Avoiding the Extremes: Moral Absolutism and Moral Relativism

Two extreme positions enter most discussions of whether or not to be sensitive to non-Western moral values: moral absolutism and moral relativism.

Moral absolutism is the belief that there are universal moral truths, and judgments about what is right and wrong are true no matter what the social, cultural, religious, or country context.  

Moral relativism is the belief that there are no universal truths, and judgments about what is right and wrong are true only relative to specific the social, cultural, religious, and country contexts.   

However tempting each is, both absolutism and relativism represent extreme positions. While some moral values approach the status of universal moral truths (e.g., lying, stealing, murder, adultery, and impiety are prohibited in almost all societies), moral absolutists cannot account for differences across cultures, religions, and societies—for instance, between the Western (largely Protestant) belief in the moral acceptability of profit maximization and the non-Western, Islamic rejection of the same business practice (see the Abbas, Al-Aadi, and Al-Owaihan reading). Moral relativists, on the other hand, properly appreciate how judgments about what is right and wrong typically rely upon culturally contingent moral values. However, there are some moral values that transcend contexts (as mentioned above), and if all our moral judgments were truly relative, then it would be impossible to make claims that apply beyond a specific social, cultural, religious or country context. To say, for example, that “employing child labor is morally wrong” would be a form of shorthand for saying that it is wrong in my society or culture, or among those who share my religious beliefs. Indeed, if moral relativism were true, then there would be no opportunity for cross-cultural ethical disagreement. Therefore, the better position is somewhere between these two extremes (i.e., accepting that some moral values are universal, while others are contingent upon particular societies, cultures, religions, and countries).