.
And finally, as a former veteran-- he was a veteran of Vietnam-- Governor Ridge brought a perspective from the defense side as well. So you had-- it was a very strange time, those nine days in between the attacks of 9/11 and the announcement of Tom Ridge as the first Homeland Security advisor to the president. I was down in Washington, as I mentioned, but I know the days leading into that day-- when he was announced in front of the world, as I think we all recall, happened to be my 30th birthday, September 20, 2001. And I was not expecting to go in to the Office of Homeland Security at first.
And then my experience with the Republican Governors Association, as well as having been Deputy Chief of Staff in Pennsylvania, brought a perspective of state and local intergovernmental outreach that was invited in to be part of that initial stand up of the department-- or excuse me, of the Office of Homeland Security. Tom Ridge was sworn in on October 8 of 2001, just almost four weeks to the date of the attacks. And he became the first Homeland Security advisor assisting the President for Homeland Security.
TOM ARMINIO: So what were those early days like? I mean, you're working for the president now and the administration. Again, for clarification, this is before the Homeland Security Act. So what was it like standing up, getting things organized for that new office?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: It was the most difficult, most wonderful experience of my life, just personally. But professionally, every day was a new day. We thought we were going to be hit again. You went to the White House, which was this-- some would argue was the expected target for one of the flights. And you are building a staff. You're building a policy that--
Governor Ridge was given the assignment to coordinate the federal government amongst about six areas to deter an act of terrorism, to prevent, to protect against, to prepare for, to respond, and to recover to terrorist activity for the federal government. So how do you coordinate all those aspects of the federal government on behalf of the president? And if you think of those six areas, every federal agency has some role to play, whether it's protecting or critical infrastructure that each of the agencies has responsibility over. So Tom Ridge was given the authority by the president to bring that entire strategy together. And that was one of the other items that he was granted or was given the responsibility for, was to create a national strategy for Homeland Security.
And so from day one on October 8, 2001, when he went in with a staff of five-- I was fortunate to be one of those five-- we started to develop what that strategy was going to be. But ultimately, it ended up-- the authority that he was given through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1, which came out a couple weeks later, was to be able to develop policy coordinating councils to receive detailed employees from the federal agencies, to how do you create or how do you understand the multitude of agencies that have a role in Homeland Security. Well, to be given staff, loaned, but to help develop what that strategy should be. And that's where you had a policy side and you had an external side of the office. And my role was intergovernmental affairs to work with state and local governments.
TOM ARMINIO: Yeah, I want to ensure that our students understand that, as an office within the White House, at the time, Governor Ridge was not a cabinet secretary, so he didn't have a budget. And in DC, in the capital, budget authority equates to power. So there were some significant challenges there. Not only did he not have budget authority-- he wasn't a cabinet secretary yet-- but he also had to, as you say, was responsible for preventing, deterring, responding, recovering from another terrorist attack. So how do you sort of navigate those waters? The interagency process is complicated enough. And it was complicated enough on September 10th, 2001. How did it change on September 11th?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Well, you had a nation of patriots that were committed to doing the right thing. As hard as that is in an interagency process, you had everyone giving whatever they were asked to do on September 11th through until-- well, from that time on, for the foreseeable future, what were they being asked to do? What resources were they being asked to give? What policy coordination were they asked to provide? But what changed was you had one individual on behalf of the president coordinating the federal government for all policy, whether it was border and transportation security, or intel and warning, science and technology.
If you think about all the facets that go into Homeland Security, like I said, the critical infrastructure protection. You have water systems. You have chemicals systems. You have the response and recovery policies that are required. Every piece of Homeland Security was being coordinated now from a very small office.
But everything was on the table to be reviewed and to be established for the strategy going forward. What roles would be played? Or what policies would be suggested? And ultimately, it came to the development of the Department of Homeland Security, which was a proposal that President Bush provided in June of 2002, about a month before the National Strategy came forward in July.
And so you had a commitment from the federal agencies. Now not everyone agreed with everything. And it wasn't just Tom Ridge was giving authority to make decisions on behalf. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 1, which I mentioned, established a Homeland Security Council of federal agencies. The heads of those agencies were part of the council that the Governor Ridge chaired. They also established policy coordinating councils, PCCs. And each of the-- that were to be run or chaired by the staff of the Office of Homeland Security.
So you had in-- the structure of the OHS, or Office of Homeland Security, was that you had three major policy leads. You had protection and prevention-- or prevention and protection, excuse me-- director headed by Bruce Lawlor. He was senior director for prevention protection. You had Rich Falkenrath. He served as the senior director for policy and planning. And then you had Mike Byrne, who headed up the-- was senior director for response and recovery. So the three of those gentlemen had a huge portfolio of issues that they were leading policy coordinating councils to help drive to decision making that would then ultimately be led into the strategy and to the department.
TOM ARMINIO: You mentioned the national strategy for Homeland Security a couple of times. Tell us about that process. What considerations, what priorities, went into it? And how it supported the National Security Strategy. We have so many strategies now-- the Cyber Security Strategy, National Infrastructure Strategy. So how do they all support and complement the National Security Strategy?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Sure. The national strategy for Homeland Security was one of the four primary responsibilities granted to Tom Ridge when he became assistant to the President for Homeland Security. So Executive Order 13228 that established the Office of Homeland Security established this responsibility. And as I previously mentioned, to be able to coordinate the federal government within those six areas, from deterrence to prevention, protection, preparedness, response, and recovery.
The national strategy had three major objectives. Primarily, the national strategy was intended to prevent terrorist attacks from occurring again. Or how do we prevent terrorist attacks from occurring? How do you minimize the damage that comes from a terrorist attack? And then how do you identify your vulnerabilities? So the three areas around-- we talk about critical infrastructure protection, so that's where our vulnerabilities lie. How do you put a full nation filled with-- with the private sector owning most of this critical infrastructure, how do you put that to work to make sure that you're managing that risk?
And then within those-- from those objectives, there are primary areas, such as border transportation security, intelligence and warning, counter-terrorism, emergency preparedness and response. There are major areas of the national strategy that were defined going forward. And as you match that up against the way the Department of Homeland Security was created, you'll see the major directorates that were developed coming out of the legislation that created the department that match up with the national strategy.
So it wasn't a federal strategy. It wasn't intended to be government. It was a national strategy, because you had state and local governments. You had the private sector. You had the public at large. And all that needed to play into this new phenomenon known as Homeland Security, that on September 10th, really weren't familiar with. The public at large was not-- wasn't supposed to know what Homeland Security was.
TOM ARMINIO: Secretary Ridge has said a number of times that Homeland Security is a national challenge-- not only a federal, but it's a challenge that's a national obligation.
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Has to be. And when you think about the law enforcement community and the first responder community that exists out in the 50 states and around the territories, the private sector entities, the individuals that are working at the power plants and the places that we know are soft targets for the enemy, the public, See Something, Say Something, the Ready Campaign, how do we as-- and I think that's what you saw after 9/11, was individual people wanting to know, what could they do.
And the goal was to not scare people. You don't have to go take law into your hands. But if you see something, be aware of it. Be aware of your surroundings. When the threat level was raised from time to time, in '02, '03, and '04, again, not intended to scare people, but just make you a little more aware of your surroundings-- to know that things are just a little bit hot right now and to be aware of it.
TOM ARMINIO: So in 2002, the Homeland Security Act was passed. And the department was turning lights on in March of '03. So in terms of historical perspective, what did you see were the greatest challenges in getting 22 federal agencies together under this new department, some of which have long histories and some organizational culture and different roles and missions now coming together under one department, one new department?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Sure. One of the greatest challenges was just physical, being in the same physical place. You've got-- just in the Washington, DC, area alone with 22 agencies, that amounted to about 17,000 employees. You weren't going to find a building that housed 17,000 employees. In fact, we had a complex of buildings we went to on January 27, which was the first day that the doors opened of the department's first initial wave of staffing. Then March 1 was the official first day of DHS. You had Secretary Ridge sworn in as Secretary on the 24th of January. On the 25th, several of us were up at the Nebraska Avenue complex, which was our new home, cleaning out the pencils and the rubber bands and making it somewhat of a place where a hundred new senior staff for the department could call home on that Monday, the 27th.
That Building 3 of Nebraska Avenue complex was a building that was set aside for the Office of Homeland Security. There was a thought that the Office of Homeland Security, which ended up residing with Tom Ridge in the West Wing of the White House and our offices were in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. But there was a building that was set aside for whether or not that staff was going to be developed to have an off-site. And we ended up transitioning to that building. And then ultimately the entire Nebraska Avenue complex became the home where DHS resides today. It fits about 2,000 people.
So you're still nowhere near that full universe of agency personnel. I don't know that you have to have that. But the challenge was, you would be having meetings that involved the FEMA director. And the FEMA director was down at 500 C Street, his headquarters. And it made it very difficult to-- you have phones and you have email, but really the facility-- the proximity of having everyone together was a challenge.
180,000 employees across the country. You had the DC region, but you had-- obviously you had multiple regions for each of the component agencies. FEMA has 10 regions. Coast Guard has its districts and its ports. TSA had its airports. You didn't have an overlay that matched up. And so just a natural challenge, which was to get everyone together on the same page.
We talked about one team, one fight. And there was a cultural commitment that came from the top, from Secretary Ridge. And that was, we are one team. We may have 22 agencies, but we-- and we have great respect for the histories of the Customs Service and FEMA and the Coast Guard and the Secret Service, but we are part of this new department, the Department of Homeland Security. And we can keep our cultures. We can build a new culture, though, as that department.
TOM ARMINIO: So now, we have a new federal department with a budget. And with that budget comes congressional oversight. So how did you help staff prepare for the plethora of testimonies that were about to come down the road?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: It was and probably remains one of the greatest challenges of the department. And that is the help that is granted through oversight. And there were 88 committees or subcommittees when we were at DHS. I believe it's up to 104, 106. Ironically, I believe it's the one recommendation coming out of the 9/11 Commission Report that has not been enacted. It's actually grown.
And that just sends a really difficult signal to the department's staff. And these are the same people who are going up to testify that are supposed to be looking to the vision of prevention and protection and response and recovery. It's very difficult when you're being asked and you're being pulled up to multiple committees. And then come the questions for the record. And the preparation that goes into the testimony is just-- it is not an insignificant amount of time that is asked to be placed on individuals who are being asked by the department and by the country to look forwardly.
Now, there is a place for oversight. I have no disagreement with that. But 106 different committees or subcommittees that can just pull you up. And you as an individual have to make that decision based on your budget. There's appropriations that you don't want to keep-- you don't want to upset the appropriators, the authorizers, same thing. But you have to-- and I think that's where there needs to be a coordinated review of those requests that come in to determine when you can push back, when you can offer up other individuals, and when you go. There's a time and place definitely for it.
TOM ARMINIO: Like to talk about risk for a few minutes. Risk is often defined as threats times vulnerabilities times consequences. And there's other variables in that equation, including frequency and mitigation actions. But from the early days in DHS, were you and the staff and the secretary-- were you talking about risk and how to manage risk? And what was your outlook towards risk assessment and risk management?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: No, absolutely. Risk management was always talked about it. It was something that Governor Ridge felt very strongly about. Part of the challenge of risk management, when you talk about the vulnerabilities piece of it, this country had never had to or never had pulled an inventory of all the sites that you would call vulnerable. And each state and each locality had a different sense of what was critical infrastructure, what was a vulnerable site.
And so I know early in the days of DHS, there was a commitment to developing an asset database. And that came with challenges and concern from others, because what may be a critical infrastructure or critical key resource or a place of where people gathered in one state was important to them and should be on that database. Water parks and places became somewhat mocked in the national press. But to that locality or that state, it was where people gathered, and they wanted to keep it protected. And they were doing what we asked them to do, which was identify locations or places that you felt required attention and protection.
So managing the risk was a huge commitment from Governor Ridge and the secretary and the department. It's evolved, just as we've been able to evolve to understand what the key vulnerabilities are and the consequences that come. A lot of this was just being started from day one. And even though the department was created, what, 16 months after 9/11, or 18 months after 9/11, it was still-- it was early on. And it was the start of how to even review and view these issues. So it was not an easy task.
TOM ARMINIO: Well, I'd like to continue that thought there with the critical infrastructure database at the local level versus the national level. Different perspectives-- where you stand depends on where you sit kind of mentality. So a big box retail store in rural Pennsylvania or Kansas River may be critical infrastructure to that community, because of the economic impacts, jobs. And so how did you coordinate that with the state and local folks? And what was their pushback?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Well, there was-- first of all, just getting the information was a huge ask. Anytime the federal government asks the state and local governments for something, you want to believe that just on the merits and the patriotic want to be part of the team, but it's a huge task. And we worked very closely with the state Homeland Security advisors. And we were very careful when we asked for something. We knew it was going to take time and resources on that end, but that it was for the good of the fight.
So it wasn't like they had this list on a shelf and they could pull it off and send it to you. This was a huge ask, from that perspective, from the local perspective, the state perspective, what was being asked. But once you received that information, once you had a full inventory, then it was a matter of reviewing it and determining what-- it's hard to, say, tell the governor of South Dakota that that facility is not important to them. Its speaks to the federalism that we so respect.
But that's where-- then how do you devote resources to protecting? And the one way that we were able to help accomplish the resource allocation was through grant programs. And how do you let the states determine how to spend their funding that they're going to get and with their local partners? How do you spend that money? And how do you define for your own state what your strategy is going to be?
We tried to lay out for the states a menu of items they could spend grant funding on. And it was training, it was planning, it was exercises, and it was equipment. And as long as you took a review-- you, governor from Pennsylvania, from whatever state-- you took a review. You had your team reviewing, working with your local communities to determine what was going to make sense. We didn't want every county in Pennsylvania to have the same shiny equipment, when they could use mutual aid and regional efforts to share the burden. And so it really took coordination.
And locals wanted that money coming directly to them. And the states-- and we believed the state should receive funding directly, so they could look across their entire municipality, their map, and see, OK, and work with those regions to determine what was best for the state as a whole. So I looked at-- you look at the database list as kind of an example of where the federal government was helping the states determine what their needs were. And then by providing funding to them, they could then help to provide the resources and shore up their security at those places.
TOM ARMINIO: We all strive-- or we all should be good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars. And with that in mind, the grant money that's flowing to the states, and then the states allocate it to where they think the needs are. So our students understand the grant process. With grants come deliverables. It's not just here's some money, do whatever you want with it.
The states are required to provide feedback to the federal government, to DHS, on how they use that money, in terms of exercising or equipment. And one thing early on in the grant program, one thing that was not permitted was brick and mortar. Can you talk about the grant process a little bit? And how states-- or what your philosophy was on issuing grants to different states?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Take you back even to right after 9/11. And that was, when we started in the Office of Homeland Security, one of the first things that Governor Ridge did was he held a conference call with the governors of the states and said, we know you need funding. We're asking you to do more to help protect your critical infrastructure and your people and develop your own strategies how can we help you.
And so there was $500 million that was going to FEMA in the first '01 supplemental. Well, something happened at that time. And that was the anthrax attacks. And the anthrax attacks, one, helped to-- if nothing else, it helped to establish the Office of Homeland Security based on the executive order that was created to give Tom Ridge incident management support of that incident, working with the postmaster general and with the attorney general and the full array of federal agencies. But what it also did was it took the funding that was intended for state and local response and recovery efforts or preparedness efforts-- went to bioterrorism and to the states for bioterrorism efforts. So it's just an anecdote about how the funding originally set for FEMA went to HHS in that first supplemental of '01.
Now, for the '02 budget-- and you'll recall, and for your students, the federal budget, as they may know already, runs from October 1 through September 30, notwithstanding continuing resolution, which we end up seeing more and more of from time to time. At that time-- so on October 8, when Tom Ridge enters the White House-- the federal budget for '02, the '02 budget is already pretty much wrapped up and getting ready to go to the president for-- to OMB, the Office of Management and Budget. So we had two real quick months, if that-- one month, I guess-- to get budget priorities in line for the '02 budget. And those four priorities that were established were information sharing, border and transportation security, bioterrorism-- again, coming out of the anthrax-- and first responder funding.
And so the funding level that was requested and agreed to was $3.5 billion to help develop our first responder capability nationwide. Sounds like a large number. There was probably $100 billion worth of need, if you believe some of the reports. But the system could not accept more than $3.5 billion at one time. The equipment manufacturers and the-- there was just a systematic need to be able to address what the supply and the demand was. So that initial grant program for '02 was $3.5 billion to be spread out to the 50 states.
In '02, we were also getting ready to-- the Iraq War was beginning in March. March 17, I believe, of '02. And there was another attempt in-- there was a supplemental bill that was developed during that time. And there was increased funding put towards what are now called Urban Area Security Initiative, or UASI, cities. So in the '02 budget, I think there was maybe $100 million for six cities. And that number grew increasingly to where-- I'm not sure of the exact numbers, but ultimately, it was about $1.5 billion to the states and $1 billion to the cities and ultimately about a $3.5 billion number that was intended to go out to states and locals.
Where we are today, 10 years later, a lot of money has been put into the system. We're not done. But you're going to see, and you're starting to see, especially as we're looking at the economic times, somewhat of a pullback from the amount of money being put into the first responder system. That's probably understandable, but it's also-- in my opinion, it's somewhat concerning. Because we're definitely not done. We don't have our first responders capability established nationwide to where we're ready to be done.
Bricks and mortar was not intended to be part of the initial funding, and same with personnel. The concern about hiring individuals on this money against this funding and then not being able to continue to pay for it. And so like I said, planning, training, equipment, and exercising were the four priorities.
In 2002, when this first program was established-- and even before 9/11, there was a small program, a $5 million program over at the Department of Justice within the Office for Domestic Preparedness. And that office-- there were [INAUDIBLE] cities. There was some very small effort to be prepared for terrorism, but it was by no means coordinated with FEMA. Or I should say, it was by no means had the attention or the level of funding that it grew to. Now, ODP is part of FEMA, coming out of Katrina-- post-Katrina response. So that's where it became one-stop shopping to the state and local.
TOM ARMINIO: You were also the Director of Intergovernmental Affairs. So how did you approach that job? And what were your responsibilities in that position?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Sure. With a background, having worked in a state capital for Governor Ridge as his Deputy Chief of Staff, and then the time at the Republican Governors Association, where I was able to get to know the governors and their Chiefs of Staff, the first thing I did as Director of Intergovernmental Affairs was to call each of the Chiefs of Staff for the 50 governors, as well as the territorial governors and the mayor of DC, give us a point of contact. It's not going to be you, necessarily, Governor, or even Chief of Staff, but who can we call if on the days after 9/11, if something happens that we need to be able-- we have a threat or we want to be able to get to your governor? So establishing what is now the Network of Homeland Security Advisors around the nation. Every governor has someone, whether it's an emergency manager, an adjutant general, a director of a new office that was created.
And it didn't matter. There was no politics involved. It was Republican, Democrat, independent at the time. But we just-- you know, here's my home number, here's my cell number, here's my pager, at the time. Here's everything that we want you to be able to get to Tom Ridge, if you see something coming out of, again, the horrible attacks of 9/11 that we should be aware of. So as the Director of Intergovernmental Affairs, working with the state governors in their offices-- in this case, the Homeland Security Advisors-- working with the big city mayors and the counties and the state representatives and the first responder community, it was a huge universe of national participants in this, as we talked about the national strategy. Every one of those stakeholders has a role to play from the state and local governments side.
So we had, I think, biweekly conference calls with five regions. We split up the nation by the FEMA regions. And it was as much to receive information as it was to share information. I'm very proud of the efforts. I think Tom Ridge as a former governor at the time, as a former member of Congress, he understood the importance of that outreach. And it was external affairs.
And it was-- if you were going to be asking these governors and mayors for their support, for their information, we needed to offer something in return, which was information, as well, as well as just a place that they could come to if they had any questions or concerns. So very serious part of the office that, beyond the policy and the establishment of the Homeland Security Strategy, each of these individuals played into that strategy.
We had an annex that went out with the national strategy that showcased the state and local actions and activities that were being performed post-9/11. And it's also important to say, with regards to the Homeland Security Advisory system, the color-coded system that your students may be aware of from David Letterman and Jay Leno-- but that system was created at the bequest of the state and local community and with their input. International Association of Chiefs of Police met right at ground zero in December of 2001.
And right after 9/11, you had Governor Ridge and John Ashcroft and director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, going out doing press conferences, letting the world know, or the country know, that we're at a higher alert. And you had the public saying, well, what do you mean we're at higher? What does that mean? What are we supposed to do? So the development of the Homeland Security Advisory system with each of those state and local partners was intended to help better define what action should be taken, what are the protective measures that the state and local individual should be taking, and what the federal government would be doing, as well, at the federal agency level.
TOM ARMINIO: So was there acceptance, let's say, for the Homeland Security Advisory system or other initiatives? Was there acceptance-- reluctant acceptance or otherwise-- from the states and local folks? Or was there some pushback there?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: With every day that something didn't happen and the days that went on post-9/11, the patriotism which exuded on September 11 and September 12 and for the year after-- and I'm not questioning the patriotism of our state and local partners, but-- it became more difficult for them to stay in block on issues that they felt that they wanted to disagree with. But I would say, immediately in the aftermath of 9/11, the state and local partners did whatever they were asked to do.
And they did it at a cost. Their budgets were not in a position to continue forever the protective measures that came with elevating the Homeland Security Advisory system, but they did it. And they asked for help when they needed it. But it was not pushback, in that we don't want to be part of the team, we don't want to be doing our part. It was very respectful. And I would say, for the first year after 9/11, there was not the resistance. It was, what can we do, how can we do it.
There may have been some quiet private disagreements, but it was never taken into the papers and the public. The greatest public debate was probably over how the funding should be spent and where it should be going. The US conference of mayors and the local communities wanting that funding to come directly to them. The national governors and the states wanting it to come directly to them, so that they could then, again, not have waste and-- shouldn't say waste-- shouldn't have overlap of equipment purchasing and training, when it could be done in a more comprehensive and coordinated way. But I would say, in general, the participation of the state and local community post-9/11 was just superior. And they did whatever they were asked to do, and they did it with a smile. And they continue to be part of the national effort.
TOM ARMINIO: In terms of planning and planning protocols, there are several DHS documents available. But one size doesn't necessarily fit all. I mean, our country is very big. Geographically, it's very big. It's diverse in terms of population, population density, resources, capabilities. So the planning protocols, we had the-- initially, we had the National Response Plan and then the National Response Framework, NIMS, the National Incident Management System, had the National Preparedness Guidelines, the National Planning Scenarios, the Target Capabilities List. I mean, the list is as long as your arm.
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: And you'll have more coming.
TOM ARMINIO: Right. But again, some smaller communities or counties don't have the resources to apply some of these planning protocols. Or they may not even be applicable to them. So again, in terms of the Intergovernmental Affairs role, were there any interactions with the State Homeland Security advisors and yourself or other members of your staff to talk about the planning protocols in particular?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: The National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, NIMS, NRP, were established by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, HSPD5. Admiral Loy took the lead of the outreach to the first responder community to make sure they were part of the process. Bob Steffan took the handoff from Admiral Loy to finish that outreach. Each step of the way, the state and local community-- and it wasn't all 3,000 county individuals. It was a manageable group of representative bodies. But they were at the table to ensure that these plans were established.
And the federal government-- this was going to happen. The National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System, it was understood that those two plans-- those two doctrines-- were going to be established. And they didn't want to do it without the involvement of the state and local community that we're going to have to then be enacting the system. So the planning itself and the multitude of plans, that's-- unfortunately, that's what federal government does is establish doctrine. And for every part and every facet of the enterprise, there are plans-- the cybersecurity planning, the preparedness goal.
And that's part of what these individuals at the federal government are being asked to do. And to do it-- how can be done in a coordinated fashion? How can it be done in a way that isn't burdensome to the folks, the stakeholders that have to then enact what those plans establish?
TOM ARMINIO: So in the past 10 years, the relationship with the states has developed and matured. So where do you see it now? As we sit here in December of 2011, where do you see the relationship with the states and the federal government now? And where do you see it going in the future?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: I think it's evolved quite a bit since September 12th of-- October 8th, if you will, when the Office of Homeland Security was created. You have leadership. And leadership is the greatest tool that can be offered to Homeland Security, in my opinion, is to have the right people in leadership. And the intent was never to prescribe to the governors or to the states who they had to have as that leader, but to have someone that had the confidence of the governor that could help to coordinate-- similar to what Tom Ridge was asked to do at the White House-- but to coordinate the state agencies.
So whether you're an emergency manager, to be able to work with the adjutant general and the state police commissioner and the office of technology secretary, whoever it is. Because the federal government's going to continue to work with whomever they decide. Not every agency is going to work directly with that one agency in the states. So you're going to have multiple state agencies that are interfacing with the federal government on Homeland Security issues. The hope was that you would not have that. You wanted a one-to-one relationship, but it never evolved to that point.
But at the state level, you have more funding that's come into the states. You have more capability that's been established. And if nothing else, you've got a communication channel that's been established. In some states, you've got regions-- I know Pennsylvania with Region 13 and the other various regions throughout the Commonwealth.
The state and local government does not want to have to rely on the federal government. And I know that, having worked in a governor's office, you want to be able to take care yourself. And to be able to come to the federal government when the resources are overwhelmed. But in this case, at the local level, and then to the state level where that coordination can be defined and the strategy can be implemented to where the states can take care of themselves, and then come to the federal government as needed, I think that's probably what would be preferred out of the state level.
TOM ARMINIO: Early in our conversation, you talked about your role with the Republican Governors Association. Our students should know that there's a National Governors Association, NGA, that is a very proactive organization. They meet frequently. Where do you see that body interacting with DHS?
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Very strongly. Again, they represent the 50 governors. And the National Governors Association is a policy-leaning organization that is intended to push policy. They have they have a Homeland Security advisor network that meets under the guise of the National Governors Association, the NGA. So they are a constant advocate on the hill, advocating for policies and funding to go to the governors and to the states.
They are one of six or seven entities in the DC area of the state and local organizations that receive direct attention from the department, because it's not easy to go to 50 governors. But to be able to go to one association, but at the same time to also be able to go those 50 governors, because you don't want just one association speaking on behalf of each of those entities if each situation will require a different approach.
But the NGA is a very strong organization. It's got strong leadership and will continue to be representative of those 50 state governors on the hill, interfacing with DHS, and setting their own policy. I know during transition, they've offered to their new governors a Homeland Security transition guide, just as you don't want to lose that time between election and governing the intelligence and the capability that's been established by their predecessors. And so the NGA works to help to offer training and that type of resource.
TOM ARMINIO: Duncan, thank you very much for your time.
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Thank you very much.
TOM ARMINIO: I appreciate the conversation. And most of all, I appreciate your insight and sharing your experiences with us as you helped establish the Office of Homeland Security, as well as the Department of Homeland Security.
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: It's my pleasure.
TOM ARMINIO: Thank you. Thank you very much.
DUNCAN CAMPBELL: Thank you for your time. Thank you.
Development of the Office of Homeland Security
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Development of the Office of Homeland Security
Upon his arrival in Washington, D.C. in September 2001, Governor Ridge was tasked to create and staff the White House Office of Homeland Security. At the outset, Governor Ridge was at a disadvantage. Even though his office was located down the hall from the Oval Office in the White House, he was given no large staff complement and the budget authority/funding provided to him was minimal at best. Even under these difficult circumstances, Governor Ridge and his dedicated staff worked to confront the myriad of issues before them and deal with these threats that had clearly changed the course of our nation’s history.
In this clip, Duncan Campbell discusses the development of the Office of Homeland Security shortly after the events of 9/11. Mr. Campbell served in that office as the director of Intergovernmental Affairs.
Video 3.5. Perspectives Interview: Establishing the Department of Homeland Security with Duncan Campbell
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Video 3.5, Length: 00:49:08 Perspectives Interview Transcript
Transcript coming soon!
The Patriot Act of 2001
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The Patriot Act of 2001
One of the most controversial acts enacted by Congress in response to the 9/11 attacks was the Patriot Act, passed October 26, 2001. George W. Bush signed the wide-ranging bill into law 45 days after the attack.
The Patriot Act gave the federal government broad new powers to investigate and detain potential terrorists to: (Click on the tabs below.)
facilitate the tracking and gathering of information with new technologies.
The law allowed federal officals greater authority to use a kind of 'secret caller ID,' which can identify the source and destination of calls made to and from a particular telephone. Existing laws allowed such 'trap and trace' orders for phone calls. The new law permitted them for other electronic connections, including e-mail.
permit 'roving surveillance,' or allow observation not limited to a particular place or instrument.
In the past, court orders had allowed surveillance only on telephones or place identified in advance. Since terrorists may change locations often, discard their cell phones after a single use, frequently switch the SIM cards in their cell phones, and repeatedly create and change free e-mail accounts, court orders were often a step behind. The new law permitted investigators to obtain authority to track targets as they moved or switched phones and emails. It also allowed investigators to obtain a court order to examine any "tangible item" rather than just business records. For example, investigators could probe voicemail messages and library records showing who borrowed which books.
increase federal authority for investigation money laundering.
The new law required financial institutions to keep more complete records of the financial activities of suspicious individuals and to allow federal investigators broader access to them. In the aftermath of September 11, federal officials had discovered that hundreds of thousands of dollars had flowed through the financial system to terrorist cells undetected, and they wanted stronger authority to trace this flow of money.
strengthen the authority of border agents to prevent possible terrorists from entering the United States.
The new law gave authorities greater power to detain and deport suspicious individuals and those suspected of supporting them. To signal that these provisions were not aimed at punishing foreigners, the law also provided humanitarian assistance for foreign victims of the September 11 attacks.
define a broader array of activities - terrorist attacks on mass transportation facilities, biological attacks, harboring of terrorists, money laundering to support terrorism, and fraudulent solicitation of money to support terrorism - as federal crimes.
Federal officials were concerned that the ingenuity of terrorists had grown faster than criminal law, and they were intent on creating a broader net to snare terrorists.
allow so-called sneak-and-peek searches, in which investigators can enter homes and facilities and conduct searches without informing those searched until a later time.
Whereas previous law specified that individuals who were searched had to be informed before the search began, federal officials said that giving even a few minutes' notice might disrupt their investigations and tip off members of a terrorist cell. Sneak-and-peek searches, they said, would permit more effective investigations.
expand the government's authority to prosecute computer hackers.
Government officials increasingly worried that terrorists, or even ordinary hackers, would exploit vulnerabilities in the Internet to flood the system with e-mails or damage computer records. With the growing dependence of the world economy on electronic commerce and communication, officials wanted to increase the system's protection against cyberterror attacks and to provide stronger remedies to those hurt by hackers. Such attacks had not occurred on a broad scale at that point, but security analysts warned that the system was vulnerable and that they could occur in the future. Over the next few years, hackers proved them right.
(Kettl, 2014, p. 125-126)
At the outset, the Patriot Act caused a great deal of consternation, especially civil libertarian advocates. Many questioned the constitutionality of the Act, generating countless lawsuits and concern from community activists that the law was too broad and many of its provisions were being used against their original intent and in some instances violated or suspended many civil liberties.
Because many of the provisions of the original Act enacted in 2001 were under a “sunset clause,” meaning that once the clear and present danger dissipated, Congress was required to address the Patriot Act again in 2005. The Bush Administration was successful in its arguments that the Act not be altered in such a way to weaken its enforcement measures. In fact, the “revised” Act authorized the imprisonment, for an indefinite period of time, of foreigners suspected of terrorism, without trial or indictment. Despite the years of allegations, accusations, and heated controversy surrounding the passage of the Patriot Act in 2001, most of the more controversial provisions with “sunset” dates which were set to expire on December 31, 2005 were either made permanent under the reauthorization act of 2005 or were given a four-year extension.
In 2011, the Act was again the subject of congressional scrutiny as many of its provisions were slated to expire.
Shortly after its passage, the Congressional Research Service summarized the law:
The Act gives federal officials greater authority to track and intercept communications, both for law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes. It vests the Secretary of Treasury with regulatory powers to combat corruption of U.S. financial institutions for foreign money laundering purposes. It seeks to further close out borders to foreign terrorists and to detain and remove those within our borders. It creates new crimes, new penalties, and new procedural efficiencies for use against domestic and international terrorists (Doyle, 2001).
In May of 2011, Congress voted to extend several provisions of the law that would have otherwise expired. These provisions allow investigators to get “roving wiretap” court orders; allow them to follow terrorism suspects who switch phone numbers to different providers; to get orders to seize “any tangible things” relevant to a security investigations, like a business’ customer records; and to get national security wiretap orders to monitor noncitizen suspects who are believed to not be connected to any foreign power.
The Senate voted overwhelmingly in favor of the extension and the House followed hours later on the afternoon the entire Patriot Act was due to expire. In a historic move, President Obama was on an overseas trip and for the first time ever, the president directed the use of an autopen to sign the bill into law.
Outlook
According to critics, homeland security initiatives and legislation have neither made the country safer not protected liberty and freedom. However, legislators have made significant attempts at reconciling those two values (liberty vs. security).
As one example, sneak-and-peak rules had already been revised in the USA Patriot Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005. A delayed notice requirement was introduced, where suspects must normally be informed about a previously conducted sneak-and-peek search within a “reasonable period not to exceed 30 days.” The most pertinent example however is the USA Freedom Act:
Following a lack of Congressional approval, parts of the Patriot Act expired on June 1, 2015. The Uniting And Strengthening America By Fulfilling Rights And Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015 (USA Freedom Act) renewed some expired provisions from the Patriot Act through 2019, as well as set limits on mass data collection by the government. Much about the legislative as well as public debate about the USA Freedom Act centered on its expected impact on domestic surveillance, specifically by NSA. The Act largely restricts domestic surveillance and the use of technology for such surveillance to the presence of specific requests. Under the Patriot Act, production of domestic surveillance data would often have been allowable for mere threat assessment. In particular, the Act responded to concerns about NSA surveillance of U.S. persons by putting a halt to the agency’s mass phone data collection program. NSA now requires a federal court permission to receive information about targeted individuals.
The Act also establishes limitations on use of Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act, the particular section emblazing the Snowden debate. According to Section 215, the government may apply for a court order compelling any person or entity to turn over records of data relevant to a foreign intelligence investigation. In 2013, Edward Snowden leaked information about the use of Section 215 to bulk collect telephone metadata that NSA held and that could be queried by foreign intelligence investigators. Under the USA Freedom Act, use of Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act is limited to government data collection based on a “specific selection term” (SST), defined as “a term that specifically identifies a person, account, address, or personal device, or any other specific identifier.”This puts strong constraints on bulk data collection. (Siedschlag, 2017 p. 37)
We will revisit the discussion of security vs. liberty in more detail during lesson 8.
References
Doyle, C. (2002). The Patriot Act: A sketch, CRS to Congress. Washington, DC: Library of Congress. Retrieved April 23, 2012 from www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf.
Kettl, D. (2014). System under stress: The challenge to 21st century governance (3rd ed.). Los Angeles, CA: CQPress.
Siedschlag, A. (2017). “Ethical, legal, and social issues in homeland security: what they are and how to address them,” in Martin J. Alperen (ed.), Foundations of homeland security: law and policy. 2nd ed. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2017, pp. 29-54.