

Millennium - Journal of International Studies

<http://mil.sagepub.com>

Allison and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review of the Bureaucratic Politics Model of Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Steve Smith

Millennium - Journal of International Studies 1980; 9; 21

DOI: 10.1177/03058298800090010301

The online version of this article can be found at:

<http://mil.sagepub.com>

Published by:



<http://www.sagepublications.com>

On behalf of:



[Millennium Publishing House, LSE](#)

Additional services and information for *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* can be found at:

Email Alerts: <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

Subscriptions: <http://mil.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

Reprints: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

Permissions: <http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav>

Citations <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/9/1/21>

Allison and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review of the Bureaucratic Politics Model of Foreign Policy Decision-Making*

Steve Smith

Even a cursory glance at the literature on foreign policy analysis reveals that there exists a plethora of approaches which vie for the attention of the academics in the field in their attempts to explain foreign policy behaviour. One approach which dominated the last decade is the bureaucratic politics approach. According to Colin Gray, the popularity of this approach has been due to a set of factors:

... the experience of many academics as "insiders" in the 1960s ... ; a widespread dissatisfaction with U.S. policies towards the outside world, many of the errors [of] which are understood to stem from domestic structural weaknesses; and the appearance of a major work that has served as a near-sacred text, namely, Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision*.¹

Allison's work on conceptual models of decision-making and the Cuban missile crisis has been one of the seminal studies in the history of international relations. The work is now summarised in most American textbooks on international relations and virtually all monographs on foreign policy analysis refer to it. While much of the attention that this work has received has been favourable, there has also been considerable criticism of Allison's analysis of the Cuban missile crisis, and, more fundamentally, about the bureaucratic politics approach. The aim of this paper is to provide an assessment of these critiques.

It is important to state at the outset that Allison's work lends itself to the task of critical assessment for two reasons: on the one hand, it is focused on one case-study which has been widely studied and about which there is a vast amount of information; on the other, the approach starts from the premise that the analysis of events is affected by the assumptions and biases of the analyst. Indeed, study of the Cuban missile crisis indicates very clearly how different accounts of what happened are provided by approaches based on different assumptions.

Before outlining the major criticisms that have been levelled at Allison's

work, it is important to clarify the precise work being examined here. The general area of bureaucratic politics is one that was first established in the literature in the late 1950s. Furthermore, Allison was not alone in developing the approach in the 1970s: most notably there is the work of Halperin,² with whom he has collaborated, but also Destler,³ Steinbrunner,⁴ Gallucci,⁵ and Spanier and Uslaner.⁶ However, this paper restricts itself to an examination of Allison's work on the Cuban missile crisis.⁷ It is important to note that Allison has refined his approach since his work on the Cuban missile crisis first appeared⁸; specifically, he has merged the two additional "conceptual models" he presented as alternatives to the dominant "rational actor" approach to foreign policy analysis.⁹ However, for the purpose of assessing the work it appears to be fairest to examine the approach in the context in which Allison developed it, in relation to the case-study of the Cuban missile crisis; this examination will thus be on the grounds most favourable to the author. If his approach has weaknesses in explaining the Cuban missile crisis, then this would seem to be a severe limitation on it, hence concentrating on the critiques that arise from Allison's case-study provides a fair and epistemologically acceptable test. Thus, this paper will deal only with those critiques that focus on his analysis of the missile crisis and not on his later work or the work of other bureaucratic politics analysts. Even so, there have been some 35 critical discussions of Allison's work.

It must, however, be pointed out that, in addition to specific criticisms of Allison's work, his account of the crisis has also been called into question by the publication of works that have been based on material declassified since the publication of *Essence of Decision*; to cite just one example, on the basis of new evidence, Bernstein has shown that Kennedy knew that the missile sites on Cuba were operational by the middle of the crisis. This obviously undercuts much of the argument in *Essence of Decision* that was based on the premise that Kennedy had to do something *before* the missiles became operational.¹⁰

Although, of course, any attempt at classifying these critiques of Allison's analysis of the missile crisis runs the risk of over-zealous compartmentalisation, the criticisms levelled against it seem to fall into seven main groups; these will be outlined with examples of the relevant criticisms drawn from the specific critiques.

The Approach is Not Original

Several critics have attacked the work by arguing that, despite the emphasis placed on the originality of Models II and III, the approach is in fact not original: Cornford has argued that "... none of Allison's 'models' is new."¹¹ At one level, this criticism is concerned with illustrating that much of Model II (organisational process) is derived from theories of the firm developed by writers such as Simon,¹² March and Simon,¹³ and Cyert and March.¹⁴ As Wagner argues, the application of theories of the firm to foreign policy behaviour may lead to serious epistemological difficulties, and he asks "... what is a government bureaucracy's counterpart to the market, and how easy is it to transfer concepts and theories from one sort of enterprise to the other?"¹⁵

Another group of critics have argued that Model III (bureaucratic politics) is clearly derived from earlier work. Horelick *et al.*,¹⁶ have suggested that the bureaucratic politics approach is "closely related" to the earlier work of Kremlinologists. The major criticism, however, has come from those writers who have noted that Allison's work is clearly based on the writings of earlier foreign policy analysts. Ball¹⁷ and Art¹⁸ each name the same four writers from whom, they argue, the bureaucratic politics approach was derived; these are Schilling, Huntington, Neustadt, and Hilsman. Cornford, in fact goes so far as to suggest that "... Model III ... is pure Neustadt."¹⁹ Thus, rather than presenting us with a new approach to understanding foreign policy behaviour, Allison's claim to be innovative is questionable.

However, Allison acknowledges his intellectual debt to earlier scholars. In *Essence of Decision* he spends some time summarising the work of those authors noted above and indicating how they have laid the foundations for his development of Model's II and III.²⁰ Thus, although concerns may be expressed over the applicability of models derived from different areas of study, it is difficult to criticise Allison for implying that the models are wholly original. As several writers have pointed out, Allison's originality lies in his use of previously disparate approaches in the analysis of one case-study; as Cornford writes, "... the virtue of Allison's approach is that he makes the assumptions explicit, he applies them to a particular set of events, and he applies them consistently. He does not slide in the same account from one set of assumptions to another when the first set ceases to pay off."²¹

Criticisms of Allison's Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Allison's account of the crisis has also been criticised on the grounds that it is factually incorrect and that this biases the evidence towards Models II and III. These criticisms can be divided into five groups, each of which deals with a particular factual problem.

(1) *The Turkish missiles*

In *Essence of Decision* Allison argues that a key problem in the solution of the missile crisis was the Soviet demand for the withdrawal of U.S. missiles in Turkey in return for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles on Cuba. Had the U.S. Government responded to this demand Kennedy would have won a less clear-cut victory. Allison argues that Kennedy had ordered the removal of the missiles as far back as early 1961 and had, in August 1962, personally directed George Ball to withdraw the missiles at whatever political price was necessary in the light of Turkish objections.²² Thus, Allison contends, when Khrushchev introduced the missiles as a *quid pro quo*, Kennedy was surprised and angered since he imagined that they had already been withdrawn; he is reported to have shouted, "... get those frigging missiles off the board!"²³

This version of events has recently been challenged by Hafner,²⁴ who argues that Allison's portrayal is a "myth" for a variety of reasons. Hafner contends that Kennedy knew that the missiles were still in Turkey: the press had been full of speculation about their rôle in any solution to the crisis; a possible trade-off between the Cuban and Turkish missiles had been discussed in Excom; and Kennedy had discussed such a deal in detail with the

American Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, in a meeting on October 20.²⁵ Hafner argues that Allison emphasises Kennedy's surprise to support his general contention that the organisational processes of a large bureaucracy can nullify the decisions of leaders. Hafner's account, while indicating the attempts Kennedy made to have the missiles withdrawn, establishes that Kennedy was still aware of their presence during the crisis. It is nonetheless important to note that, although Kennedy's reaction may have been one of annoyance rather than one of surprise, Hafner's account still accepts that Kennedy's *orders* to withdraw the missiles had not been carried out; thus the missiles on Turkey became an issue in the crisis because of organisational factors, and Allison's basic contention seems to be substantiated.

However, even this contention has recently been undermined in an article by Bernstein.²⁶ Using material that has been declassified in the last few years, Bernstein has examined the rôle of the Turkish missiles in the crisis. The bulk of his evidence clearly backs up Hafner's claims concerning Kennedy's knowledge of the existence of the missiles; indeed the evidence cited by Bernstein reveals the extent to which Excom discussed a possible trade-off between the Cuban and Turkish missiles.²⁷ But, more importantly, he states that Allison's argument that Kennedy had ordered the missiles in Turkey to be removed is inaccurate; as he writes, "... it is too simple to conclude ... that Kennedy ordered removal of the missiles and that the bureaucracy thwarted his instructions."²⁸ He points out that at no time did Kennedy *order* the removal of the missiles in Turkey, rather Kennedy tried to find out what options were available to him. Referring specifically to Allison, Bernstein writes that he

... uncritically accepted recollections that Kennedy had given a clear order and then tries to explain, in terms of bureaucratic politics, why it was not carried out. A more subtle approach would acknowledge that a chief executive may often express preferences (not orders) for policies, and that he may sincerely reinterpret them as orders when his own inaction leaves him woefully unprepared in a crisis... In later memoirs and journalistic accounts, the president's interpretation dominates and becomes "fact." Practitioners of the "bureaucratic politics" model develop a vested interest in uncritically accepting such dubious evidence precisely because their model so nicely "explains" it. Thus, the model *first* helps define the reliability of the evidence and *then* explains it – a dangerous circular process.²⁹

Thus, the empirical studies by Hafner and Bernstein undermine Allison's account of events, and also, of course, his reliance on the organisational process model. Not only is Allison inaccurate in the way in which he portrays Kennedy's reaction to the Soviet offer of a trade-off, but, more importantly for the utility and explanatory power of the organisational process model, his argument that Kennedy's orders for the missiles removal were thwarted by the bureaucracy seems to be contradicted by the evidence.

(2) *The location of the blockade*

During the missile crisis, most attention was focused on the reaction of Soviet ships to the blockade imposed by the United States, since that represented the most direct source of contact between the two states. An attempt by the Soviet ships to force their way through the blockade would have represented a serious escalation of the crisis. Allison argues that the establishment of the blockade led to serious organisational and bureaucratic problems, including a series of disputes between the Navy and Kennedy's officials,³⁰ especially concerning the location of the blockade. According to Allison, the original location of the blockade was calculated so as to allow interception of the Soviet ships to take place without the risk of attack by Cuban jets. Following a suggestion by the British Ambassador, David Ormsby-Gore, that the blockade be moved closer to Cuba in order to give Khrushchev more time to think, Allison notes the accepted view that Kennedy ordered the blockade to be drawn closer to Cuba and that, after "... a sharp clash with the Navy, he made certain his will prevailed."³¹ However, he argues that despite a clear Presidential order, the organisational processes of the Navy determined the location. Thus, the blockade was originally placed at 500 miles from Cuba and was never moved closer. This incident is used by Allison as a powerful piece of evidence for the utility of Model II.

However, Williams³² has argued that Allison's interpretation is "misleading"; he points out that against Allison's interpretation must be set the statements of the participants. Specifically, Williams points to three problems in Allison's account: first, Robert Kennedy's statement that the blockade was originally located at 800 miles but was subsequently brought back to 500 miles; secondly, the evidence that Excom closely monitored the movement of ships on a large board in the Situation Room, thereby making apparent any non-implementation of the President's order; finally, he points out that it was just this detailed knowledge of the location of the various ships in the area that allowed Kennedy to decide which ones to let through the blockade. Williams concludes that "to interpret the implementation of the blockade as a prime example, either of naval intransigence or of standard operating procedures obstructing presidential objectives, may be misleading. The evidence for it is ambiguous at best."³³

The evidence has been made much less ambiguous by a more recent article by Dan Caldwell.³⁴ He argues that much of the extant literature puts the blockade originally at 800 miles, and 500 miles following Kennedy's order. Therefore, he obtained the "Deck Log-Weather Observation Sheets" for 11 of the 46 ships that participated in the blockade, in order to examine Allison's rejection of the extant literature. From the log-sheets, Caldwell computed the exact positions of each of the ships for each day of the blockade. His findings clearly indicate that the ships were placed originally some 700-900 miles off Cuba; following the conventional account, the ships were moved to approximately 500 miles from Cuba by October 25. Although, in correspondence with Caldwell, Allison argues that his information came from senior (and unnamed) officials, Caldwell's research seems to be absolutely conclusive. Therefore, one of Allison's main illustrations of the necessity

for a Model II approach to explain foreign policy behaviour seems to be undermined. Thus, Allison's contention that, the blockade was never moved, and therefore that Presidential authority was undermined by standard operating procedures, is, on the basis of the evidence cited by Williams and Caldwell, incorrect. This inaccuracy, combined with the problems in his explanation of the Turkish missiles, removes much of the supporting evidence for the organisational process model.

(3) *The delay in the U-2 overflight*

The presence of Soviet missiles on Cuba was only confirmed by a U-2 overflight, on October 14 which provided photographic evidence. Allison argues, however, that the decision to undertake the overflight was made on October 4 and that the 10 days' delay between the decision and the flight was the result of bureaucratic bargaining over which organisation – the CIA or the Air Force – should undertake the operation. Allison argues that “this ten-day delay constitutes some form of ‘failure.’”³⁵ Thus, Allison uses this incident as an example of organisational disputes determining outcomes – in this case the fact that the U.S. Government had to react to the presence of the missiles when it did.

This version of events has been challenged by Krasner,³⁶ who argues that the delay was not entirely attributable to bureaucratic bickering. He points out that an attempt to make an overflight failed, on October 9, for technical reasons and that further delays were caused by bad weather. The actual delay, Krasner argues, was from October 4-9. Even this, he points out, was the outcome of Kennedy's own indecision about the risks of overflights, which resulted in the decision being made only after some three weeks of discussion. Nevertheless, Allison's basic contention – that the 10 days' delay was the result of bureaucratic bickering – seems accurate; although the delays from October 9 to the 14 were due to technical and meteorological factors, these would not have intervened had the earlier dispute between the CIA and the Air Force not held up the overflight from October 4 to 9. Allison does appear guilty, however, of presenting the evidence in a rather convenient light.

(4) *Deployment of Soviet missiles*

Allison points out that the task of American intelligence agencies in identifying the Soviet missiles on Cuba was made much easier by the fact that they were deployed in exactly the same way as were missiles in the Soviet Union. Allison argues that “. . . it was the established Soviet four-slash ‘signature’ of excavations . . . that alerted American intelligence analysts to the Soviet deployment of IRBM's.”³⁷

This interpretation has been criticised by Ball³⁸ who argues that it is not clear that bureaucratic factors determined the deployment; “. . . [it] might quite probably have been for unavoidable technical reasons.”³⁹ This criticism seems to miss the point – Allison is not arguing that bureaucratic factors determined the deployment, rather he is pointing out that it was the result of organisational factors: the discussion of the issue in *Essence of Decision* is in the chapter on Model II and Cuba. Thus, when Ball writes that the

deployment may have been for “unavoidable technical reasons,” that is exactly the point made by Allison in connection with Model II since what counts as “unavoidable technical reasons” is determined by organisational procedures.

(5) “Where you stand depends on where you sit”

One of the key arguments in *Essence of Decision* is that bureaucratic politics are important in determining foreign policy behaviour. Allison argues that, in decision-making, participants will propose solutions and policies which reflect their own position in the bureaucracy. This is summed-up by Allison with the aphorism “where you stand depends on where you sit.” In the discussion over which course of action to take in response to the discovery of the missiles on Cuba, Allison contends that this aphorism depicts the stances adopted by the participants; some 10 pages of *Essence of Decision* are spent outlining the relationship between bureaucratic position and policy proposals in Excom. This relationship is the basis of Allison’s bureaucratic politics model.

The linkage between bureaucratic position and policy proposals has received considerable attention in the critiques of Allison’s work. Specifically, Art, Ball and Krasner⁴⁰ have argued that the aphorism is not accurate. Ball argues that “. . . in the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison’s bureaucratic politics approach would generally have been unable to have predicted from the basis of a person’s position in the bureaucracy, what his position on the question of the missiles in Cuba would be.”⁴¹ Despite the predictable policy proposals of the military, Allison’s critics point out that the key members of Excom either had no bureaucratic position, being imported for the occasion, or did not propose solutions associated with their bureaucratic position: thus, the key advisers – Lovett, Acheson, Robert Kennedy, Bundy and Sorensen – had no bureaucratic position, and Rusk, Ball and McNamara – all key bureaucrats in the Departments of State and Defence – did not propose solutions which reflected their position.⁴² More generally, Art has noted that the precise status of the aphorism is very vague and that it requires so many qualifications to make it fit that it scarcely represents a bureaucratic perspective. Since the proposition “where you stand . . .” has to be modified and qualified to fit the events of the crisis, Art believes that this indicated a central problem of the approach, “. . . we must qualify it with so many amendments before it begins to work that when it does we may not be left with a bureaucratic paradigm, but may in reality be using another one quite different.”⁴³

It is clear that Allison’s aphorism does not sum up the positions adopted by the participants in Excom; bureaucratic position *per se* did not determine the policy stances. In the specific case of the missile crisis, many of the key participants did not have any bureaucratic position. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that there is a tendency in more routine decision-making situations for bureaucratic position to be of significant importance in determining policy stance. And, whilst Allison’s treatment of this relationship in the missile crisis is not totally convincing, certain of the members of Excom – notably the military – did see solutions in terms of their bureaucratic position.

However, it must be accepted that the aphorism is inaccurate in the case of the missile crisis; as such the most important component of the bureaucratic politics approach is not supported by the evidence.

Criticisms of Allison's Portrayal of the U.S. Political System

Another major strand of criticism levelled at Allison's account of the missile crisis is that he gives an inaccurate portrayal of the American political system. There are two aspects of this noted by his critics: his portrayal of the power of the President, and his treatment of forces outside Excom.

(1) The power of the President

Several critics⁴⁴ have pointed out that Allison underestimates the power of the President in that he treats him as one player amongst many. As Krasner notes, "... leaders may find it advantageous to have others think of them as ineffectual rather than evil. But the facts are otherwise — particularly in foreign policy. There the choices — and the responsibility — rest squarely with the President."⁴⁵ Although Allison spends much time in illustrating how the President's choices were affected by bureaucratic and organisational considerations, his critics have argued that he consistently underestimates the ability of the President to get his way. On the one hand this is so because the ability of bureaucracies to establish independent policies, or not to carry out Presidential orders (so-called "slippage"), is a function of the President's attention and, thereby, his values. Thus, Steel has argued most forcefully that the debate in Excom over the options available in response to the discovery of the Soviet missiles was primarily shaped by Kennedy's own values and preferences; having made his choice he was able to utilise bureaucratic considerations to get his way.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the President establishes much of the bureaucratic structure which surrounds him: he chooses the key personnel and they are, in the last resort, responsible to him. Thus, whilst it is true that the President has to obtain information from, and discuss policy alternatives with, bureaucratic representatives, their freedom of action and their power is largely determined by the President himself. His power, therefore, is much greater than Allison's image of him implies.

(2) Allison's treatment of "outside" political forces

A further criticism of Allison's treatment is that he fails to take account of the wider political system outside Excom. Ball has stated that "... Allison's governmental arena is too delimited; he fails to consider such non-bureaucratic elements of the American political system as, for example, electoral constraints and the power-political position of Congress."⁴⁷ Thus, Ball argues that the fact that it was Congressional election time and the consideration that, had he not acted, he would have been impeached were important considerations for Kennedy.⁴⁸ However, Allison seems to be fully aware of these considerations and, indeed, his discussion of the decision to blockade is full of references to the Congressional implications of various options.⁴⁹ Of more salience is the critique that Allison's definition of politics is too narrow; as Perlmutter has noted, "... a theory of bureaucratic action

explains the nature of the staff and its behaviour: it does not explain the direction and purpose of the political system."⁵⁰ Coulombis and Wolf have pointed out that Allison's work ignores the domination of American society by a business élite. They note that Allison's aphorism, "Where you stand depends on where you sit," could be changed to "Where you sit depends on where you stand."⁵¹ In other words, Allison is criticised for having a narrow view of politics, and, thereby, failing to consider the impact of outside groups on long-term policy. This criticism, which seems totally justified, would therefore lead to more of an examination of questions such as, "Why was Cuba so important to the United States?" than Allison provides.

The Criticism that "Bureaucratic Politics" Removes Responsibility

Allison's work has been attacked on the important normative ground that it removes responsibility from governments. By portraying foreign policy decision-making as the outcome of the pulling and hauling of various bureaucratic groups, it becomes much easier for politicians to disclaim responsibility for policy outcomes. As Steel has most forcefully argued, "... where everyone is responsible for a decision, no one is responsible. If politics is the result of bargaining games among players, neither the President nor the nation can be held responsible for the decisions made. If bureaucracies really run the show, what is the point of elections?"⁵² Krasner has also made this point;

... the contention that the Chief Executive is trammelled by the permanent government has disturbing implications for any effort to impute responsibility to public officials ... if the bureaucratic machine escapes manipulation and direction even by the highest officials, then ... elections are a farce. ... What sense to vote a man out of office when his successor, regardless of his values, will be trapped in the same web of only incrementally mutable standard operating procedures."⁵³

Certainly, it seems that this is a most important objection, for, if Allison's analysis is taken to its extreme, then no individual — not even the President — is responsible for policy. Indeed, policy itself becomes a misnomer since decisions are merely one-off plays in the bureaucratic game. But, it must be stressed that this criticism is only valid to the extent to which the President is unable to get his wishes carried out, and this relates to the previous set of criticisms. In summary, it would seem that there is some accuracy in the portrayal of decision-making as bureaucratically determined and, to this extent, the criticisms of Steel and Krasner over the removal of responsibility need to be somewhat modified; but, it is equally clear that since the President's values determine the degree of slippage over issues, and the composition, and freedom to act independently, of the bureaucracies, then too all-embracing an application of the bureaucratic politics approach would, incorrectly, remove responsibility from where it properly lies.

*The Criticism that the Bureaucratic Politics Approach Ignores
Cognitive Factors*

Following on from the criticisms made previously is the additional criticism that the approach ignores cognitive factors. Several critics⁵⁴ have argued that concentration on the bureaucratic and organisational factors leads to neglect of the values held by the participants. As has been pointed out previously, the degree to which organisational and bureaucratic factors can influence policy-making is a reflection of Presidential attention and, thereby, Presidential values. Additionally, the key personnel in the bureaucracy will be appointed by the President in accordance with the relationship between their, and his, values. Thus, as Art has noted, Allison "under-values the influence (or weight) of . . . generational mind-sets,"⁵⁵ since over many of the key issues and values there is no need for overt conflict as the key personnel share common generational perspectives. Implicitly, therefore, Allison is open to the charge that by concentrating on issues raised in open debate the approach ignores the nature of "non-decision."⁵⁶

On the other hand, as Krasner has noted, it is very tempting to see bureaucratic battles as reflecting bureaucratic differences *per se*. As he writes,

. . . before the niceties of bureaucratic implementation are investigated, it is necessary to know what objectives are being sought. Objectives are ultimately a reflection of values, of beliefs concerning what man and society ought to be. The failure of the American government to take decisive action in a number of critical areas reflects not so much the inertia of a large bureaucratic machine as a confusion over values which afflicts the society in general and its leaders in particular. It is, in such circumstances, too comforting to attribute failure to organizational inertia.⁵⁷

Thus, differences may well be seen as reflecting bureaucratic interest whereas they reflect wider disagreements over fundamental values. As Jervis has cogently pointed out,

. . . what seems to be a clash of bureaucratic interest and stands can often be more fruitfully viewed as a clash among values that are widely held in both the society and the decision-makers' own minds . . . we have no grounds for claiming that a different constellation of bureaucratic interests and forces would have produced a different result.⁵⁸

On two levels, then, Allison has been criticised for ignoring the values of the decision-makers: concentrating on bureaucratic and organisational disputes *per se* ignores both the extent to which certain key values are shared by "generational mind-sets" and the involvement of wider disputes about values and objectives in the policy-making process. Again, this seems to be a serious problem with the applicability of Allison's work. Whilst it is clear that such an objection does not cancel out the utility of his approach, it is clearly a further limitation on it. As Ball has concluded on this issue,

“... if United States policy is to be explained – or changed – the target is not the governmental structure but the values of American decision-makers.”⁵⁹

Criticisms of the Extent to Which the Approach is Applicable to Other Countries

Although *Essence of Decision* is most detailed in its analysis of policy-making in the United States, it is concerned with explaining Soviet foreign policy as well, by the use of the same models. Allison, in fact, is clear in his intention to offer the two alternative models as tools for the analysis of other countries' foreign policy behaviour.⁶⁰ His models are, therefore, not narrowly focused on American foreign policy-making but are applicable to all states. They constitute, in the words of one of his articles' title, “a paradigm.” However, on the question of the comparative applicability of the models, Allison has been strongly attacked.

One set of writers has pointed out that Allison's models are of little use in analysing the foreign policy behaviour of developing states. Hill has noted that there exists “... a growing consensus ... over the inapplicability of the insights of Allison, Halperin, Destler *et al.* to foreign policy-making inside less modernised states.”⁶¹ Migdal has argued that “... these states do not... have enough stability of structure or form in their organizational routines or bargaining processes for the researcher to employ these conceptual models usefully.”⁶² Brenner has noted that “... those features of national security policy-making accorded prominence in recent theorizing are not necessarily universal. They are more distinctive in the United States than elsewhere.”⁶³ Colin Gray, in his analysis of nuclear arms races, has stated that the bureaucratic politics perspective “... is really an Unruly Baronial view of the world, which may unfortunately prove to be more usefully analogical to England in the 1140s than it is to any capital in the world other than Washington D.C.”⁶⁴ Whilst this objection seems clearly valid – since, in many cases, developing countries do not possess the bureaucratic structures necessary for these alternative approaches – Weil has utilised the approaches in an analysis of North Vietnamese foreign policy and has found them useful. He concludes that “... examining North Vietnamese foreign policy decision-making from a governmental politics perspective complements understanding gained from a rational actor analysis.”⁶⁵ Despite this finding, it seems clear that the alternative approaches outlined by Allison can be of very limited use in societies which do not have the same kind of pluralist political system as that found in the United States.

On a more fundamental level, several writers have argued that Allison's models do not apply to the Soviet Union. Horelick *et al.*, Dawisha, Light and Gray,⁶⁶ have all noted that, although Allison utilises the models to analyse Soviet foreign policy during the missile crisis, the models, for a variety of reasons, are not strictly applicable to a country such as the U.S.S.R., not least, as Gray points out, because they require more detailed information than is available. In an excellent critique of the utility of Allison's models for the analysis of Soviet foreign policy, Dawisha demonstrates that the nature of the bureaucracy in that country is fundamentally different from

its position in American society due to the pervasive influence of the Communist Party; the "... rôle of the party in preventing bureaucratic conflict, the influence of ideology in providing universal goals, the representation of a wide range of functional and expert opinion, and the diversity of channels of access to the decision-making process all serve to undermine the applicability of Allison's models."⁶⁷

Wallace has even suggested that Allison's models are not relevant to West-European political systems such as that of Britain; as he writes "... Whitehall is not Washington; the open conflicts between sections of the administration which characterize bureaucratic politics in America have no exact parallel in Britain,"⁶⁸ More recently, a collection of essays⁶⁹ on foreign policy-making in West-European states examined the extent of the influence of bureaucratic politics on foreign policy and largely found it of little importance; Wallace, after examining foreign policy-making in Britain, West Germany, and France, concluded that "... in no case can the observer safely ascribe the outcome to bureaucratic politics alone,"⁷⁰ whilst Faurby, after analysing foreign policy-making in Scandinavia, noted that "... bureaucratic battles, however energetically fought, are not the main determinants of policy."⁷¹

Although, of course, without detailed case-studies it is impossible to be certain about the utility of Allison's approaches for the analysis of other types of states, it is clear that many area-specialists are doubtful as to the applicability of the models to their own fields. This is one form of the criticism which can be tested for its accuracy, but in the absence of the necessary case-studies there must remain a serious doubt over the culture-bound nature of Allison's models. As Wagner has noted, "... the political context within which American bureaucratic politics takes place is quite peculiar, and it may account for the fact that bureaucratic politics is so important in the United States. Thus, the extension of Allison's Model III to other countries may be a less straightforward enterprise than he implies."⁷²

Methodological Criticisms

Although Allison's work is overtly concerned with methodological issues — for example, his statements regarding the importance of the "conceptual-lenses" held by analysts — his work has received considerable attention from this perspective. It has been subjected to both a wide-ranging and a deep critique on methodological grounds. For all its self-conscious concern with methodology, Allison's work suffers from considerable methodological problems, which result in its utility being much reduced. Essentially there are six areas of methodological criticism made against Allison; these may be discussed in order of increasing generality.

(1) Allison's treatment of Model I

Although Allison gives substantial background to the way in which he derived the central premises of Model I — the rational actor model — he has been accused of setting up a "straw-man." It would, therefore, be argued that, by deliberately simplifying the rational-actor model, Allison makes the task of showing its deficiencies that much easier. Freedman has argued that this is a central problem in Allison's work since

... Model I is an artificial category ... it does not fit any self-description of an academic "school" but has been comprised by isolating a working premise shared by scholars who are otherwise engaged in different fields and operating with disparate analytical approaches and then elevating this premise to a core methodological principle.⁷³

Holsti noted that proponents of Model I argue that Allison has not done full justice to the approach.⁷⁴ Whilst it is undoubtedly accurate to say that Allison has simplified the work of those whom he denotes as being Model I analysts, this criticism does seem to ignore the point that models, by their very nature, are simplifications of reality. Allison has, clearly, put together a strange set of bedfellows by his definition of Model I, and is guilty of setting up a simplified rational-actor approach, but this would seem, to a certain extent, to be axiomatic in model building.

(2) *The relationship between the three models*

One criticism of Allison's work that has been both widespread and, by Allison's own more recent work, justified, is that the three models are not so easily separable. At one level, it is clear that Models II and III have obvious similarities, a point recognised by Allison when, in his article with Morton Halperin, he combined them to form one alternative model to the rational-actor model — the bureaucratic politics paradigm.⁷⁵ At another level, Cornford has pointed out that the three models are based in one framework of social explanation — the rational choice paradigm. He writes that "... I do not believe that these models amount to incommensurable ways of seeing the world. It is not as though the three accounts had been written by St. Augustine, Bentham and Mao Tse Tung. They bear a strong family likeness."⁷⁶ Wagner has summed up this problem by noting that

"... an effort to develop genuine models of foreign policy decision-making would most likely lead not to further development of Allison's three models but to quite different constructs ... because Allison's models are really just efforts to summarize the main features of three different bodies of literature. But since not much of that literature was written with the intention of developing formal theory, it would have been a quite unlikely coincidence that they should each provide the basis for three clearly distinct types of explanations of foreign policy decisions."⁷⁷

(3) *The logic-politics dichotomy*

A more specific criticism of Allison's work based on the problem of distinguishing between the three models is that most forcefully stated by Freedman,⁷⁸ who argues that the seeming distinction between the three models can only be achieved by accepting what he calls the logic-politics dichotomy. According to Freedman, Allison accepts this dichotomy in that he sees Models I and III as distinct and incompatible ways of viewing decision-making. Freedman, on the other hand, wishes to argue that the two models lie at the ends of a continuum — at one end all is logic, at the other

end all is politics — and that Allison adopts a too-narrow definition of politics. Accordingly, Model I deals with cases where agreed values are involved and in which no “political” disputes occur, whilst Model III sees policy as the result of political battles over values and interests within the policy-making group. The essence of Freedman’s argument is that this narrow definition of politics misses the crucial point that what is now contentious or non-contentious may be the result of past political disputes. Thus, at any one point in time, the distinction between “political” or “logical” policy issues must not be seen as permanent; an issue may be deemed to be amenable to “logical” analysis, in the absence of conflict, only because previous “political” battles have made the “rules of the game” and have structured shared perceptions. Similarly, what is now a “political” battle may not be so in the future and will involve varying conceptions of the “national interest” which will, if successful, result in new areas of agreement and disagreement. Freedman concludes that “the structure and patterns can only be discerned by standing back from the immediate battles with a long-term rather than a short-term perspective, examining those things that the participants take for granted: the shared images, assumptions and beliefs and the ‘rules of the game.’”⁷⁹ This is an important criticism of Allison’s work, but it must be pointed out that it is only accurate to the extent that Model I analysts assume that there is no conflict in decision-making: *i.e.* it assumes that Allison’s rational-actor model treats issues as non-contentious. Although this would be a problem, it is not at all clear that Allison sees the rational actor model as applicable only to cases of non-contentious issues. Rather, Allison treats the model as a method of analysing decisions, which may involve conflict, by tracing various conceptions of goals — means relationships. Allison means by rational not that the issues are clear and non-contentious but that they can be analysed in a certain way. Freedman, however, is surely right when he argues that what may seem to be bureaucratic battles will involve various conceptions of the national interest and, therefore, that the two models are not completely separable.

(4) *The methodological status of the models*

Allison argues that the three conceptual models are alternative ways of explaining the missile crisis. However, several writers have contended that there are serious methodological deficiencies in them. Stated at its baldest, Allison has not provided models but analogies; his three perspectives do not allow the generation of predictions or hypotheses. As Ball has written, “. . . because the perspectives are not used to generate predictions of any kind, let alone incompatible predictions, they are, in Popperian terms not falsifiable.”⁸⁰ Bobrow has argued that Allison’s three perspectives are fundamentally analogies or metatheories, “. . . in other words . . . think about x (the Cuban missile crisis) as if it were a, b, or c (rational policy, organizational process, bureaucratic politics).”⁸¹ Given that we start with an analogy, Bobrow argues that there is no prediction as to what we will find, except that we expect the perspective to be helpful in understanding the issue involved. As such he argues, “. . . metatheoretical statements and results are not falsifiable. They are enlightening or unenlightening . . . one cannot

test the power of one metatheory to explain observations as compared to that of another."⁸² Choice between metatheories does not, therefore, rest on evidence but on the extent to which we find them useful: there is no basis for finding any one of the three perspectives more accurate than another. Holsti has also made this point, and argues that the models are meta-theoretical rather than theoretical since "... they tend to identify factors that need to be taken into account by the analyst. There are relatively few "if-then" propositions that link independent and dependent variables."⁸³ It must be conceded that this is a most telling objection to Allison's work since it is clear that after reading *Essence of Decision* it is difficult to determine which of the three perspectives is the most accurate; in a sense, all three are, and therein lies an obvious problem in his work.

(5) *Problems concerning the evidence*

Allied to the general problem of the nature and status of the models presented by Allison are the difficulties posed by the use of evidence in the models. At one level the relationship between the models and the evidence resembles the "haunted-house" doctrine⁸⁴; data to validate the propositions may not be available but they still "appeal" to the observer. Thus, as Ball has noted, when examining the data there is the danger of "*a posteriori* over-determination."⁸⁵ Hence, attachment to one model will always enable the observer to "find" the data to support it. Caldwell⁸⁶ has noted that Allison's bureaucratic politics model suffers from two problems with regard to the use of evidence; first, case-studies which aim to utilise the bureaucratic politics model require a quantity and quality of data that is rarely available; secondly, given that the evidence is often ambiguous, bureaucratic politics analysts run the danger of imposing their theory on the evidence rather than testing their theory against it. There is, therefore, a clear problem with the use of evidence and it should be noted that many of the earlier empirical problems with Allison's work were essentially concerned with the extent to which the data was made to fit the models.

(6) *Criticism related to the philosophy of social science*

A final area of criticism that has been made against Allison's work relates to more fundamental problems in the philosophy of social science. Miriam Steiner compares Allison's work with that of Richard Snyder, who, to a significant extent, originated the study of foreign policy decision-making in 1954. Her contention is that "... on no important theoretic front does Allison appear to advance beyond the ground Snyder and his associates covered almost twenty years ago, and their work is shot through with epistemological problems."⁸⁷ Steiner examines Allison's work from the standpoint of its treatment of individual actors' plans, purposes and commitments. She argues that Allison's explanation of foreign policy behaviour starts from the perspective of causal explanation -- with human goals and purposes deemed exogenous -- but results, by its use of bureaucratic politics, in bringing in human values "by the back door." She argues, therefore, that Allison's metaphysic, epistemology, and classification system varies throughout his analysis. In summary, she states that his work "... fails to provide the

scientific basis for even the most circumspect and contingent of prescriptions.”⁸⁸

Ernest Yanarella seeks to examine what he regards to be an area not examined in previous critiques, namely, “. . . the character of the philosophical basis of his inquiry and its relation to his methodological framework.”⁸⁹ Yanarella argues that Allison’s work is plagued by one overriding methodological problem which derives from a tension between two views of social science. On the one hand, Allison adopts a revisionist position with regard to explanation in that he attempts to explain events in terms of how what happened was appropriate.⁹⁰ On the other hand, Allison is explicitly aligned with the Hempelian school of explanation – the Deductive-Nomological form.⁹¹ Yanarella concludes that Allison’s work typifies much of modern foreign policy analysis, but is nevertheless inconsistent with regards to his use of models of explanation. In so far as Allison wavers between the contextual and the deductive forms of explanation, Yanarella argues, “. . . the equivocation of Allison is to a large extent the equivocation of contemporary behavioural foreign policy inquiry writ large.”⁹²

Conclusion

Although this summary of critiques of Allison’s work on the Cuban missile crisis did not deal in detail with the various areas of criticism, it is clear from the above that there are serious problems with his approach. Despite the clear concern with problems of methodology that runs throughout *Essence of Decision*, Allison’s approach does seem to contain significant problems. On an empirical level, there are serious doubts regarding his portrayal of the U.S. political system and of his treatment of events in the missile crisis. On a normative level, Allison has been attacked for removing responsibility in the U.S. political system. On an epistemological level, Allison has been criticised for presenting “old wine in new bottles,” for ignoring cognitive factors, for presenting an approach that is inapplicable to other countries, and for producing “models” which contain a series of important theoretical inconsistencies and deficiencies.

The book was hailed as a seminal work and dealt with a well-documented major event in contemporary history, and yet, surprisingly, it has promoted a catalogue of criticism. On one level, Allison’s approach has serious deficiencies in its ability to explain the crisis it purports to examine. On another level, however, the work is plagued by problems that are common to many – if not all – approaches to foreign policy analysis. As such, the book represents an excellent and clear example of the kinds of problems that can be found in contemporary foreign policy analysis.

In summary, then, Allison’s analysis of the Cuban missile crisis has served as the basic text for the bureaucratic politics school in the 1970s. Moreover, by extending his work to concentrate on the policy-making process of the United States, Allison has bridged the gap between the study and the practice of foreign policy-making. However, despite these achievements, the case-study on which the school of thought is based is flawed in a number of areas. Although, many of these flaws relate to his interpretation of the missile crisis, they are more fundamental in that they seriously undermine the

foundations on which Allison builds the bureaucratic politics approach; as such, the evidence for the explanatory power of Models II and III is significantly weakened.

Despite these criticisms, however, Allison's work has been of truly seminal importance in that it has aided the search for more applicable, cumulative, and methodologically self-conscious approaches to foreign policy analysis. The fact that the "near-sacred" text has a catalogue of deficiencies does not remove the explanatory power of the approach *per se*, and possibly the main reasons for the continued popularity of the approach can be derived from the original reasons for its development (as noted in the quote from Gray at the start of this paper), and the fact that the criticisms of it have been developed in a piecemeal manner over a long period of time. Perhaps, by locating the main criticisms of the approach in one source, this paper will provide the stimulus for a long overdue examination both of the deficiencies of the bureaucratic politics model in its wider usage, and of its continued popularity in the face of what must be accepted as a damning set of criticisms.

*Steve Smith is a Lecturer in the School of Economics
and Social Studies at the University of East Anglia.*

REFERENCES

* This study was originally undertaken for a chapter of M. Clarke and B. White (eds.), *Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis* (Ormskirk: Hesketh, forthcoming). An earlier and shorter version appears therein.

1. Colin Gray, *The Soviet-American Arms Race* (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1976), p. 28.

2. See M. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings, 1974); M. Halperin and A. Kanter, "Introduction" in their, *Readings in American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), pp. 1-42; M. Halperin, "Why Bureaucrats Play Games," *Foreign Policy* (No. 2, 1971), pp. 70-90; M. Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM," *World Politics* (Vol. 25, 1972), pp. 62-95; and his article with Graham Allison - G. Allison and M. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in R. Tanter and R. Ullman (eds.), *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 40-79.

3. I. M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972).

4. J. Steinbrunner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974).

5. R. Gallucci, *Neither Peace Nor Honor* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1975).

6. J. Spanier and E. Uslaner, *How American Foreign Policy is Made* (New York: Praeger, 1974).

7. See G. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review* (Vol. 63, 1969), pp. 689-718; and, G. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971).

8. See G. Allison, "Questions About the Arms Race: Who's Racing Whom? A Bureaucratic Perspective," in R. Pfaltzgraff (ed.), *Contending Approaches to Arms Control* (Lexington, Ma: Lexington, 1974), pp. 31-72; G. Allison, "Implementation Analysis: 'The Middling Chapter' in Conventional Analysis. A Teaching Exercise," in R. Zeckhauser *et al.*, *Aldine Cost Benefit Annual* (Chicago: Aldine, 1975), pp. 361-391; G. Allison, "Military Capabilities and American Foreign Policy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Vol. 406, 1973), pp. 17-37; G. Allison and F. Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control: Exploring Determinants of Military Weapons," *Daedalus* (Vol. 104, 1975), pp. 99-130; G. Allison and P. Szanton, *Remaking Foreign Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

9. See G. Allison and M. Halperin *op. cit.*
10. See Barton J. Bernstein, "The Week We Almost Went To War," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Vol. 32, February 1976), p. 17.
11. J. Cornford, "The Illusion of Decision," *British Journal of Political Science* (Vol. 4, 1974), p. 234.
12. H. Simon, *Administrative Behaviour: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization* (New York: Free Press, 1947).
13. J. March and H. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: J. Wiley, 1958).
14. R. Cyert and J. March, *A Behavioural Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961).
15. W. Wagner, "Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives on International Relations," *International Organization* (Vol. 28, 1974), p. 450.
16. A. Horelick, A. Johnson and J. Sleisbruner, *The Study of Soviet Foreign-Policy: Decision-Theory-Related Approaches* (Sage Publications, 1975), p. 55.
17. D. Ball, "The Blind Men and the Elephant," *Australian Outlook* (Vol. 28, 1974), p. 71.
18. R. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy," *Policy Sciences* (Vol. 4, 1973), pp. 469-472.
19. J. Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 233.
20. See Allison, *Essence of Decision, op. cit.* For a discussion of the origins of Model II, and the debt to, *inter alia*, Simon, March and Simon, and Cyert and March, see pp. 69-78. For Model III's debt to Schilling, Huntingdon, Neustadt, and Hilsman, see pp. 147-162.
21. J. Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 234.
22. See Allison, *Essence of Decision, op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.
23. *Ibid.* p. 142.
24. D. Hafner, "Bureaucratic Politics and 'Those Frigging Missiles': JFK, Cuba and U.S. Missiles in Turkey," *Orbis* (Vol. 21, 1977), pp. 307-333.
25. *Ibid.* pp. 312-314.
26. B. J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey," *Political Science Quarterly* (Vol. 95, Spring 1980), pp. 97-125.
27. *Ibid.* pp. 104-123.
28. *Ibid.* p. 103.
29. *Ibid.* see his footnote 24.
30. See Allison, *Essence of Decision, op. cit.*, pp. 129-132.
31. Sorenson, quoted *ibid.*, p. 129.
32. P. Williams, *Crisis Management* (London: Martin Robertson, 1976), pp. 128-129.
33. *Ibid.*
34. D. Caldwell, "A Research Note on the Quarantine of Cuba," *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 22, 1978), pp. 625-633.
35. Allison, *Essence of Decision, op. cit.*, p. 107.
36. S. Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important? (or Allison Wonderland)," *Foreign Policy*, No. 7, 1972, pp. 172-174.
37. Allison, *Essence of Decision, op. cit.*, p. 107.
38. D. Ball, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
40. See R. Art, *op. cit.*, pp. 472-473; D. Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 77; S. Krasner, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-167.
41. D. Ball, *ibid.* p. 77.
42. For a discussion of this, see *ibid.* p. 71 and Krasner, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.
43. R. Art, *op. cit.*, p. 473.
44. See R. Art, *ibid.* pp. 477-480; D. Ball, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-82; Krasner, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-169; W. Kohl, "The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and U.S.-European Relations," *World Politics* (Vol. 27, 1975), pp. 2-3; J. Spanier and E. Uslander, *How American Foreign Policy is Made* (New York: Praeger, 1974) pp. 103-131; R. Steel "Cooling It," *New York Review of Books* (19th October, 1972), pp. 43-46.
45. S. Krasner, *op. cit.*, p. 169.
46. R. Steel, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
47. D. Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
48. *Ibid.*
49. G. Allison, *Essence of Decision, op. cit.*, pp. 185-210.
50. A. Perlmutter, "The Presidential Political Center and Foreign Policy," *World Politics* (Vol. 27, 1974), p. 97.

51. T. Coulombis and J. Wolfe, *Introduction to International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978), Chap. 7.
52. R. Steel, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
53. S. Krasner, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-161.
54. R. Art, *op. cit.*, p. 486; D. Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 92; S. Krasner, *op. cit.*, p. 179; R. Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 24-28.
55. R. Art, *op. cit.*, p. 486.
56. For a critique along these lines, applied to the pluralist view of decision-making, see P. Bachrach and M. Baratz, "Decisions and Non-Decisions," *American Political Science Review* (Vol. 67, 1963), pp. 632-642.
57. S. Krasner, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
58. R. Jervis, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
59. D. Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
60. See, for example, *Essence of Decision*, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-263.
61. C. Hill, "Theories of Foreign Policy Making for the Developing Countries," in C. Clapham (ed), *Foreign Policy Making in Developing States* (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1978), p. 2.
62. J. S. Migdal, "International Structure and External Behaviour," *International Relations* (1974), p. 519.
63. M. Brenner, "Bureaucratic Politics in Foreign Policy," *Armed Forces and Society* (Vol. 2, 1976), p. 332.
64. C. Gray, "How Does the Nuclear Arms Race Work?," *Co-operation and Conflict* (Vol. 9, 1974), p. 290.
65. H. Weil, "Can Bureaucracies be Rational Actors?," *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 19, 1975), p. 414.
66. A. Horelick *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42; K. Dawisha, "The Limits of the Bureaucratic Politics Model: Observations on the Soviet Case," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Vol. XIII, 1980); M. Light, "Approaches to the Study of Soviet Foreign Policy," paper presented to *National Association for Soviet and East European Studies* (Amrol Conference, 1980), pp. 14-19; C. Gray *The Soviet American Arms Race*, *op. cit.* p. 30.
67. K. Dawisha, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
68. W. Wallace, *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1975), p. 9.
69. W. Wallace and W. Paterson (eds.), *Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe* (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1978).
70. *Ibid.* p. 48.
71. *Ibid.* p. 124.
72. R. Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 451.
73. L. Freedman, "Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes," *International Affairs* (Vol. 52, 1976), pp. 435-436.
74. O. Holsti, "Review of Essence of Decision," *Western Political Quarterly* (Vol. 25, 1972), p. 138.
75. See G. Allison and M. Halperin, *op. cit.*
76. J. Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 242.
77. R. Wagner, *op. cit.*, p. 451.
78. L. Freedman, *op. cit.*
79. *Ibid.* p. 449.
80. D. Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 88.
81. D. Bobrow, *International Relations: New Approaches* (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 41.
82. D. Bobrow, "The relevance potential of different products," in R. Tanter and R. Vilman (eds), *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 206.
83. O. Holsti, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
84. See L. Bloomfield, *The Foreign Policy Process* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974), p. 26 and footnote 17 on p. 51 for an explanation of this.
85. D. Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 88.
86. D. Caldwell, "Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making," *American Behavioural Scientist* (Vol. 21, 1977), pp. 99-100.
87. M. Steiner, "The Elusive Essence of Decision," *International Studies Quarterly* (Vol. 21, 1977), pp. 189-190.

88. *Ibid.* p. 421.
89. E. Yanarella, " 'Reconstructed Logic' and 'Logic-in-use' in Decision-Making Analysis: Graham Allison," *Policy* (Vol. 8, 1975), p. 158.
90. *Ibid.* pp. 162-164.
91. *Ibid.* pp. 164-167.
92. *Ibid.* p. 172.

Forthcoming Book

PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1980 MILLENNIUM CONFERENCE
"Detente, Arms Control and the NATO Alliance"

Contributions by:

Desmond Ball
Richard Burt
Colin S. Gray
Pierre Hassner

Lawrence Freedman
Uwe Nerlich
Lothar Ruehl
Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Philip Windsor
and others

To be published Spring 1981 by Croom Helm Publishers