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Chapter 1

Introduction

How has the changed international security environment of the post–Cold War era affected the relationship between civilian and military leaders? This new security environment is bringing about changes in civil-military relations globally. For example, in both of the Cold War protagonists, the end of the Cold War coincided with a deterioration in the relationship between civilian authority and the military. The United States and Russia, once models of military subordination to civilian authority,[1] have both experienced a weakening of civilian control. Since the August 1991 coup attempt in the Soviet Union, there have been recurrent concerns about whether the Soviet and then Russian militaries have been fully under civilian control.[2] More recently, some observers in the United States have suggested that there is a "crisis" in U.S. civil-military relations.[3] In neither country is there much danger of a military coup d'état or even outright insubordination by the military. Nevertheless, in both countries once-ideal patterns of civilian control changed for the worse with the end of the Cold War.

This development is surprising. Much of the theoretical and conceptual literature on civil-military relations focuses almost exclusively on domestic influences on civil-military relations, such as the character of individual civilian and military leaders, the structure and norms of the military organization, the institutions of civilian government, and the nature of society. And the small part of the literature that looks to international variables shares Harold Lasswell's premise that the military should be

harder to control in a challenging international threat environment than in a relatively benign one.[4] The end of the Cold War, according to Lasswell's logic, should make it more, rather than less, likely that civilians will maintain control of their military organizations. In this book I explain why the opposite is true. The root of the problem, at least in the Russian and American cases, is that neither military quickly found new doctrines and missions as conducive to firm civilian control of the military as were their Cold War doctrines and missions.

Historically, interest in civil-military relations, at least in the United States, has been most intense at times when the international security environment seemed to be changing. The first wave of Cold War scholarship on the subject was prompted by concerns about how a prolonged period of "neither peace nor war" might affect U.S. civil-military relations.[5] A second wave of scholarly interest emerged in the mid-1970s, when many thought that détente might inaugurate an enduring period of reduced international threat.[6] The post–Cold War renaissance of interest in civil-military relations constitutes a third wave.[7] This coincidence between international change and intensified scholarly interest in civil-military relations is in line with my theory that changes in the structural threat environment ultimately shape the relationship between the military and civilian leadership. I trace the actual causal relationship in the cases I examine in this book.

One might ask why, if there is so much scholarly interest in post–Cold War civil-military relations, this issue is not more prominent in the public debate in the United States. There are four reasons. First, civilian leaders, especially those in the Clinton administration, have little interest in publicizing their ongoing problems with the American military because these problems make the civilian leaders look weak.[8] Second, the American military also does not want to highlight this weakening of civilian control because the notion of subordination to civilian authority is so deeply embedded in its professional culture that it is difficult for most military officers to admit publicly their changed attitudes toward civilian control.[9] Yet it is clear that these attitudes *have* changed.[10] I heard an active-duty Russian Army officer minimize the extent of post–Cold War civil-military tension in his country by arguing that the actions of Russian generals in challenging civilian policies with which they disagreed were no different from those of American generals such as Colin Powell.[11]

Third, the U.S. public's interest in military issues has waned dramatically since the end of the Cold War, so the short-term consequences of this weakening in civilian control of the military are not readily apparent.[12]

Finally, many believe that problems with civil-military relations are exclusively a Third World phenomenon and that if there is no danger of a military coup d'état, everything is fine. The confluence of these four factors explains why this issue has so far remained largely an inside-the-Beltway and academic-specialist concern.

Civil-military relations is a very complicated issue. Analysts disagree about how to define and measure civil-military relations as the dependent variable. These disagreements have two causes. First, it is not always clear when issues involve civil-military conflict rather than intracivilian struggles, intramilitary fights, or civil-military coalitional wars. Few issues clearly pit civilians against military officers.[13] In pluralist democracies, civilian leaders may be divided over an issue—especially in the United States, where the institutions of civilian rule are divided and the Constitution assigns responsibility for control of the military to both the executive and the legislative branches.[14] Ironically, legislative assertiveness in this area, while constitutionally sanctioned as an important check on executive power, is likely to dilute executive authority and thereby weaken civilian control of the military. The theory I offer in this book would lead us to expect greater civilian and military disunity, and a consequent weakening of civilian control, in less challenging external threat environments.

A second cause of disagreement in analyses of relations between civil and military establishments is that even when we are sure the issue is one of civil-military relations, it is often not clear whether these relations are good or bad. There is a remarkably broad range of ideas on what constitutes "good" or "bad" civil-military relations.

Most people think about civil-military relations strictly in terms of coups: if there are coups, then civil-military relations are bad, and if not they are good. But there are many other aspects to civil-military relations.[15] As Samuel Huntington notes, "the problem in the modern state is not armed revolt but the relation of the expert to the politician."[16] One can have poor civil-military relations without the threat of a coup.

Some analysts use the extent of military influence in areas beyond strictly military issues as a measure of civil-military relations.[17] By this indicator, good civil-military relations exist when the military concerns itself exclusively with military affairs. The problem with this standard is that sometimes the military takes on nonmilitary functions at the behest of civilians.[18] Moreover, the line between the civilian and military spheres is not always clear.

Others may argue that excessive military influence on national policy debates is a potential problem: for example, military support for the Com-

mittee on the Present Danger's critique of the SALT II treaty may have skewed public perception of the soundness of that agreement. There may be a problem here, but not necessarily one of civil-military relations. There is in principle nothing wrong with the military's participating in national debates on important issues in which it has substantial interest and expertise. When its influence in these debates is disproportionate, it is likely to be due to civilian deference rather than inappropriate military influence.

Some observers look to the frequency of conflict between military and civilian leaders as an indicator: a state has good civil-military relations when there are few conflicts. This criterion also is misleading, since some conflict is inevitable and perhaps even desirable in a pluralistic political system.[19]

Still others suggest that the state of civil-military relations should be measured by how much civilians and military officers like and respect one another. But it is not necessary for military officers to like and respect civilian leaders in order for them to obey these leaders.[20] Disrespect is not a problem in itself, though it could reflect deeper problems.

Another possible definition is that good civil-military relations are whatever results in effective military policies.[21] The objective of civilian control is not, however, just to produce good military policy. Civilian control of the military, like the separation of powers among the civilian branches of the U.S. government, was clearly a compromise between increased military or political effectiveness and the preservation of domestic liberty.[22] Good civil-military relations will usually produce good policy, but not always. During the Vietnam War, for example, the U.S. military, despite its grave reservations, obeyed civilian orders that led to disaster. Conversely, Gen. Charles de Gaulle made the right choice in breaking with the Vichy Republic in June of 1940 but established an unfortunate precedent for later French civil-military relations.

In an ideal world, of course, there would never be any threat of a coup, the military would always stay clearly within the "military" realm and make only constructive contributions to national policy debates, there would be few civilian-military conflicts, top military and civilian leaders would respect and even like one another, and effective national policies would result. But in the real world, the bottom line for developed democracies is civilian control: can civilian leaders reliably get the military to do what they want it to?

The best indicator of the state of civilian control is who prevails when civilian and military preferences diverge.[23] If the military does, there is a problem; if the civilians do, there is not. To determine whether the military plays an important role in a society's political decision-making, one should identify a number of issues that pitted military preferences against those of civilians and show who prevailed.[24]

There are four potential, but not ultimately insurmountable, problems with this approach. First, initial civilian and military positions may be strategic and not reflect real preferences. However, this ought to be true of both sides, so it should still be possible to judge whose preferences prevailed based on the outcome. Second, parties in a dispute may resolve their differences if members of one side change their minds about the issue. If this genuinely occurs, this outcome should not be coded as a victory for either side. The best way to tell whether one side has really persuaded the other is to observe whether the issue is a recurrent source of civil-military conflict. Third, the two sides may compromise. Often, however, "compromises" conceal a victory by one side or the other. Moreover, it is not indicative of firm civilian control that civilian leaders have to bargain with the military. Fourth, it is conceivable that looking only at disputes might bias my study toward finding more conflict than there really is. But if the outcomes of civil-military conflict vary with changes in the international and domestic security environments, we have at least established a causal link, even if the magnitude of conflict is somewhat overstated.

The level of civilian control can be determined by whether or not civilians prevail in disagreements with the military. Civilian control is weak when military preferences prevail most of the time; the most extreme example is military rule or military coups that oust one civilian regime and install another. It is a less serious problem for civil-military relations when military preferences prevail only some of the time, though civilian control is still not firm. Finally, civilian control is firm when civilian preferences prevail most of the time.

Obviously, the prospects for successful democratization in the former Soviet Union and other areas of the world are inextricably linked to reliable civilian control of the military. As Robert Dahl has argued, the "circumstances most favorable for competitive politics exist when access to violence . . . is either dispersed or denied to oppositions and to government."[25] Military institutions are inherently undemocratic, because they are hierarchically organized. Moreover, they have a near monopoly on coercive power in a state. If it is not under firm civilian control, the military can represent a serious threat to democracy. Given that most political violence during recent years has been domestic, rather than interstate, and domestic violence has been one of the primary precipitants of the complete breakdown of civilian control of the military in various coun-

Worst |------------|------------| Best

Military preferences prevail — Mixed — Civilian preferences prevail

FIGURE 1 Measures of Civilian Control (the Dependent Variable)

tries, inadequate civilian control of the military will likely remain a crucial issue in the years to come.

Not only is civilian control necessary to preserve domestic liberty (not in danger in the contemporary United States), but *on balance* it also produces better national policy, since civilian leaders are less subject to organizational biases and have a more "national" perspective on defense issues.[26] As Carl von Clausewitz argued early in the nineteenth century, "The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be contrary to common sense, for policy has declared the War; it is the intelligent faculty, War only the instrument, not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible."[27] When democratic civilian leaders make bad policy decisions, they can be replaced. It is more difficult for the public to hold military leaders directly accountable for failure.[28]

This does not mean that civilian leaders should be deeply involved in every tactical or technical military decision. Usually a natural division of labor will emerge, with the military enjoying substantial autonomy in military-technical matters. The issues likely to divide civilian from military leaders are the larger military-political questions, including the use of force, budgets, and procurement.

Although various theories might explain the changing patterns of civilian control of the military in the post–Cold War world, in my view the case studies undertaken in this book show that it is easiest for civilians to control the military when they face primarily international (external) threats and it is hardest for them to control the military when they face primarily domestic (internal) threats. Structural incentives in states facing both external and internal threats (or neither) are less decisive. In order to account for these patterns, we need to look to other variables. Certain aspects of a state's military doctrine take on a greater independent role in strengthening or weakening civilian control in less structurally determinate situations.

The cases studied in this book cover all four combinations of threats—high or low, external or internal—and they show that each combination tends to produce the level of civilian control of the military predicted by

my theory. From this examination, we can draw some policy prescriptions for how civilians can maintain firm control of the military in a changing international security environment, and we can explore some of the theory's implications about how international change affects domestic politics.

Chapter 2

Civilian Control of the Military in Different Threat Environments

Alternative Theories of Civilian Control of the Military

The individual characteristics of civilian and military leaders have been used to explain changes in civilian control of the military. Charles Moskos and others hold that America's post–Cold War problems with civil-military relations are a result of the Clinton administration's insensitivity to military norms and values. Conversely, many scholars of the French civil-military crisis during the Algerian war attributed its successful resolution to de Gaulle's skillful leadership. Others assign great weight to Douglas MacArthur's and Colin Powell's personalities in their respective civil-military conflicts. On this view, the level of civilian control of the military should vary with the personality, character, and experience of the individual civilian and military leaders.[1] The problem is that these arguments beg the question of why different types of civilian or military leaders come to power at particular times.

Another possible explanation centers on changes in military organization. Employing Morris Janowitz's military organizational model,[2] for example, one would expect that civilian control of the U.S. military would have begun to deteriorate after the enactment of JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) reform through the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of the mid-1980s. Richard Kohn has attributed the post–Cold War difficulties to the increasing unity of the American military since Goldwater-Nichols.[3] Alternatively,

Samuel Huntington has argued that the higher the military's level of professionalization, the better the civilian-military relationship.[4] Either of these views predicts that institutional changes in the military—such as increasing or decreasing unity, changes in organizational culture, or changes in the level of professionalism—will strengthen or weaken civilian control. In my opinion, however, these organizational perspectives are also inadequate, because the strength of civilian control of the military cannot be understood merely by examining military institutional variables. We need to ask, what ultimately accounts for the particular organizational structure and professional culture of a military?

A third explanation holds that changes in the civilian institutions of government affect civilian control of the military. For example, Huntington argues that when civilian authority is divided, as it is in the United States because of the separation of powers, the military will be able to play civilians off one another and achieve greater autonomy. The increasing assertiveness of Congress, this argument goes, has diluted the authority of the executive branch and given the military more freedom from civilian control. In contrast, when civilian authority is relatively unified, as it is in parliamentary systems such as that of the United Kingdom, control over the military will be easier.[5] This argument has been resurrected by the new institutionalist "principal/agent" approach to studying American civil-military relations.[6] This is logical, since this approach was initially developed by rational choice scholars studying the American Congress. But it has serious limitations: it remains more a framework than a theory; logically, it should predict constant rather than variable civil-military tensions; and it is not clear that it will work well beyond the American case. We need, therefore, an explanation of variation in the level of unity of civilian authority.

A related argument is that weak state institutions are less effective tools of civilian control. In *Political Order and Changing Societies,* Huntington contrasted "civic societies"—those with a high level of institutionalization and a low level of participation—with "praetorian societies," which have a low level of institutionalization but a high level of political participation. In the former, stable civil-military relations are part of a larger, more orderly political system, while in the latter the "wealthy bribe; students riot; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup."[7] However, this distinction leaves unanswered the question of what determines whether a state has strong civilian governmental institutions or not.

Yet another argument holds that the method of civilian control determines its strength. Under "objective control," the military is given a large

measure of autonomy in its narrow technical sphere in return for complete political subordination to civilian authority. In contrast, "subjective control" means that civilians try to control the military at all levels and make it look more like civilian society. Huntington has suggested that objective control mechanisms are most conducive to stable civil-military relations.[8] But what determines which method of control the civilian leadership embraces?

An important societal argument is that sharp differences in civilian and military ideas and cultures weaken civilian control of the military.[9] Some have begun to argue, for example, that since the abolition of the draft in 1973—which meant fewer Americans would serve in the military—civilian and military political and social attitudes have increasingly diverged.[10] This divergence could have implications for both domestic resource allocation and the international use of force. Unfortunately, this societal argument does not explain what causes convergence or divergence of military and civilian cultures and ideas.

A few analysts have suggested that changes in the international environment are ultimately the cause of the post–Cold War problems.[11] However, the most rigorous theoretical statements of how international factors might affect civilian control of the military are contradictory. Stanislaw Andreski has argued that an increasing external threat should improve civilian control of the military: "'The devil finds work for idle hands': the soldiers who have no wars to fight or prepare for will be tempted to interfere in politics. Taking a long-term view, it seems that there is an inverse connection between strenuous warfare and pretorianism."[12] Harold Lasswell, on the other hand, suggested that a challenging external threat environment should undermine civil-military relations by creating the "garrison state." "Only the iron heel of protracted military crisis can subdue civilian influences and pass 'all power to the general.'"[13] While Huntington has articulated the most comprehensive and influential framework for the study of civil-military relations, even he does not clearly explain the effect of international variables. In some places he seems to take a Lasswellian line; in others, his argument is more in line with Andreski's.[14] The question remains: how should the less challenging international security environment of the post–Cold War era affect civilian control of the military?

A Structural Theory of Civil-Military Relations

Factors relating to individual leaders, military organizations, state structures, and societies undoubtedly influence the ability of civilians to control their militaries. The question is, what in turn affects these intervening variables? This book provides a theory of civilian control of the military that considers the role of individual, military, state, and societal variables as they respond to domestic and international threats. In other words, it treats them as intervening variables. This approach has been employed in analyses of the role of the military in individual countries; Alfred Stepan, for example, has suggested in his pathbreaking work on the Brazilian military that a "central task of the political sociology of the military is to look at both the military institution and the political system and to determine how the special institutional characteristics of a particular military establishment shape its response to influences coming from the political system."[15] So far, however, this perspective has not been applied more broadly across a number of different cases and incorporated into a general theory that also includes international influences.[16]

A theory of civilian control of the military with broad explanatory and predictive power will have to incorporate some elements of the theories discussed above. My argument is that the strength of civilian control of the military in most countries is shaped fundamentally by structural factors, especially threats, which affect individual leaders, the military organization, the state, and society. The variables emphasized in other theories have their effects primarily as intervening variables shaped by different combinations of international and domestic threat environments. Such a structural theory holds that the causes of patterns of civilian control are not completely reducible to the internal attributes of a particular state; rather, the patterns of civilian control are shaped by the interaction of these internal attributes with the external environment. My theory anticipates, therefore, that differently configured units (a unit being a particular country's society and military with their particular attributes) in similar structural positions will usually behave similarly. Like other structural theories, it cannot predict individual coups or other manifestations of a breakdown in civilian control of the military; it can only specify the general conditions under which civilian control is likely to deteriorate or improve.[17]

Structure does not determine outcomes directly. It operates indirectly through three mechanisms: socialization, emulation, and competition. As

Kenneth Waltz notes, states are not forced to adopt any particular pattern of behavior by the international structure. But they observe that states that conform their behavior to the structure of the international system do better in competition with other states, and so they will gradually learn to do so as well. On balance, similarly positioned states will behave in similar ways.[18] Waltz cautions that "one must ask how and to what extent the structure of a realm accounts for outcomes."[19] The degree of structural influence can vary: in some cases structure explains much about a state's pattern of civilian control of the military, while in other cases we must look to different variables. I offer a theory that integrates domestic and international independent variables and shows when one or the other is more important.

The problem with structural theory, as Peter Gourevitch points out, is that while the "world sets constraints and offers opportunities . . . explanation of the variance within those limits . . . requires analysis of internal politics."[20] Since the determinacy of structure varies, under certain conditions domestic variables can play a larger role in the outcome of civil-military conflict. In particular, military doctrines come to play an important independent role in structurally indeterminate threat environments such as the post–Cold War era. While international structure is not always decisive, international variables are nevertheless the place to begin in order to understand the strength of a state's civilian control of the military.

Threats, my independent variable, can be external (international) or internal (domestic) to the state and can vary in intensity (from high to low). They affect three major domestic actors: the military, the civilian government, and the rest of society.[21] Wars and periods of heightened international tension, such as World War II and the Cold War, present greater external threats; détentes and periods of peace, including the post–Cold War era, present lower external threats. External threats have obvious effects: they threaten the entire state, including the military; they usually produce increased unity within the state; and they focus everyone's attention outward.

Internal threats have more complex effects upon the various actors within a state. An internal threat that affects only state and society, not the military, is unlikely to adversely affect civilian control. A threat from society to the military and civilian institutions could lead to a military-supported civilian dictatorship, as in Alberto Fujimori's Peru. A threat from the state to the military and society is likely to produce a military coup that installs a different civilian leadership, as in France in May 1958.

Finally, a threat from the state and society to the military is apt to lead to military rule, as in Brazil in 1964 or Chile in 1973. Domestic threats divide the state and focus everyone's attention inward. The most important aspect of domestic threats for my theory is how they affect the military. The domestic priorities of the military institution that can be threatened are (in ascending order of importance) protection of budget share, preservation of organizational autonomy, maintenance of cohesion, and survival of the institution.

What really counts with threats, of course, is how actors perceive them. As Lewis Coser notes, "If men define a threat as real, although there may be little or nothing in reality to justify this belief, the threat is real in its consequences."[22] Clearly, when a state is at war, it is hard to argue that the threat is subjective. In peacetime, however, threats may indeed be subjective. In structurally determinate situations (where there is just one optimal behavior), threats are objective; in indeterminate environments (where there are a number of optimal behaviors), they are more subjective. In the latter case, military doctrines can play a significant role in determining what is considered a threat.

My structural theory of civilian control of the military is premised upon some simple assumptions. The structural threat environment should affect the character of the civilian leadership, the nature of the military institution, the cohesiveness of state institutions, the method of civilian control, and the convergence or divergence of civilian and military ideas and cultures. Any complex organization is likely to experience internal conflict and divisions. Sociologists have demonstrated that under certain conditions a common threat will mask these divisions, making members of a group more cohesive.[23] Threats to the organization also orient it in a particular direction. Unity or cohesiveness is not always desirable: for example, in an externally oriented military, cohesiveness is the sine qua non of military effectiveness, but in a military facing a domestic threat, it could make that organization a serious contender for control of society.[24] From these assumptions, we can deduce a number of simple hypotheses and predictions about the strength of civilian control of the military in different structural threat environments. These deductions will be illustrated with historical and contemporary evidence.

A state facing high external threats and low internal threats should have the most stable civil-military relations (fig. 2, quadrant [Q] 1). A challenging international security environment is more likely to bring to power a civilian leadership experienced in and knowledgeable about national security affairs.[25] Civilian institutions are also likely to be more cohesive

		External threats	
		High	Low
Internal threats	High	Poor (Q3)	Worst (Q4)
	Low	Good (Q1)	Mixed (Q2)

FIGURE 2 Civilian Control of the Military as a Function of Location and Intensity of Threats

because of the "rally 'round the flag" effect of external threats.[26] Civilians are more likely to rely on objective control mechanisms, trusting in the greater competence of the military to fight wars. An external threat will also tend to unify potential and actual military factions, orienting them outward. An externally oriented military will have less inclination to participate in domestic politics, especially if the state is supplying sufficient resources to execute the military's external missions. Furthermore, in an age of total war, the military must count on the complete support of the state in fighting a major war. "An embattled nation," Gerhard Ritter concludes, "sharing in the war down to the lowest rungs in the ladder, simply cannot be governed by authoritarian methods."[27] Armed forces recently used for internal repression would not have a high level of popular support or the military skills requisite for external wars.[28] Finally, civilian and military ideas will tend to be in harmony in such a threat configuration. One important reason that civilian control of the military in Europe and North America has been so firm is that the majority of threats these states have faced have been external.[29]

In contrast, a state facing low external and high internal threats should experience the weakest civilian control of the military (fig. 2, Q4). The civilian leadership is less likely to be attentive to national security affairs. In such a situation, civilian institutions are also likely to be weak and deeply divided.[30] Civilian factions may be tempted to impose subjective control mechanisms in order to gain military support in internal conflicts. As Huntington notes:

> Antigovernmental war encourages civil-military relations different from those stimulated by inter-state conflict. Other things being equal, the more a state achieves a system of objective control the more effective it is in providing for its external security and in conducting foreign wars. Domestic war, on the other hand, demands subjective control. In particular, in the post–World War II period the strategies of deterrence and of limited war not only required types of military forces that were of little use in internal wars, but they also tended to demand a relationship between military institutions and the government opposite to that required by internal war.[31]

An internal threat to the military institution from the state and society will unify it, but with an inward orientation, making direct military intervention in politics more likely. There is some evidence that increasing factionalization within the military leads to more coup attempts, but the bulk of the evidence suggests that cohesion, successful coups, and military rule are highly correlated.[32] Finally, civilian and military ideas and cultures will be at great variance. Given that most of the threats to states in the Third World are internal, it is not surprising that civilian control of the military there has been so uncertain and military intervention into politics so frequent.[33]

Sustained military intervention in politics gives rise to something of a paradox, however. While threats to the military institution increase its cohesion and thereby its ability to seize power, the task of ruling eventually reduces that cohesion and results in the military's withdrawal from power.[34] The explanation of the paradox appears to lie in the nature of coalitional politics within the military. It appears to be relatively easy to forge a consensus among military officers on questions of "high politics" (e.g., protection of the institution and its core values), but it is more difficult to achieve consensus on matters of "low politics" (e.g., economic development strategies and the nature of the political regime). As Stepan puts it:

> Military unity . . . is weakest in regard to . . . detailed political and economic development policies, because these normally lie outside the professional domain of the officers, and as such, outside the realm of unquestioning obedience or established military doctrine.
>
> Military unity . . . is strongest when one of its central principles, such as military discipline, is threatened from outside.[35]

What this suggests is that not only do increasing threats produce greater cohesion, but decreasing threats undermine cohesion. The reason is that factions, even in highly professional armies, do not simply disappear. They are papered over during times of high perceived threat to the institution, only to reappear when that threat is gone.[36] When factionalism reappears, it is difficult for the military to continue ruling without further institutional decomposition.

The most difficult cases for a structural theory involve states facing indeterminate threat environments, such as low external and low internal

		External threats: High	External threats: Low
Internal threats	High	Experienced leaders? Divided civilians Unclear control? Unified military? Unclear orientation? Divergent ideas? (Q3)	Inexperienced leaders Divided civilians Subjective control Unified military Internal orientation Divergent ideas (Q4)
	Low	Experienced leaders Unified civilians Objective control Unified military Outward orientation Convergent ideas (Q1)	Inexperienced leaders? Divided civilians Unclear control? Divided military Unclear orientation? Divergent ideas? (Q2)

FIGURE 3 Predictions of Structural Theory for Intervening Variables

		External threats: High	External threats: Low
Internal threats	High	military ---------- civilian (Q3)	military (Q4)
	Low	civilian (Q1)	mixed ---------- civilian (Q2)

FIGURE 4 Anticipated Range of Outcomes for Civilian Control of the Military

threats (fig. 2, Q2) or high external and high internal threats (Q3). A state facing low internal and external threats may have a civilian leadership without knowledge, experience, or interest in military affairs. Civilian policy-makers may abandon objective control. Civilian institutions may not be very cohesive. Factionalism can also emerge within the military institution, and the military's orientation may be uncertain. The lack of clear threats may reduce the military's cohesiveness, making it less capable of concerted collective action. Civilian and military ideas may not remain in harmony. Hence, we should expect low-level civil-military conflict to emerge. The problem is likely to be one of coordination rather than insubordination, because not only will the military, the state, and

society be divided from one another, but they will also be divided internally. This means that many conflicts will pit one civilian-military coalition against another, rather than simply civilians against the military. Civilian control of the military in these circumstances can range from good to mixed.

Civilian control of the military in a high internal and high external threat environment is also complicated. A challenging security situation may bring experienced and knowledgeable civilian leaders to power, but it may not. A heightened internal threat may lead civilians to adopt subjective control mechanisms. Competing internal and external threats may cause splits within and among civilian institutions. A high level of threats may unify the military, increasing its capacity for effective action. But because it faces both internal and external threats, the military's orientation may not be clear. The military may recognize that if it ignores the external threat and seizes power, the nation will likely suffer military defeat, and for this reason soldiers will probably be inclined to remain outside politics. Civilian and military ideas may not be in harmony. On the other hand, civilian leaders may embrace the military's view of international politics, and civilian and military ideas may remain in harmony. In this case, then, we should expect to find serious problems with civilian control, but fewer than in a low external and high internal threat environment. The reason is that while the military's orientation may be uncertain, the presence of intense internal and external threats can render the military more unified and more capable of concerted action.

Figure 3 shows the expected values of the intervening leadership, organizational, state, and societal variables, while figure 4 provides the anticipated level of civilian control for each threat environment.

Military Doctrine

Although knowledge of structural circumstances is necessary for explaining different patterns of civilian control of the military, at times it is not sufficient. Structure tends to establish parameters; actual outcomes are sometimes determined by other factors. In quadrants 1 and 4, structure shapes outcome to a large extent directly. In quadrants 2 and 3, structure is not fully determinate; other possible determinants are domestic ideational variables such as military doctrine. Doctrine determines which military resources will be employed, how they will be used, and where. There has been widespread attention in the security studies literature to

the external consequences of military doctrine,[37] but little discussion of the internal consequences.[38] Military doctrine can affect civilian control in structurally indeterminate environments by one of three routes. Acting as a proxy for structural threats, doctrine can influence the structure of military institutions, provide normative "road maps" for military behavior, or serve as a focal point for agreement between civilian and military leaders.[39]

Military doctrines can affect civilian control by shaping the structure of military organizations. As Andreski notes:

> There exists an intrinsic incompatibility between the internal and the external uses of armed forces. In other words: the more often the armed forces are used internally, the less capable they become of waging a war; and secondly (when the military participation ratio is high) the more intensely they are—or have recently been—involved in a war, the less amenable and dependable they become as tools of internal repression.[40]

Training and resources geared toward one mission are generally not immediately applicable to another. One clear implication of my argument is that internally oriented militaries should be harder to control than externally oriented ones. Therefore, externally oriented military doctrines should be more conducive to civilian control, while internally oriented doctrines should undermine it. External orientation is a necessary, though not always sufficient, condition for firm civilian control of the military.

Another way military doctrine can affect civilian control is through its effect upon the military's organizational culture. Organizational culture is the "pattern of assumptions, ideas, and beliefs that prescribe how a group should adapt to its external environment and manage its internal affairs."[41] One important component of military organizational culture is norms of subordination to civilian control. If these norms are deeply embedded, civilian control will be much stronger.[42]

Finally, military doctrine can affect civilian control of the military as a focal point for the convergence or divergence of civilian and military ideas about the use of force and the international environment. Huntington has argued that much about civil-military relations in the United States can be explained by the clash of two fundamentally different mind-sets: military realism and civilian liberalism. The former is premised on a skeptical view of human nature, rates the needs of society above those of the individual, values order and hierarchy, assumes the centrality of the nation-state and military force in international relations, advocates the discriminate use of force, and affirms a strict separation between the "military" and "civilian" realms. In contrast, civilian liberalism usually opposes the use of force, advocates either no use of force or the maximum use of force, and regards the military as a potential threat to liberty, prosperity, democracy, and peace.[43] In a challenging external security environment, civilian and military ideas will converge on realism. In a less threatening environment, civilian liberalism is more likely to emerge and come into conflict with military realism, weakening civilian control.

Selection of Cases for Study

The basic intuition behind my structural theory is the observation that challenging external threat environments (defined by participation in war) and good civil-military relations (defined by absence of coups) seem to go hand in hand. States in regions with relatively challenging external threat environments and relatively benign internal threat environments tend to have fewer military coups.[44] Of course, coups are not the only, or even the best, measure of civilian control, especially in developed democratic states. In fact, by focusing just on this most extreme breakdown of civilian control of the military, analysts risk biasing their findings.[45] We need a more fine-grained analysis, which can only come through in-depth case studies. Case studies will also allow us to go beyond simple correlation and illustrate causation through process tracing.[46]

There are four clusters of cases in this book, each of them illustrating the consequences of a different structural threat environment.

(1) During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union faced few internal threats but significant external ones (fig. 5, Q1). This threat environment produced the most consistent and reliable civilian control of the military. I shall argue that this was also the case with Japan in 1945 and Brazil and Argentina after the Falklands War.

(2) In the post–Cold War period, the United States and Russia face declining external threats (fig. 5, Q2). These cases, plus Argentina (1955–66), Brazil (1961–64 and 1974–82), Chile (1970–73 and 1978 to the present), and Japan (1922–32), illustrate how the shift from a challenging external threat environment to a more benign one weakens civilian control of the military. They also demonstrate how military doctrine affects civilian control of the military in structurally indeterminate threat environments.

(3) Germany during World War I, France during the Algerian crisis, Japan during the interwar period, and the Soviet Union for a brief period

Internal threats		External threats: High	External threats: Low
	High	SU 1986–91 Ger 1914–18 FR 1954–62 Japan 1932–1945 (Q3)	ARG 1966–72 ARG 1976–82 BRA 1964–74 Chile 1973–78 (Q4)
	Low	US 1941–45 US 1948–89 SU 1955–86 Japan 1945 BRA 1982– ARG 1982– (Q1)	RUS 1991– US 1945–47 US 1989– ARG 1955–66 BRA 1961–64 BRA 1974–82 Chile 1970–73 Chile 1978– Japan 1922–32 (Q2)

FIGURE 5 Detailed Case Studies

in the late 1980s all faced significant external and internal threats (fig. 5, Q3). Because of the structural indeterminacy of such a threat environment, various aspects of a state's military doctrine can play a greater independent role than they otherwise would: civilian control of the military will be firm if the military's primary focus is the external threat; it should weaken if the main focus shifts to the state's internal problems. The military's perception of which threat is more pressing will be a function of its doctrine.

(4) From the mid-1960s to the late seventies and early eighties, the southern Latin American states of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile faced few external threats but many internal ones (fig. 5, Q4). This threat environment produced the antithesis of civilian control of the military: military rule.

These four clusters provide us with a total of twenty-three cases.[47] Within these cases, there are 127 data points. Three of the clusters have obvious policy relevance, and all are of clear historical interest. But the primary reason for their selection was to have sufficient variation on the independent variable—threat.[48] In addition, the majority of these countries represent "most likely" cases for Lasswell's "garrison state" theory: they are all highly developed states, most with long histories of involvement in international conflict. Like the United States and the USSR, Germany and France were both involved in major wars and periods of international tension. Interwar Japan would also seem to be a "most likely" case for Lasswell's garrison state theory. The southern Latin American countries, although technically part of the Third World, are among the most highly developed of Third World states and have historically been parties to serious international conflict, so they should also be hard cases for my theory. Thus, if my structural theory of civilian control of the military holds up when applied to these cases, it will have earned at least a modicum of credibility.

In sum, although this book is not strictly an exercise in comparative theory-testing because many of the domestic-level theories are subsumed in my structural theory, the cases examined can help us evaluate Lasswell's and Andreski's very different arguments about the impact of a challenging international threat environment on civilian control of the military. The cases in the following chapters do two things. First, they show that there is a correlation between the various combinations of my independent, or causal, variables (the internal and external threat environments) and changes in the dependent, or caused, variable (the strength of civilian control of the military), as predicted by my theory.[49] Second, they show through process tracing how different combinations of external and internal threats affect the intervening individual, military, state, and societal variables in the manner the theory anticipates.