

William L. Waugh Jr. is a professor of public administration, urban studies, and political science in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University.

E-mail: wwaugh@gsu.edu.

Gregory Streib is a professor and chair of the Department of Public Administration and Urban Studies in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University.

E-mail: gstreib@gsu.edu.

William L. Waugh Jr.
Gregory Streib
Georgia State University

Collaboration and Leadership for Effective Emergency Management

Collaboration is a necessary foundation for dealing with both natural and technological hazards and disasters and the consequences of terrorism. This analysis describes the structure of the American emergency management system, the charts development of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and identifies conflicts arising from the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the attempt to impose a command and control system on a very collaborative organizational culture in a very collaborative sociopolitical and legal context. The importance of collaboration is stressed, and recommendations are offered on how to improve the amount and value of collaborative activities. New leadership strategies are recommended that derive their power from effective strategies and the transformational power of a compelling vision, rather than from hierarchy, rank, or standard operating procedures.

Hurricane Katrina revealed a national emergency management system in disarray, one that was incapable of responding effectively to the immediate needs of communities along the Gulf Coast and unprepared to coordinate the massive relief effort required to support recovery. Criticism focused on the lack of leadership at all levels of government and the inability of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to mount a disaster response and coordinate the relief. Unfortunately, critics have tended to view the emergency management effort as synonymous with emergency response. Emergency management is a broader set of functions that go beyond search and rescue, emergency medical services, temporary shelter and feeding, and restoring lifelines. Emergency management also includes (1) hazard mitigation to prevent or lessen the impact of disaster, such as building levees or moving people out of floodplains; (2) disaster preparedness, such as emergency planning and training; (3) disaster response activities, such as conducting search and rescue activities; and (4) disaster recovery, usually meaning the restoration of lifelines and basic services.

A lack of understanding of emergency management is likely one reason why officials have suggested that the nation's response to catastrophic disasters needs a stronger command and control system that might be best handled by the military. This article explores whether command and control systems are appropriate in dealing with catastrophic disasters in which authority is shared, responsibility is dispersed, resources are scattered, and collaborative processes are essential. Collaborative processes or some combination of command and control and collaboration might be more appropriate. It also begins to address how FEMA and the DHS should structure the nation's capabilities to deal with catastrophes of all sorts, natural and unnatural.

The field and profession of emergency management have been evolving into a more collaborative enterprise since the 1940s and 1950s. This transformation has gradually moved beyond the classic top-down bureaucratic model to become a more dynamic and flexible network model that facilitates multiorganizational, intergovernmental, and intersectoral cooperation. Yet in the aftermath of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, there have been strong pressures to return to command and control approaches, which are inconsistent with the shared responsibility and authority that characterizes the national emergency management system and interfere with the collaboration that is necessary to address natural and man-made hazards and manage disaster operations. Why is collaboration so important in emergency management, and why are command and control approaches so problematic?

The Evolution of Emergency Management

By the 1990s, professional emergency managers had largely overcome images of the authoritarian air raid wardens and civil defense directors to develop a leadership model emphasizing open communication and broad collaboration. The transition from the civil defense focus of the Cold War to the all-hazards focus of the 1990s involved a fundamental cultural change, as well as a mission adjustment. Relationships with

the public changed. Relationships with other governmental and nongovernmental organizations changed. The successful emergency manager came to be defined as one who could interact effectively with other government officials and with the broader disaster relief community (Drabek 1987). Hundreds of organizations have some role in dealing with hazards or disasters, and many are not linked closely with federal, state, or local emergency management agencies. Making and maintaining the necessary linkages is a monumental challenge, and it is a necessary task when dealing with catastrophic or potentially catastrophic disasters. In other words, the capacity to collaborate effectively with the nation's disaster networks is essential. Frequent interaction, including participation in planning and training exercises, builds that capacity.

Emergency management is also being better integrated into mainstream government operations in more states and communities, though it is still a peripheral function in some. Some communities either lack the resources to invest in hazard management and disaster response capabilities or simply do not see the need to do so. However, when there is identifiable and significant risk to life and property, officials may face political and legal liability for failing to take action. The 9/11 Commission's recognition of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 standard and the emergency management community's acknowledgment of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) standards have made it difficult for public officials to ignore the need to invest in programs to address hazards (Bea 2004). These standards have also made it easier to hold public officials accountable when they do not address known risks and prepare for disasters reasonably. It is much more difficult to claim ignorance of risks when the standards identify potential hazards and provide assessment procedures.

The profession of emergency management has also changed since 9/11 and the catastrophic hurricanes of 2004 and 2005. The task environment has become even more complex with the increased involvement of law enforcement and national security agencies and the addition of terrorist threats. Although there are many similarities between disasters caused by so-called weapons of mass destruction and those caused by natural hazards, unnatural hazards present some special problems for emergency responders. Recent catastrophic disasters have also changed the way natural disasters are viewed. For example, long-term disaster recovery has become a much more central concern, and pre-disaster recovery planning has become a focus in emergency planning. There is more pressure to link disaster recovery to economic development and to deal with the long-term social and economic problems exacerbated by disasters. The broadened mission of emergency management requires a much different

skill set than what was once expected of civil defense officials and has been expected of homeland security officials.

At the local level, collaboration has always been a necessary skill because of the reliance on voluntarism and community involvement. Volunteer fire brigades were organized to protect colonial communities more than two centuries ago, and most American communities still rely on volunteer fire departments. The American Red Cross and the Salvation Army are still the principal sources of assistance to disaster victims. Volunteers provide essential surge capacity and links to community resources.

Clearly, hierarchical bureaucracy can still be found in the mosaic that is contemporary emergency management. In response to the growing number of major natural disasters that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, the National Governors Association asked President Jimmy Carter to consolidate the hundred-plus federal programs that had some responsibility for dealing with disasters. When FEMA was created in 1979, the new agency was given responsibility for programs ranging from the Emergency Alert System to the U.S. Fire Academy to the National Flood Insurance Program. During this time, FEMA experienced serious integration problems as diverse organizational cultures were mingled and national security programs were given priority. The DHS has experienced similar problems since its creation in 2003. For FEMA, the failure to respond effectively to Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Iniki led Congress to consider dismantling the agency in 1992. However, James Lee Witt reinvented the agency, and it proved remarkably capable during the Northridge earthquake in 1994 and the 9/11 disasters. Problems became evident again, however, during the response to the 2004 Florida hurricanes, and they became a national scandal following the poor response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster in 2005. The question now is how to repair the nation's capability to deal with disaster. In some measure, the question has become "FEMA in or FEMA out"—should FEMA remain within DHS, or should it be an independent agency that reports directly to the president, as it was before the DHS was created? Is it even possible to restore FEMA's capabilities to deal with natural and technological disasters? The collaborative approach that guided FEMA's programs in the 1990s may be lost.

The Essential Roles of Networks

Modern emergency management presents a paradox. On one hand, emergency response requires meticulous organization and planning, but on the other hand, it is spontaneous. Emergency managers have to innovate, adapt, and improvise because plans, regardless of how well done, seldom fit circumstances. Blending these conflicting needs is no easy task.

Government hierarchies play a central role, of course, but emergency response also necessarily draws on a wide range of community economic, social-psychological, and political resources. The mobilization of organizational and individual volunteers also serves a social-psychological purpose in that it brings communities together and gives them a sense of efficacy.

Sociologists have described a process of *convergence* in which those wishing to help converge on disaster areas (Fritz and Mathewson 1956). In fact, the state of California's manual for anticipating and organizing volunteers is titled *They Will Come* (2001). Emergency response differs from many other aspects of modern life that are dominated by rigid organizational structures. The involvement of nongovernmental actors builds the capacity of communities to deal with future disasters. The disaster experience can speed recovery and make communities more resilient when disaster strikes again. Community capacities to respond to and recover from disasters are not enhanced when officials preempt or exclude community involvement (Comfort 1999).

In California and (increasingly) in states with a high frequency of disaster, emergency management has become a cottage industry. Professional groups and consultants address almost every aspect of natural and technological hazards and disasters. Private companies are also involved, providing an extensive range of services from retrofitting buildings so that they are less vulnerable to earthquakes to providing psychological counseling. The lines between governmental and nongovernmental activities are blurring as services are contracted out and governments encourage preparedness efforts. Itinerant emergency managers move from community to community, developing emergency operations and mitigation plans, coordinating disaster operations, and facilitating collaboration among communities and state agencies. To be sure, emergency management is not unlike other government offices and agencies today in terms of the contracting out of central functions, but a key difference is that service demand escalates tremendously when a major disaster strikes. Communities become vulnerable when their internal capacity is permitted to atrophy and outside resources are unavailable. Hurricane Katrina tested the limits of governmental and nongovernmental capacities.

Emergency management capacity is built from the ground up. Neighborhood and community programs have to stand on their own because assistance may not arrive for hours or days. Major incidents are addressed by mutual assistance arrangements among

community police, fire, and emergency medical service providers. Prevention is generally a local responsibility as well. Local governments have principal responsibility for adopting and enforcing building codes, building standards, and land-use regulations to mitigate water, wind, seismic, landslide, and other hazards. Local emergency managers are increasingly collaborating with building code, urban planning, and other officials who can help reduce risks. What we now call the *new governance process* forms the core of our national emergency response. Consensual processes are the rule. State and federal agencies play important roles by providing public education, alert and warning systems, and evacuation plans, but the tools needed to manage hazards and reduce risks are most often in the hands of local officials.

Disaster operations, particularly large operations, frequently involve a great many organizational and individual participants. For example, the response to the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah

Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 involved hundreds of public, nonprofit, and private organizations, as well as spontaneous volunteers. The bombing was a federal crime involving a federal facility that resulted in the deaths of federal officers, and legal jurisdiction clearly resided with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other federal agencies. However, the search and rescue operation was managed by the Oklahoma City Fire Department, and the outer security perimeter was managed by Oklahoma City and Oklahoma State law enforcement officers. The rescue operation included federalized Urban Search and Rescue teams from local agencies across the nation. Firefighters from more than 75 Oklahoma communities and more than 35 departments from Texas, Kansas, Arkansas, and other states participated. In all, FEMA deployed more than 1,000 of its own employees and hundreds from other federal agencies. The American Red Cross provided food and shelter for emergency personnel and support for victims and their families. Private firms ranging from building supply companies to funeral homes to restaurants supported the responders. The scale of the operation required resources from all levels of government and a wide variety of nongovernmental organizations.

The response to the World Trade Center attack in 2001 was much larger and much more complex than the response to the Oklahoma City bombing. The operation involved hundreds of organizations and many thousands of volunteers. Restaurants, catering firms, and disaster relief organizations fed emergency response and law enforcement personnel for weeks. The American Red Cross coordinated the recruitment

The involvement of nongovernmental actors builds the capacity of communities to deal with future disasters. The disaster experience can speed recovery and make communities more resilient when disaster strikes again.

and deployment of tens of thousands of volunteers around Ground Zero. Private firms provided material support ranging from equipment for search and rescue operations to clean socks and underwear for emergency responders, not to mention big-screen televisions, lounge chairs, and massage therapists for rest areas. Representatives from the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Pet Rescue, and other animal welfare organizations located and rescued pets left in apartments by owners who had evacuated. Relief organizations cleaned apartments and businesses covered with dust and debris from the collapsed towers (Lowe and Fothergill 2003; Sutton 2003), and volunteer counselors provided psychological counseling for emergency responders, law enforcement personnel, and victims for months afterward (Seeley 2005). Ad hoc relief organizations created in the neighborhoods surrounding the World Trade Center site continue to operate today. In fact, approximately 350 new charities were created after the 9/11 attacks. Similarly, almost 400 new charities were created after the Hurricane Katrina disaster (Strom 2006).

The large number of nongovernmental organizations involved in disaster operations has encouraged the creation of umbrella organizations such as National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster and InterAction, a consortium of U.S.-based international humanitarian and development organizations, as well as activities such as the Disaster News Network, which is funded by the American Baptist Churches USA, Episcopal Relief and Development, the Mennonite Disaster Service, Presbyterian Disaster Assistance, the United Methodist Committee on Relief, and other faith-based groups (see www.disasternews.net/sponsors/). As early as 1992, Monte Sahlin of Adventist Community Services noted the development of networks of nongovernmental actors. In a speech to the National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster, Sahlin judged the Hurricane Andrew disaster to be a watershed marking a shift toward network organizations. He described the shift in these terms:

Increasingly our constituencies all gray together into a mass of individuals who want to respond to disasters. And we don't know anymore whether they are part of the Adventist constituency or the Mennonite constituency or the Red Cross constituency or the Methodist constituency and they don't care. They are just individuals who want to do something and make a difference because people are suffering. They tend to operate on the basis of the personal and want to participate on a personal level. They do not trust large organizations and they don't want to be put into some bureaucratic system. (Sahlin 1992)

Sahlin's comments underscore the complexities of developing an effective emergency response when organizational cultures vary so greatly. As he notes, imposing a hierarchy can have a stifling effect. In fact, conflicts between the organizational cultures of groups such as those described by Sahlin and those of hierarchical governmental organizations, particularly law enforcement and the military, are legend in disaster relief organizations. Cultural interoperability problems are major impediments to the effective coordination of disaster relief operations (Waugh 2003, 2004). Effective collaboration requires both cultural sensitivity and a common language. Nonetheless, conflicts are inevitable, and some organizations simply may be unable or unwilling to work with others.

Collaborative networks are a fundamental component of any emergency response. It is a mistake to assume that a response can be completely scripted or that the types of resources that are available can be fully catalogued. It is also a mistake to assume that any individual or organization can manage all the relief and recovery efforts during a catastrophic disaster.

The Collaborative Role of Emergency Managers

At the professional level, the critical tasks leading up to, during, and following a disaster involve coordinating multiorganizational, intergovernmental, and intersectoral response and recovery operations. In the early 1970s, because of coordination problems during large California wildfires, the incident command system was created to integrate and coordinate fire operations involving multiple departments. Unity of command tempered by management by objectives was the solution for mounting large-scale, disciplined fire responses, and incident command became the mantra of fire services. When events get larger and involve more participants, a unified command is created. Unified command usually means more sharing of information and coordination of effort, but participation in decision making is limited in large emergency response operations. There are practical limits to participation, particularly when quick decisions are needed, but there are also limits imposed by culture and convention. Noncollegial professions typically do not find open communication and participation comfortable. Public health professionals, for example, generally expect open discussion of issues before decisions (Waugh 2002b).

By the 1980s, it was recognized that the effectiveness of emergency management programs rested primarily on the interpersonal skills of emergency managers rather than on their technical skills (Drabek 1987). The emergency manager became a coordinator and facilitator of emergency operations by first and second responders largely by maintaining a central emergency operations center, ensuring communications between

and among responders, and providing essential links to policy makers. The coordinative role became crucial in large intergovernmental, intersectoral, and multiorganizational operations (Waugh 1993). In large jurisdictions, the emergency management director, working as an agent of the chief executive or chief administrative officer, might also provide strategic direction when necessary. Distinctions were made between the coordinative role of the emergency manager and the operational roles of first responders. In small jurisdictions, however, the roles were often intertwined with fire chiefs, police chiefs, or their subordinates acting as emergency managers as well as responders. Whether the incident command system has utility at the emergency operations center level (as opposed to the field operations level) is an issue that needs to be examined.

By the mid-1990s, the paradigm shift noted by Sahlin was also being reflected in the new FEMA of James Lee Witt. The focus shifted from disaster response to mitigation. The agency's mantra became "one dollar spent on mitigation saves two (or several) dollars in recovery." The federal role changed from being the proverbial cavalry, rushing in to save people, to being a supporter of individual and community efforts to reduce risks and prepare for and respond to disasters. The cavalry approach is impractical in a large nation or state because it simply takes too long for the cavalry to mobilize and ride to the rescue. Proactive activities, such as pre-positioning material near expected disaster areas, were adopted to support state and local efforts and to prevent the kinds of delays that occurred during responses to Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The lessons of Hugo and Andrew also gave impetus for a speedier federal response to aid the most vulnerable populations—notably the poor, elderly, and ill, who do not have the resources to fend for themselves for even a few days. The creation of the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (now the National Stockpile), with medical supplies dispersed across the nation, was a part of this response. These changes also required partnerships with state and local agencies to facilitate communication and coordination and to expand the capacities of first and second responders, particularly at the local level. Increased partnerships with nongovernmental organizations and private firms (such as Home Depot) were part of the new FEMA in the Clinton administration.

A 2002 study of FEMA's involvement in promoting safe construction methods to reduce vulnerabilities to flood, fire, wind, and other hazards found the agency taking a multifaceted approach. It was using its regu-

latory power and economic incentives through the National Flood Insurance Program to reduce flood losses and employing the Project Impact (Disaster-Resistant Communities) program to address a variety of hazards. It was also funding workshops through the Blue Sky Foundation to help create a market for safe construction methods and to encourage the building industry to adopt such methods. Funding was given to the Institute for Business and Home Safety's "fortified home" program, university agricultural extension "model home" programs, and other local, state, and federal programs to educate the public and builders about construction methods that can reduce vulnerabilities to wind, fire, and water hazards. The efforts included direct regulation, financial and regulatory incentive programs, direct funding, collaboration with other agencies, and informal, often personal encouragement for the champions of safe construction methods. In some cases, the same agency personnel were working formally and informally with very different kinds of networks to promote the adoption of safe construction methods (Waugh 2002a).

Developing an Effective Leadership Strategy

Leadership problems were cited specifically by the House Select Committee that investigated the poor response to Hurricane Katrina. The committee found "failures at all levels of government that significantly undermined and detracted from the heroic efforts of first responders, private individuals and organizations, faith-based groups, and others" (U.S. House 2006, 1). The committee went on to say in its final report,

We reflect on the 9/11 Commission's finding that "the most important failure was one of

The lessons of Hugo and Andrew also gave impetus for a speedier federal response to aid the most vulnerable populations—notably the poor, elderly, and ill, who do not have the resources to fend for themselves for even a few days.

imagination." The Select Committee believes that Katrina was primarily a failure of initiative. But there is, of course, a nexus between the two. Both imagination and initiative—in other words, leadership—require good information. And a coordinated process for sharing it. And a willingness to use information—however

imperfect or incomplete—to fuel action. (1)

Likewise, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs in June 2006, Donald Kettl concluded that leadership was the critical and missing element in the poor Katrina response. He argued that the committee should focus on improving FEMA and the DHS leadership rather than on organizational reform.

How, then, should leaders lead in times of disaster? The findings of the 9/11 Commission and the House

Select Committee that officials lacked imagination and initiative, respectively, certainly focus on the inability of leaders to be proactive. The House Select Committee report also points out that officials failed to adapt existing plans to circumstances as the storm approached New Orleans and especially when the levees failed (2006, 4). Ultimately, officials had to respond on an ad hoc basis because plans were not implemented, were not implemented in time, or were found to be ineffective.

Leadership needs vary, and comprehensive emergency management presents a different set of challenges than emergency response. The task environment is very different after the storm has passed or the ground stops shaking or the terrorists have fled. Nonetheless, hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and disaster recovery are not just closely linked—they are intertwined. A flexible leadership approach is necessary. In fact, Charles Wise (2006) suggests that although command and control structures are important, the DHS also needs to have more flexible and more nimble processes to ensure that it can adjust to changing circumstances. Network management is the missing capability in the DHS organization, in other words. Wise concludes that more adaptive management—that is, processes that encourage the sharing of information and more collaboration—would foster organizational learning and facilitate adaptation and improvisation.

There is evidence that inappropriate leadership strategies were a factor in the poor response to Hurricane Katrina. The House Select Committee report faulted the command and control system because it interfered with the disaster response. The implication was that a better command and control system rather than a decentralized system would have worked better. However, a large part of the problem with the command and control system was the lack of situational awareness—that is, poor communication among officials in the disaster area and decision makers in Baton Rouge, Jackson, and Washington. The leadership strategy required for crises may well be counterintuitive. Information often flows from the bottom in a traditional hierarchy, to the extent that it flows at all. Such a situation may be better handled by a style that is affiliative, open, and democratic. An authoritarian response would certainly be faster and more consistent, but it would require insight and vision that may not be available to those with actual authority and media access. As noted previously, flexibility needs to be a key requirement for leaders in catastrophic disasters and hierarchical decision processes are neither flexible nor speedy in rapidly changing circumstances (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004, 31).

Collaboration and Katrina

Following the 9/11 attacks, the nation focused on the threat of terrorism rather than on more familiar and

probable natural and technological disasters (Waugh 2006). The all-hazards Federal Response Plan that served to coordinate the federal response to the 9/11 attacks was replaced by a more terrorism-centric National Response Plan. The federal government is assumed to be the lead government for major disasters of all sorts, even though the primary legal and political responsibility for dealing with most disasters normally resides with state and local officials. Sorting out responsibilities was one of the major problems in the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (U.S. House 2006).

Homeland security–style emergency management has become more response oriented, less collaborative, and more centralized. Centralized decision processes caused delays in approving and dispatching disaster assistance and greatly complicated communication between and federal officials on the ground in New Orleans, Mississippi, and Alabama and their bosses in Washington. The infamous e-mail exchange between FEMA director Michael Brown and Marty Bahamonde, a FEMA official who rode out the storm in New Orleans and reported conditions in the Superdome, is indicative of the disconnect between federal decision makers and emergency management personnel in the disaster area (Lipton 2005). After action reports and studies have noted serious communication problems between and among local, state, and federal officials, not to mention serious problems communicating with and among emergency responders (U.S. House 2006; Waugh 2006).

A major criticism of homeland security officials has been their failure to collaborate extensively with non-governmental disaster organizations, as FEMA did in the 1990s. Although FEMA experienced some problems coordinating with charities following the 9/11 attacks, the problems were largely resolved within a few weeks (GAO 2002). The House Select Committee report on the Katrina response cites serious coordination problems among FEMA, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the state of Louisiana (2006, 3). The report also cites problems coordinating search and rescue operations among the U.S. Coast Guard, the National Guard, the regular military, and others (4). The lack of coordination of military and state and local emergency management efforts was attributed to the fact that the Northern Command was not connected to state emergency management structures prior to the disaster. As a result, there was a lack of understanding and trust (4). These problems were not new when Katrina made landfall. Intergovernmental and interorganizational coordination problems have been noted in several TOPOFF (Top Officials) exercises (DHS 2005; Inglesby, Grossman, and O'Toole 2001).

Part of the common wisdom of emergency management is that communication and collaboration are facilitated

by personal familiarity, not just institutional contact. The development of strong working relationships with state and local counterparts was a central component of FEMA's regional programs during the 1990s, and those relationships have since deteriorated. Building regional offices and roles has been suggested to DHS (Heyman and Carafano 2004; Meese, Carafano, and Weitz 2005), but recent reorganizations have centralized rather than decentralized decision processes.

Terrorist-spawned catastrophes require considerable collaboration in order to utilize the nation's capacity to deal with disaster (Waugh and Sylves 2002). Effective utilization of nongovernmental resources is a problem following terrorist attacks because the agencies that are supposed to take the lead role are often unfamiliar with the networks that respond to large natural disasters and unused to communicating openly and collaborating closely with nongovernmental actors (Waugh 2003). This is one of the concerns with proposals for a larger military role in the nation's emergency management system. Greater capacity for command and control is not synonymous with greater capacity for collaboration. The poor response to Katrina demonstrated a lack of collaboration and, as the House Select Committee has pointed out, the Defense Department does not have continuous working relationships with state and local emergency management offices. Nor does it have a role in hazard mitigation (except for the work of the Corps of Engineers), disaster preparedness, and disaster recovery.

Collaboration is an expectation in emergency management. The NFPA 1600, the international standard for emergency management programs, and the EMAP standard, which was adapted from the NFPA 1600 for public emergency management programs, define *programs* as "a jurisdiction-wide system that provides for management and coordination of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery activities for all hazards. The system encompasses all organizations, agencies, departments, entities, and individuals responsible for emergency management and homeland security" (EMAP Standard 3.3.3).

The standard goes on to require an advisory committee to ensure input by program stakeholders (Standard 4.3.1) and to "ensure that the program is developed and maintained in collaboration with program stakeholders, both from policy and operational levels" (Standard 4.3.2). Organizations are not accredited, but programs are. An analysis of the baseline assessments, conducted as part of FEMA's National Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assurance Program to help programs improve their capa-

bilities, found that about one-half of the states evaluated had committees of stakeholders or similar mechanisms to ensure meaningful involvement in program policy and operational decision making (Lucas 2005). Accreditation is contingent on developing mechanisms for cooperation and collaboration, even when it requires a change in state law or local ordinance to permit participation by nongovernmental organizations.

The focus on collaboration and cooperation is also evident in FEMA's training programs. FEMA encourages communities to send their elected and appointed officials, along with their emergency managers, to the National Emergency Training Center for four-and-a-half-day Integrated Emergency Management courses that use simulations and classroom instruction to develop collaborative skills, as well as an understanding of technical issues such as recovery and mitigation following hurricanes (FEMA 2004). Some jurisdictions send dozens of officials, including elected leaders, to ensure that they develop the skills to handle complex emergencies. The point is that the interpersonal contact—the working relationships—are critical.

Intellectually, the emergency management profession has moved beyond a focus on emergency response to a focus on all hazards and comprehensive emergency management. Indeed, to receive the highest credential in the field, the Certified Emergency Manager designation, emergency managers have to have education, training, and experience in all four functions (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery). It is not enough to be an experienced firefighter or an emergency medical technician or a military logistician. A working knowledge of the four functions and an understanding of the social, political, and legal contexts of emergency management are required. These developments certainly illustrate the value placed on leaders able to understand the big picture, but these actors are seldom the ones designing the major organizational infrastructure that governs national action. They must also manage the "rowers," who may not have a clear conception of the different roles in the system.

Conclusions

Disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery are the end products of complex political and administrative interactions, and the results cannot be easily controlled or anticipated. Analyzing the best way to approach these tasks is valuable, as improved performance in emergency management depends to a great extent on the ability of public officials to fully comprehend the complexities of the policy networks operating in the areas in which they work and to think

Disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery are the end products of complex political and administrative interactions, and the results cannot be easily controlled or anticipated.

strategically about how to use or alter them. They also need subject-matter knowledge of diverse topics—such as land-use regulation, zoning, and building codes—in order to properly understand and explain community vulnerabilities.

Understanding the implications of disaster response decisions on a community's ability to recover quickly is also essential. It is not just a case of "putting the white on the red," as firefighters describe putting out fires. The need for a broad perspective and effective leadership skills is not radically different from other public administration activities, but the hazards faced are often far more dire and consequential. Sorting out these complex issues is more than any single person can do, and this is certainly one reason emergency managers were quick to understand and embrace collaborative activities. Collaboration is the way professional emergency managers get the job done. That said, disasters and fear of disasters also generate a strong desire for hierarchy—somebody to take charge, or possibly someone to be held accountable. Such thinking is inconsistent with the tenets of the field and displays blindness to what collaborative action has accomplished. There are pressures in emergency management that help drive collaboration, but there is also pressure for the kind of security promised by a commanding leader.

Emergency management theory and practice has certainly been influenced by the revolution that is changing all aspects of public administration here and abroad. The National Performance Review called for delegating authority, replacing rules and regulations with incentives, developing budgets based on results, exposing government operations to competition, searching for market rather than administrative solutions, and, whenever possible, measuring the success of government in terms of customer satisfaction (Gore 1993, 7). FEMA has been transformed by the National Performance Review, the Government Performance and Results Act, and the New Public Management. In the 1980s, FEMA officials measured outputs—for example, the number of training programs and the amount (in dollars) of assistance delivered. In the 1990s, saving lives and reducing property losses, as well as customer satisfaction, were the results that FEMA pursued. The achievement of those results necessitated partnerships and broader collaboration because FEMA had neither the authority nor the resources to achieve the desired results on its own (see Waugh 1999). Little has changed since the 1990s. FEMA, as well as the DHS, lack the authority and the resources to protect life and property without collaboration.

Better understanding of the nature of collaboration can also produce benefits. It is easy to confuse responsiveness with collaboration, for example. This kind of

confusion could also help to fuel the desire for greater hierarchical control. Disasters will inevitably produce calls for responsiveness, but an effective response is unlikely to happen without collaboration. Vigoda (2002) helped to clarify this issue when he argued that New Public Management notions of responsiveness have also been accompanied by "a lower willingness to share, participate, elaborate, and partner with citizens." Responders can be blinded by their own good intentions.

Likewise, public officials need to know that network management and intergovernmental management may not be related activities (Agranoff and McGuire 2003). Despite arguments about the disarticulated state, the basic legal and normative structure remains intact. This makes collaboration much more challenging in emergency management than in other public arenas. The federal government is always the elephant in the room, possibly facilitating or inhibiting the actions of others. And, we saw during the Katrina response, it can be frustrating for federal officials when they lack the authority to deal with the catastrophe they see developing. Though they could have supplanted state authority and taken over the response, the political repercussions would have been severe. The temptation is to change the rules rather than to collaborate closely. By the same token, it can be frustrating for state officials when federal officials want to assume control over state resources, such as the National Guard.

The response to natural disasters is, in large measure, an ad hoc affair involving organized nongovernmental actors, governmental actors, and emergent groups that often become well organized and long lived. No one can ever have complete control; it is not possible to fully command attention or to compel compliance. Nongovernmental organizations will respond with or without government approval. Volunteers will arrive with or without an invitation. First responders will self-deploy. This type of convergence behavior is inevitable. Better integration of nongovernmental organizations into federal, state, and local disaster relief operations is the best approach, as recommended by the White House's review of the Katrina response (Townsend 2006), but this will not be easy to achieve. An enhanced military role in disaster response is likely to occur, but unless the Defense Department develops long-term and close working relationships with state and local emergency management offices, a broader role is not realistic. Some (perhaps many) nongovernmental organizations would choose not to work with military units as well.

Although integration might facilitate the co-optation of nongovernmental organizations (O'Toole and Meier 2004), it is likely that some differences cannot be smoothed over. Goal conflicts are common, as is

distrust. The controversy over rebuilding neighborhoods in New Orleans's Ninth Ward is a good illustration. Nongovernmental organizations and volunteers are helping to rebuild homes as city and state officials consider redevelopment plans, including plans not to rebuild in some areas, and as federal officials determine what restrictions should be in place to prevent future flooding. Governors, mayors, sheriffs, and other public officials, including presidents and members of Congress, have heavy political stakes in the management of hazards and disasters. Their goals frequently conflict, and finding common ground is challenging.

As Donald Kettl (2006) noted in his congressional testimony, leadership has been a serious problem for FEMA and the DHS. The skills and experience that should be required for new appointees has been a subject of debate following recent resignations. The type of leadership credibility discussed by Gabris (2004) is certainly needed. The choice should derive from vision and strategic thinking rather than from a predisposition to hierarchy or management control. Though political savvy will also help, developing an appropriate agenda can only come from mastering the fundamentals of emergency management and related disciplines. To be sure, James Lee Witt was the transformational leader who reinvented FEMA in 1993, beginning his first day at work as he shook hands with employees as they arrived for work at the front door of the headquarters building in Washington. Defining the core values of the agency and building morale and competence was his approach to transforming the agency into what was once one of the best-functioning agencies in the federal government. Although the values may have changed somewhat since 9/11, the imperative to collaborate has not.

References

- Agranoff, Robert, and Michael McGuire. 2003. Inside the Matrix: Integrating the Paradigms of Intergovernmental and Network Management. *International Journal of Public Administration* 26(12): 1401–22.
- Bea, Keith. 2004. *Emergency Management Preparedness Standards: Overview and Options for Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
- California, Governor's Office of Emergency Services. 2001. They Will Come: Post-Disaster Volunteers and Local Governments. www.oes.ca.gov [accessed August 28, 2006].
- Comfort, Louise K. 1999. *Shared Risks: Complex Systems in Seismic Response*. Oxford, UK: Pergamon/Elsevier Science.
- Drabek, Thomas. 1987. *The Professional Emergency Manager*. Boulder, CO: University of Colorado, Institute for Behavioral Science.
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 2004. *2004–2005 Training Catalog: Catalog of Courses for the National Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute*. Emmitsburg, MD: U.S. Fire Administration/FEMA.
- Fritz, Charles E., and J. H. Mathewson. 1956. *Convergence Behavior in Disasters: A Problem in Social Control*. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council.
- Gabris, Gerald T. 2004. Developing Public Managers into Credible Public Leaders: Theory and Practical Implications. *International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior* 7(2): 209–30.
- Goldsmith, Stephen, and William D. Eggers. 2004. *Governing by Network: The New Shape of the Public Sector*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Gore, Al. 1993. *From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less*. Report of the National Performance Review. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Heyman, David, and James Jay Carafano. 2004. DHS 2.0: *Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security*. Special Report No. 2, Heritage Foundation. www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/sr02.cfm [accessed August 28, 2006].
- Inglesby, Thomas V., Rita Grossman, and Tara O'Toole. 2001. A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF. *Clinical Infectious Diseases* 32(3): 436–45.
- Kettl, Donald F. 2006. National Emergency Management: Where Does FEMA Belong? Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., June 8. http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/060806Kettl.pdf [accessed August 28, 2006].
- Lipton, Eric. 2005. Worker Tells of Response by FEMA. *New York Times*, October 21.
- Lowe, S., and A. Fothergill. 2003. A Need to Help: Emergent Volunteer Behavior after September 11th. In *Beyond September 11th: An Account of Post-Disaster Research*, edited by J. L. Monday, 293–314. Boulder: University of Colorado, Institute of Behavioral Science, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center.
- Lucas, Valerie J. 2005. Analysis of Baseline Assessments: Emergency Management Accreditation Program, 2003–2004. Master's thesis, California State University, Long Beach.
- Meese, Edwin, James Jay Carafano, and Richard Weitz. 2005. Organizing for Victory: Proposals for Building a Regional Homeland Security Structure. Backgrounder No. 1817, Heritage Foundation. www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg1817.cfm [accessed August 28, 2006].

- O'Toole, Laurence J., Jr., and Kenneth J. Meier. 2004. Desperately Seeking Selznick: Co-optation and the Dark Side of Public Management in Networks. *Public Administration Review* 64(6): 681–94.
- Sahlin, Monte. 1992. Paradigm Shift. Speech to the Conference of the National Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster, September 14. www.nvoad.org/articles/paradigm.php [accessed August 28, 2006].
- Seeley, Karen. 2005. The Psychological Treatment of Trauma and the Trauma of Psychological Treatment: Talking to Psychotherapists about 9/11. In *Wounded City: The Social Impact of 9/11*, edited by Nancy Foner, 263–92. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Strom, Stephanie. 2006. Many Charities Founded after Hurricane Are Faltering. *New York Times*, March 13.
- Sutton, J. 2003. A Complex Organizational Adaptation to the World Trade Center Disaster: An Analysis of Faith-Based Organizations. In *Beyond September 11th: An Account of Post-Disaster Research*, edited by J. L. Monday, 405–28. Boulder: University of Colorado, Institute of Behavioral Science, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center.
- Townsend, Frances Fragos. 2006. *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*. Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned [accessed August 28, 2006].
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of the Inspector General. 2005. A Review of the Top Officials 3 Exercise. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. OIG-06-07.
- U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 2002. *September 11: More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable Organizations' Contributions in Disasters*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. GAO-03-259.
- U.S. House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. 2006. *A Failure of Initiative*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm [accessed August 28, 2006].
- Vigoda, Eran. 2002. From Responsiveness to Collaboration: Governance, Citizens, and the Next Generation of Public Administration. *Public Administration Review* 62(5): 527–40.
- Waugh, William L., Jr. 1993. Coordination or Control: Organizational Design and the Emergency Management Function. *International Journal of Disaster Prevention and Management* 2(4): 17–31.
- . 1999. The Fiscal Risk of All-Hazards Emergency Management or the Political Hazards in Rational Policy. *International Journal of Public Administration* 22: 611–36.
- . 2002a. *Leveraging Networks to Meet National Goals: FEMA and the Safe Construction Networks*. Washington, DC: Pricewaterhouse Coopers Foundation for the Business of Government.
- . 2002b. Organizational Culture, Communication, and Decision-Making: Making Multi-Organizational, Inter-Sector, and Intergovernmental Operations Work. Paper presented at the National Conference on Catastrophic Care for the Nation, National Disaster Medical System, April 13–17, Atlanta, GA.
- . 2003. Terrorism, Homeland Security and the National Emergency Management Network. *Public Organization Review* 3: 373–85.
- . 2004. Building a Seamless Homeland Security: The Cultural Interoperability Problem. Paper presented at the National Conference of the American Society for Public Administration, March 28–30, Portland, OR.
- . 2006. The Political Costs of Failure in the Responses to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Special issue, *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science* 604: 10–25.
- Waugh, William L., Jr., and Richard T. Sylves. 2002. Organizing the War on Terrorism. Special issue, *Public Administration Review* 62: 145–53.
- Wise, Charles R. 2006. Organizing for Homeland Security after Katrina: Is Adaptive Management What's Missing? *Public Administration Review* 66(2): 302–18.