Where is the Threat Today?
Today, the fundamental debate on terrorism is whether the “leaderless jihad” has replaced a more organizationally structured terrorist model. Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman represent the opposing views and two of the readings present their perspectives. While each of you need to make your own determination on the valid of models, I would personally offer that each makes valid points while falling short on others.
Organizational structure does remain relevant in the development and maturation of a terrorist organization. Notwithstanding, what is meant by “organizational structure” is more ambiguous in a world linked via technology. A disenfranchised Muslim youth in Minneapolis, Minnesota may become increasingly radicalized via web-based interactions that bring real and imagined atrocities to his computer screen. However, what it takes for that individual to move from radicalization to violent action remains less clear. In many cases, the catalyst to violence requires some physical interaction, perhaps through a radical imam at a mosque or more simply with others who share similar views on the soccer field. Following are some real world examples surrounding radicalization and violent action.
- The bombing on the Madrid transit system in 2004 was carried out by a group of men who were inspired via an Al Qaeda website but without direct Al Qaeda support. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/spain/article/0,,2202367,00.html)
- In 2006, second generation middle class Canadians in their late teens early 20s and from secular households were arrested for planning large scale attacks in Toronto & Ottawa. The group who formed a high school group known as Religious Awareness Group also connected via on-line forums. Prior to their arrest, they purchased bomb making materials, reached out the Irahbi007 who directed them to websites for bomb making. They also connected with militants in Bosnia, Britain, Denmark, Sweden Atlanta and actively planned attacks.
These examples are the basis for Sageman’s theory of belonging globally and acting locally (Sageman ’08) In summation, Sageman contends that victory is not achievable by decapitating Al Qaeda because it is not a organization but a social network and threat is not a revived al Qaeda in the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AF-PAK) region but the homegrown Muslims living in the West who are inspired by Al Qaeda. “Homegrown wannabes” are the most dangerous, frightening, and unpredictable. They are self-recruited leaderless thrill seekers connected via cyberspace. (Sageman ’08) Judging from this description, their commitment is based on personal fulfillment issues such as belonging to a group that offers them individual significance rather than commitment to a cause.
Hoffman counters by citing the consistent message in the National Intelligence Estimates which continue to identify Al Qaeda as a “serious threat” to the United States and that it has been able to regenerate its leadership and rank and file in Pakistan. (see the National Intelligence Estimates 2007 & 2009) Further proving his point, Hoffman references 30 plots in the United Kingdom that are linked back to Al Qaeda. His contention is that Al Qaeda must continue to move forward and thus has developed a survival capacity that reflects the resilience and resonance of ideology.
The key lesson of the debate is that the terrorist threat is multi-faceted and constantly evolving. Terrorists and terrorist groups are learning organizations that integrate new tactics and technologies to allow them to recruit, radicalize, and execute attacks. The challenge facing counter-terrorist experts is understanding the variety of forms of terrorism and adapting as quickly as the enemy adapts.